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Abstract 
This thesis seeks to analyze the ways in which refugee assistance organizations operate and 
develop their operational strategies in light of a changing work landscape. Moreover, it 
contextualizes these strategies within the greater context of the organizational field (conceived of 
as the range of resource flows and political opportunities which come together to shape the 
organizational structures and methods of operation in an NGO field) in order to develop an 
understanding of how state and international institutions influence the actions and decisions of 
NGOs. Using the community of NGOs providing assistance to refugees and migrants in Serbia 
between 2016 and 2017, the work puts forth several conclusions. First, it identifies four distinct 
patterns of organizational structure within the case study. Second, it argues that the organizational 
field presents certain incentives which mediate organizational activity. This is observed in 
particular through the tendency of organizations to professionalize in response to dynamics 
surrounding funding opportunities and access to camps. Finally, this thesis ties the moderating 
characteristics of the organizational field to a rationality of governance that strategically utilizes 
NGO-work to accomplish goals. Through the soft mechanisms of organizational influence a 
dynamic is produced wherein NGOs function not only as subjects of governance but also as 
participants of governance. Importantly, this field of influence is both enabled and constrained by 
powerful institutions; it has finite boundaries of control against which it is possible for 
organizations to navigate and push back.  
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Introduction 
For many refugees and migrants in Serbia during the winter of 2016-2017, their time in the 
country was one of stagnation. Although not subject to the aggression and violence that defined 
the experience of many refugees in neighboring Bulgaria and Hungary, refugees and migrants 
within Serbia have become increasingly vulnerable as a result of their inability to either return 
home or progress towards Western Europe.1 In the face of poorly-defined legal statuses, many 
described feeling a loss of control in their lives, which they experience within the context of 
poverty and social exclusion in their host communities. Their pervasive boredom, and the inability 
to progress towards their intended destinations, each became significant contributors to the 
deteriorating mental health of many.2 
During the winter of 2017 in Belgrade, the health conditions of the refugees and migrants 
living in squats were thrust into serious uncertainty as they faced particularly harsh weather 
without adequate supplies. Foremost amongst these was an abandoned factory complex in 
downtown Belgrade, colloquially known as the Barracks, which housed around 1,500 residents 
during the coldest months of 2017. In these informal camps, the residents faced persistent problems 
with scabies, frostbite, body lice, and skin infections. (Gardos, 2017) While those staying in the 
government’s reception and asylum centers experienced a higher degree of safety and security, 
many were afraid that staying in these state-run camps would compromise their ability to continue 
towards their intended destination countries. Although the majority of those staying in the official 
camps and squats did not plan to stay in Serbia permanently, data shows a growing number who 
                                               
1 Although hundreds of thousands have passed through Serbia on the way to Western Europe, the UNHCR estimates 
the number of refugees in Serbia at around 7,400, of which most are living in one of the 16 official asylum centers in 
the country or residing in short-term and often vulnerable living arrangements (“Serbian Centres”, 2017). 
2 In addition to my own observations, this sentiment among refugees has been recorded in a variety of refugee camps 
in Serbia, Greece, and the FYROM. For more information one might look to In the Loop’s Special Edition #35 entitled 
Refugee Voices on Integration.   
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have decided to embark on the path towards long term integration. (James, 2017) The number 
remains small for the moment, but as border controls intensify, it is likely that more may begin to 
opt for long term integration despite the weaker economic prospects that Serbia holds, in 
comparison to finding a new life within the EU.  
The situation continues to evolve rapidly. However, an uncomfortable dynamic has been 
created as the European Union refuses refugees and migrants at Serbia’s EU borders, while 
simultaneously providing a well of funding to assist them while they stay in Serbia. This is part of 
a broader shift towards an external border policy meant to export, or at least offset, some of the 
perceived burden of migration away from the EU (El-Anany, 2013; Attina, 2016).  Within this 
context, a diverse community of groups that ranges from UN bodies to large international 
organizations such as Médecins Sans Frontières to smaller non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) such as Refugee Aid Miksalište are currently engaged in assisting these refugees and 
migrants.  
As migration becomes an increasingly present fixture in public and political debates 
throughout the world, it is essential to critically analyze the institutions that are engaging with the 
movement of people towards more stable and developed regions. This thesis sheds light on how 
refugee assistance organizations manage and develop their operational strategies in light of an 
evolving work landscape. Moreover, it develops an understanding of how state and international 
institutions exert pressure on the actions and organizational structure of NGOs. Informed by these 
issues, this thesis studies the humanitarian assistance provided to refugees and migrants by NGOs 
in Serbia in the period between June 2016 and June 2017.  
This is an important area of research not only because there has been relatively little 
scholarship done on the impact of the migration crisis on the behavior of NGOs, but also because 
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it informs the broader discussion on the strategies humanitarian NGOs deploy in contentious 
environments to accomplish their goals. More broadly, it will also shed light on the overall role 
state and international institutions play in NGO work. As such, this paper explores strategies of 
solidarity, advocacy, institutional engagement, and direct assistance in the realm of NGO work in 
Serbia’s place in the refugee crisis. I have conducted the bulk of this research through semi-
structured, face-to-face interviews with more than twenty figures from the community of NGOs 
that are providing assistance to refugees and migrants in Serbia. This data is supplemented by a 
comprehensive analysis of media reports, NGO publications, social media posts, field 
observations, and UNHCR briefings which help construct a thorough understanding of the case 
study.  
 The first chapter provides an overview of the literature relating to NGO work in the field 
of migration. I begin by outlining the definitions and terms important to this field. Next, I provide 
an overview of the current literature on the relationship of NGOs and IGOs as it relates to migration 
and refugee assistance. Finally I highlight existing frameworks for understanding the goals and 
organizational strategies of migration NGOs, and suggest a methodology for analyzing the NGOs 
in my case study which is reminiscent of Henry’s (2011) work on the environmental NGO-field in 
Russia. 
 The second chapter details the progression of the refugee and migrant situation in Serbia. 
First, I review key developments that emerged in Serbia prior to March, 2016. Then, I provide an 
in-depth overview of the refugee crisis in Serbia between March, 2016 and May, 2017. In 
particular, I identify three important events in this time period which significantly altered the 
situation of refugees and migrants around Belgrade by affecting the assistance which they were 
provided. These were the border closures of March, 2016, the Open Letter of November 2016, and 
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finally, the demolition of the Belgrade Barracks in May, 2017. 
The third and fourth chapters cover the presentation and analysis of my data. In the third 
chapter, I argue that there are four distinct patterns of organizational structure that exist within the 
community of NGOs providing assistance to refugees and migrants in Serbia. These ideal 
organization types are referred to as independent organizations, international organizations, 
institutional domestic organizations, and non-institutional domestic organizations. These four 
categories provide a way of characterizing the general management structure and project focus of 
organizations. It is recognized, however, that within these ideal types, organizational activities 
vary widely. I use in-depth case organizations to both demonstrate this variety and to highlight the 
underlying characteristic of each group. Then, in the fourth chapter, I overview the institutional 
pressures at play within my case study. Specifically, I detail how the organizational field presents 
certain institutional factors that mediate organizational activity. Primary among these factors is the 
field’s funding landscape as well as the interests and behavior of three groups of institutional 
actors: the Serbian state, the EU, and international institutions like the UNHCR. These groups 
influence the organizational field in a multitude of ways.  In particular, I highlight how their 
involvement provides incentives for organizations to professionalize. I how this is accomplished 
through funding opportunities and the control over camp access. 
In the final chapter, I develop some conclusions from this body of work. Specifically, I 
argue that despite the diversity of ways in which organizations mediate structural factors, the 
organizational field creates powerful incentives for NGOs to structure themselves in ways which 
help further the interests and obligations of the state. In this way, institutional pressure serves to 
reinforce the role of NGOs in humanitarian work as both objects and subjects of governance. In 
terms of the refugee crisis in Serbia, the constraints and pressures applied to refugee assistance 
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organizations work, broadly speaking, towards the interest of the Serbian state, the European 
Union, and international institutions. Refugee assistance organizations provide humanitarian 
support in cases where the state does not or cannot provide support. This relationship is blurred, 
however, in the cases of refugee assistance organizations which work in direct contention with the 
state. The local No Borders group and, to a lesser extent, solidarity groups like No Name Kitchen 
present a challenge to this relationship due to their interests in engaging in activities such as 
contentious political protests or illegal border crossings which run in direct contrast with the 
European Union’s border regime. Their avoidance of traditional funding models further insulates 
them from this influence.  
To this end, this paper contributes to the recent yet growing field of academic research on 
the work of European civil society in the assistance of refugees and migrants. Of particular 
relevance is the information this paper holds on the work of independent solidarity organizations 
in Serbia. These organizations, primarily staffed by young volunteers, have played a constant role 
in the provision of humanitarian assistance to refugees and migrants in Europe over the last decade. 
Faced with the increased securitization of asylum and migration in developed countries around the 
world, it will be necessary to expand our understanding of the effects that these sorts of 
organizations have as agents of assistance as well as change.    
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 Figure 1. Graffiti, sprayed by a local solidarity group, on the wall of a Belgrade building 
(Sapoch, 2017) 
 
I - Literature Review 
Given that the this paper analyzes how refugee assistance organizations manage and 
develop their operational strategies, it is important to first contextualize this analysis within the 
existing academic literature on refugee assistance organizations and the concurrent roles played 
by host states and donor entities. This previous research provides important insight into how NGOs 
organize themselves in relation to institutional influences. In the following chapter, I will present 
a brief overview of the terminology that I have elected to use for this paper before providing an 
overview of several key debates which allow me to contextualize my analysis.  
Previous attempts to categorize and delineate the patterns of organizational structure that 
exist within communities of NGOs provide a useful point of reference for this research. In 
 
EUROPE’S OUTSOURCED REFUGEES      Sapoch, 11 
particular, I review the work of Laura Henry (2011) in which she taxonomizes environmental 
NGOs in Russia. Following this, I utilize the work of scholars such as Duda (2017) and Milan & 
Pirro (2018) who are active in the field of NGO work in the European refugee crisis to provide 
added context. This previous scholarship provides a practical framework to analyze refugee 
assistance work by NGOs in Serbia.  
Of additional importance is the academic discussion concerning the relationship between 
NGOs and the state. Previous authors highlight the symbiosis that has emerged between 
humanitarian NGOs and the state, paying particular attention to the role that these organizations 
play in the greater state objectives of developmental assistance and security. Overall, many observe 
the levels of interdependency that characterizes the work of NGOs and governing institutions in 
recent time. To this end, the work of Sending and Neumann (2006) on the role that NGOs play in 
governance is of great value. They develop a rationality of government in which “political power 
operates through rather than on civil society. Governing is performed through autonomous 
subjects, not on passive objects” (669). In this section I will outline the practical implications 
which authors observe arising from this interdependence of these actors in general before 
unpacking writing specific to the case of refugee assistance. Finally, I analyze the previous work 
on the effect of governance and institutional norms on NGO activity. In particular, I highlight two 
relevant themes from this wider discussion: the effect of funding on humanitarian NGOs and the 
effect of state controlled access to refugee camps. 
Definitions 
Defining NGOs  
This paper explores the broader dynamics of civil society. Accordingly, it is important to 
first delineate and define the specific terms I will use. Civil society can be described as all 
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associations and networks between the household and the state (and international institutions) “in 
which membership and activities are ‘voluntary’ – formally registered NGOs of many different 
kinds, labor unions, political parties, churches and other religious groups, professional and 
business associations, community and self-help groups, social movements and independent media” 
(Edwards 2009, p. 20).3 Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) are organizations, 
“characterized primarily by humanitarianism4 or cooperation, rather than commercial objectives, 
that pursue activities to relieve suffering, promote the interests of the poor, protect the 
environment, provide basic social services, or undertake community development” among other 
things (World Bank 1989). Unlike sports clubs, professional organizations or neighborhood 
associations, NGOs are almost always problem-oriented. Also, unlike voluntary organizations, 
NGOs usually hire professional staff and do not just rely on membership fees. Thus, an average 
NGO might define their constituencies more broadly than membership organizations (Fisher 
1998). 
In her work on civil society and environmental movements in Russia, Laura Henry argues 
that upholding the “...distinctions between social movements, interest groups, NGOs and political 
parties is often untenable…” and adopts a broader classification of social movement organizations 
(SMOs)5  for the organizations she studies.  While I agree with Henry’s argument, I choose not to 
                                               
3 This is slightly more elaborate than other definitions where civil society is viewed primarily as a mechanism to 
empower democratization and development efforts and is simply defined as “the voluntary associational realm that 
lies between the family and the state and is autonomous from the state.” (Ottaway and Chung, 1999; 106) 
4 I conceive of humanitarianism, in part, as “an array of particular embodied, situated practices emanating from the 
humanitarian desire to alleviate suffering of others”. (Redfield, 2005, p. 330) This withstanding, I also agree with 
the argument posed by Fassin (2007) that “critical thinking can and must emerge from within the analysis of these 
practices and this desire.” (p. 202) In other words, while the desire to alleviate the suffering of others, within the 
context of humanitarianism, is often relegated to assistance during times of crisis, long-lasting efforts to alter the 
paradigm of suffering must also be considered a mandate of humanitarian activity.    
5 Henry (2011) uses the term social movement organization to refer to a wide swath of self-organizing, non-
governmental, and not-for-profit groups.  
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adopt her classificatory scheme, for two reasons. First, the term NGO in Serbia is widely 
established and understood whereas SMO is not (Grødeland, 2006). By relying on NGO, I avoid 
bringing undue complexity to my cross-cultural communication. Additionally, various authors 
argue that some NGOs are actively dissuaded from participating in contentious social movements 
by donors and other external factors (Waal & Omaar, 1994; Reiff, 1999; Manji & O'Coill, 2002). 
Should this be the case, it seems disingenuous to extend the title of SMO to organizations who 
shirk engagement in social movements. Nonetheless, I remain cognizant of Henry’s (2011) point 
that it is important to keep an open mind as to what, exactly, constitutes an organization. To this 
end, for the purpose of my paper, I extend the definition of NGO to organizations without dedicated 
payrolls or employees, a distinction others might omit. (World Bank 1989)  
At a narrower level, it is also important to identify and define the different types of 
organizations which fall under the purview of “non-governmental” in my case study. Some authors 
tend to make a heavy distinction between traditional humanitarian organizations and more 
politicized human rights organizations (Chandler, 2001).  The most common distinction between 
these two types of organizations is that between service-provision and human-rights advocacy. On 
the one hand, humanitarian NGOs are seen as service-providers of desperately needed goods or 
services to vulnerable populations, in ways meant to help ease the distress of these populations. 
Some authors even use the term “relief” or “disaster-relief” organization as interchangeable with 
humanitarian organization. (Waal & Omaar, 1994; Chandler, 2001; Duda, 2017) Humanitarian aid 
also tends to imply assistance in the short term; it is viewed as crisis assistance meant to be 
controlled and contained. Human-rights NGOs, on the other hand, typically entertain a much wider 
call to action within their popular conception. Human-rights organizations such as Human Rights 
Watch, Amnesty International, or the Children’s Defense Fund are more activist-based, 
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continually advocating in situations where their mandate allows. Their typical focus is 
accountability, advocacy, information-gathering, and policy-influencing which entitles them to a 
certain universality that humanitarian organizations may not enjoy; they can be active anywhere 
in the world where human-rights are being abrogated.  
In general, the distinction between human-rights NGOs and humanitarian NGOs is 
problematic as it allows for the faulty assumption that humanitarian disasters are short term crises 
that can be addressed in a relatively limited timeframe by outside actors who might soon move on 
to other crises. Many within the literature have pointed to this fallacy and advocate for a mediated 
approach which seeks to address causal mechanisms that can underlie humanitarian emergencies. 
This is an important argument which will feature broadly throughout this paper.  
There are different levels of organization that can be observed when looking at various 
NGOs. The most organized organizations tend to be established, large, international NGOs which 
often have offices in multiple locations, and in addition to their field work, are also grantors to 
smaller NGOs (Autesserre, 2011). In the middle are established, domestic NGOs which also tend 
to focus their activities at the national level. They may or may not receive funding from state or 
international donors. Finally, there are the younger, more specialized organizations that tend to be 
organized around a specific task or purpose and operate predominantly at the local level. The 
majority of the existing literature tends to focus on the political, transnational, and organizational 
operations of NGOs which work at the national and international level, due to their comparatively 
higher exposure and accessibility. Nonetheless, there is small, yet important body of work which 
explores the work of grassroots, local-level organizations (Panda 2007; Spires, 2011; Duda; 2017).   
Of particular interest in the application of assistance to refugees and migrants on the Balkan 
route is the emergence of what Duda (2017) has dubbed “non-governmental, non-professional 
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humanitarian aid.” These non-professional, non-governmental aid organizations are most often 
spontaneous and self-organized which marks a drastic departure, in many ways, from the sorts of 
organizations normally active in such situations. Spontaneous, solidarity mobilizations, such as 
the No Borders6 collective represent a new way of providing assistance to refugees and migrants. 
As Cantat (2013) argues, these sorts of groups are particularly present within the European 
migration landscape where they were created “specifically to address issues engendered by the 
Europeanisation of migration frameworks” (p. 16).    
It should be noted that there is an historical precedent for these non-professional, non-
governmental aid organizations. Omaar & de Waal (1994) point to the existence of local solidarity 
organization in East Africa during the 1990s, such as the Eritrean Relief Organization and Relief 
Society of Tigray. They dub these organizations “community-implemented relief organizations”. 
The relevance of these sorts of organizations to my Serbian case study is dubious, however, due 
to the fact that they were typically organized around lines of ethnic solidarity. All the same, their 
identity as non-professional, grassroots NGOs provides an interesting framework for 
understanding how these sort of organizations function. Omaar & de Waal (1994) additionally 
identify the Bosnian War as an effective turning point in the structuring of humanitarian NGOs as 
it saw the widespread emergence of a new breed of NGOs in Bosnia created specifically in 
response to the disasters there.  
The impact of these new organizations in the current refugee crisis is yet untested although 
Duda (2017) is developing an interesting set of research on the matter. Nonetheless, the possibility 
                                               
6 No Borders is as much a decentralized, transnational movement as it is a collective of people interested in the 
assistance of refugees and migrants. “Many No Border activists consider ‘No Border’ as a label that can be claimed 
by anyone subscribing to such politics, which tacitly implies a strong anarchist affiliation” (Cantat, 2013, p. 27). In 
addition to Calais, No Borders affiliates have been active throughout Germany, Greece, and Serbia over the past 
several years engaged in contentious forms of solidarity and refugee assistance.  
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of their effect is interesting when the organizational approach to activism, developed by Laura 
Henry (2010), is considered. She writes that “grievance identification, resource flows, political 
access and issue framing are not independent factors but rather interrelated and often mutually 
reinforcing” (p. 7).  To this end, she argues for a “nuanced perspective on the role of resources in 
supporting activism, highlighting the fact that monetary and nonmonetary resources are 
inextricably tied to particular cultures of activism.”  (Henry, 2010, p. 7) In other words, the 
resources and political access afforded to an organization is closely tied and interrelated with the 
ideology and workplace culture associated with a given NGO.  Thus, where an NGO gets its money 
from, how the money is used, where the NGO works, who it works with, and who works for it all 
depend, in part, on the distinct culture and ideology behind the group. To this end, analyzing the 
effect of non-professional NGOs on the refugee situation in Serbia will contribute valuable 
information to our understanding of how NGOs work.  
This directly relates to Henry’s concept of the “organizational field” which seeks to 
contextualize the environment and opportunities that define NGOs. An understanding of this term 
will be an important tool with which to analyze the dynamics affecting NGOs in Serbia. The 
organizational field, as Henry (2010) conceives it, is the range of grievances, resource flows, 
political opportunities, and cultural framings which come together to shape the particular context 
of NGO work. Subsequently, this field is shaped by leadership’s perceptions and preferences and 
is then moderated by a limited number of organizational forms (Henry, 2010, p. 27). The overall 
importance of this concept lies in the way that the organizational field mediates and informs the 
habits of a given NGO. Henry remarks that within a context  
“Of scarce resources, organizations are likely to seek funders with a similar view of the 
problems they address and to develop dependencies on critical funders. Grievances matter 
for social mobilization because they stimulate different constituencies, activating the ideas, 
tactics, and resources of certain groups and not others. Therefore, it is the source, not just 
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the level, of critical resources that shape social organizations’ development. Dependent 
organizations will try to manage these relationships in order to achieve beneficial terms, 
but they cannot avoid being profoundly shaped by the organization field.” (2010, p. 234) 
It is important to take several things away from this concept. In short, the dissemination of the 
organizational field creates particular cultures and fields of activism which in turn mediates the 
action of NGOs. This understanding counters the claim that resource dependence is a corrupting 
factor on the effectiveness of NGOs by assuming that particular organizations will naturally 
engage themselves with actors which accommodate or further their goals. To this end, the notion 
that “resource dependence does not necessarily pose a problem for organizations, in fact, it is 
inevitable” can perhaps be seen as mediated by the concept that “an erratic or unreliable stream of 
resources from key actors can threaten organizational survival” (Henry, 2010, p. 234). 
That being said, the pressure to demonstrate legitimacy within an organizational field can 
be high, given the control over grant projects and camp access which institutional actors may 
possess.  In response to these pressures, many NGOs develop structures and behaviors to respond 
to and fend off claims of illegitimacy. As Ron (1997) suggests, “over time, organizations learn 
what types of response to audits are legitimate and what types of external structure they should 
adopt to maintain the proper aura of respectability” (p. 277).  
This is an important point as it underscores the soft, implicit power that an organizational 
field can exert. In a period of flux, this power can be witnessed in full as changing dynamics of 
control and funding incentivize organizations to reorder their activities. Ron writes that “as the 
environment changes, some forms of behavior become stigmatized while others become 
acceptable. Actors seeking to boost their reputations will want to reflect the new criteria for 
evaluation, even if they do not believe in the substantive value of the new symbols themselves” 
(Ron, 1997, p. 279). Importantly, as Ann Swidler (1995) writes, "what governs action in this case 
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is not individuals' internalized beliefs, but their knowledge of what meanings their actions have 
for others” (p. 8). 
 
Labels in the “Refugee Crisis” 
Categorizing people within the refugee crisis is difficult as it requires navigating what are 
often conflicting political, personal, and legal interests. This is particularly true in Serbia. 
Nonetheless, it is important to clarify my understanding of these terms as they relate to migration 
and migration work specifically. With this in mind, I choose a more generalized term - “refugees 
and migrants” - to account for the difficulties associated with distinguishing identities in transit 
situations. Similar to Arsenijević et. al. (2017), I use the term to refer, in general, to the refugees 
and migrants now in Serbia or formerly in transit along the Western Balkan migration route.  
 To refer to certain people as “asylum seekers” in Serbia and others as “refugees and 
migrants”, solely on the basis of their declared intent to seek asylum in Serbia, is flawed. The work 
of Lukić (2016), as well as data from the UNHCR, has shown that the vast majority of those who 
have declared asylum in Serbia have subsequently left the country for other sites of refuge, 
predominantly Western Europe. Likewise, the term “refugee” is ill-equipped in its common 
understanding to describe those moving along the Balkan route given the highly discrepant and 
political nature in which countries grant refugee status. While those fleeing violence in Syria and 
Iraq are afforded widespread recognition as refugees by European countries, those fleeing similar 
violence or persecution in Afghanistan or Pakistan are not considered refugees in many countries 
(Shea, 2017). Finally, the use of the term migrant and its ensuing descriptive iterations 
(undocumented, legal, economic or forced) is muddled by the term’s inconsistent use in political 
rhetoric. “Economic migrant”, in particular, is a term often used to deride the eligibility of a 
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person-in-transit’s right to integrate or their right to asylum. Furthermore, the use of the term is 
complicated by the entwined nature of economic, political, and oppressive migration motivations, 
particularly within the context of the lasting effects of aggressive Western foreign policy actions 
abroad (Qazi, 2017).  Although far from perfect in its designation of the myriad groups of people 
in transit along the Balkan route, the blanket term “refugees and migrants” allows me to avoid 
much of the confusion and misidentification that is attached to a single legal term to qualify this 
population.   
 
Framework for Analysis 
This paper looks across different types of organizations as they deal with coordinating and 
managing issues with diverse requirements. This being the case, it is of use to delineate how 
organizations may differ in their structural, organization, or ideological approaches. To this end, 
Laura Henry’s (2011) proposition that all social organizations attempt to achieve three general 
goals is useful to envision. First, organizations attempt to find the resources needed to sustain the 
organization. These are their internal goals. Second, organizations will attempt to institute more 
favorable state policies on the particular issues which concern their mission. These are their 
substantive goals. Finally, organizations attempt to create a political and social environment more 
suitable to the future activities of their organization. These can be thought of as their 
transformational goals (Henry, 2011, p. 7).  
This paper will also look at the ways in which professional and grassroots approaches are 
deployed within the NGO field. As argued by Marquez (2016), understanding the organizational 
approaches puts us in a better position to predict the different functional outcomes of NGOs in the 
field. Grassroots organizations typically engage in diverse projects, their activities are directly 
 
EUROPE’S OUTSOURCED REFUGEES      Sapoch, 20 
related to the interests and needs of local populations (Henry, 2010, p. 147). Conversely 
professional organizations often reflect an affinity for lobbying and bargaining with decision-
making authorities at different platforms, obtaining support from government actors, building up 
pressures through various campaign mechanisms, and actively engaging in institutional advocacy 
activities (Panda, p. 261). They often pursue multiple goals and projects at a time, and rely heavily 
on foreign funding. Overall, they are also more likely to tackle issues of national significance and 
to communicate and cooperate with higher level government officials and transnational actors. 
Finally, they are also less likely to engage in protest or contentious forms of activism (Henry, 2010, 
p. 147). 
In terms of attaching certain organizational behaviors to different functional approaches, 
Panda (2007) posits that we may conceive of three categories of NGOs: 1) those that follow a 
purely bottom-up approach; 2) those that follow a purely top-down approach; 3) and those that 
follow a combination of both. Importantly, within those that are exclusively and partially bottom-
up oriented, Panda develops a further level of categorization to accommodate the finer 
complexities of organizational structures. Thus we might delineate between radical, conformist, 
and proactive structures. First, a radical organization is “one where NGOs basically mobilize 
people to take up the violent forms of collective action, for example, strikes, demonstrations, 
protests, etc. to meet their demands.” One example of these groups might be ideologically anti-
establishment NGOs (Panda, 2007, p. 268). Other such organizations have been identified as the 
sorts of migrant-solidarity groups, such as No Borders, which have gained prominence within the 
context of Europe’s informally squatted refugee camps (Milner, 2011). Second, are conformist 
organizations which encourage and engage people “in project activities, that is, project 
formulation, implementation and maintenance, without necessarily being anti-establishment. 
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These NGOs believe in functioning based on cooperation” (Panda, 2007, p 268). Finally, proactive 
organizations utilize  
A form of bottom-up approach that advocates prompt and sweeping action. It encourages 
people to stage protests, demonstrations, strikes, etc., but not in a violent way. Creating 
awareness is another important strategy for a proactive bottom-up approach. Awareness 
building mechanisms such as street plays, padyatras, poster/banner/postcard campaigning, 
etc. can be seen as a part of a proactive strategy. These NGOs show no hesitation to obtain 
help from government organisations, and believe in making a louder and sustained impact 
by involving people in large numbers in their activities.  (Panda, 2007, p 268) 
 
Although the differences between conformist and proactive organizations may not be initially 
clear, the distinguishing characteristic is that the former is more deeply involved in local level 
cooperation to enact local level change whereas the latter may be more engaged in local level 
cooperation to enact change at the higher level.  
These categories provide a solid framework for understanding the structures of various 
NGOs. All the same, it is important to keep in mind that, despite the appearance or rhetoric put 
forth by various NGOs, these organizations all must remain dynamic in order to survive and 
therefore must draw out their strategies accordingly. Thus, Panda stresses that it is extremely 
unlikely for an NGO to follow a completely top-down approach given the incentives to also take 
support and help from the existing people’s institutions in the areas of their operation. Conversely, 
it is similarly unlikely to function as an exclusively bottom-up organization because assistance 
from local governments become inevitable in some form or the other from time to time (Panda, 
2007, p. 273). Thus, although it is difficult to generalize NGOs on the basis of their strategy and 
approach to a tee, the framework provided by previous scholars remains useful to taxonomize 
NGOs from an organizational perspective.  
Following Henry, I will look at different independent variables which may affect an 
organization’s approaches and behavior namely their sources of funding, size, the makeup of their 
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volunteer/work force (i.e. local or international), and their organizational culture and history. Then 
as dependent variables, I will look at look at organizational strategies in terms of Henry’s (2010) 
methods for categorizing organizational pursuits. 
1) What are their strategies for pursuing internal goals?   
2) What are strategies for pursuing substantive goals?  
3) What are strategies for pursuing transformational goals?   
 
This framework for analysis will in turn help answer the sub-questions that will occur from my 
research. Are organizations that are heavily dependent on foreign money from EU, as opposed to 
the crowd-funding, for example, more likely to have top-down strategies? Are they more likely to 
offer services in a less political way as far as substantive issues, and are they likely not to look at 
transformational issues? Will they be more likely to be top-down, demobilize, or associate their 
mission in terms of security/EU alignment? If the organizations are composed of predominantly 
local people relying on local funds, will they be more concerned with internal and substantive 
goals than transformational goals? Will they be more bottom-up and less security minded? 
 
Relationship between NGOs, IGOs, and the State 
 Previous work on the relationship between states, donors and humanitarian NGOs tends to 
stress the increasing tendency for these actors to rely, or cooperate, with each other to accomplish 
their respective goals. This has been observed with particular interest in the field of migration-
assistance. Thus, it important to understand what exactly migration NGOs have to do with 
humanitarianism, developmental assistance and security through their relationship with state and 
international institutions. Additionally, in this section I will outline the practical implications 
which authors observe arising from this interdependence of these actors in general before 
unpacking writing specific to the case of refugee assistance. 
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Interdependency and the State 
In the last 30 years, many authors have noted increasing levels of interdependency in the 
relationship between humanitarian NGOs and the states that they work within. Furthermore, they 
characterize this relationship as having subtle yet widespread tensions. In particular, many identify 
humanitarian organizations as engaging in a broader human rights discourse and increasing their 
demand for neutral humanitarian spaces within the last several decades (Waal & Omaar, 1994; 
Helton & Lavenex, 1999; Barnett & Weiss, 2011). Weiss and Gordenker (2002) add to this 
framework by stressing how the explosive growth within the NGO sector has resulted in the 
increased use of NGOs during humanitarian emergencies and as a resource to impact policy.  
Many authors tend to point to the presence of suspicion and bias between NGO and state 
actors, particularly in democratizing or recently democratized countries (Dupuy et. al., 2015; 
Mikuš, 2015; Grødeland, 2005). Seemingly incongruous to this sentiment, a wide array of research 
has emerged which argues for the existence of increasing levels of cooperation and 
interdependence between the two sides. What is important to understand here, however, is the 
possibility for rising levels of cooperation to exist between state and non-state entities in spite of 
contentious relationships. As Irrera (2013) stresses, interactions between NGOs and institutional 
actors “are increasingly interdependent and have produced constant tensions” between the 
powerful bureaucratic institutions and the flexible NGOs (p. 135). The question that naturally 
arises from this understanding is what the motivations behind this increased cooperation are? 
While the literature is nearly unanimous in viewing NGOs as subjects of governance, it is 
also important to consider how NGOs may also exist as participants of governance. This argument 
is rooted in Foucault's concept of governmentality which refers to an “indirect form of power 
exerted upon a population through a configuration of institutions, ideas, routines and procedures 
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to induce individual subjects to govern themselves” (Richter, 2008, p. 1). According to Foucault, 
modern political institutions do not exert power over society; they exert power through society.  
They act upon the “field of possibilities” of others’ actions’ to construct subjects who govern 
themselves (Foucault, 1982, p. 790).  Importantly, government in this sense is not limited to the 
formal institutions and policies of the state, but refers to the entire repertoire of institutions, 
procedures, analytical techniques, strategies and practices configured to shape human behavior 
towards a particular end (Richter, 2008 on Foucault, 1994a:  220).  
As Richter (2008) writes, “this mechanism of indirect rule is particularly important in the 
analysis of liberal regimes. Liberalism presents economic markets and civil society as natural self-
regulating mechanisms that exist prior to and independently from states.” Theorists of 
governmentality, by contrast, do not regard these mechanisms as operating independently from the 
state. Rather, “state and civil society represent two mutually constitutive, intertwined spheres of 
the same governance regime” (Richter, 2008, p. 2).   
 Sending and Neumann (2006) explore this concept by studying the sociopolitical functions 
and logics of governance, and in doing so generate the realization that “the role of nonstate actors 
in shaping and carrying out global governance-functions is not an instance of transfer of power 
from the state to non-state actors” (p. 652). Rather, they argue, the role of NGOs in carrying out 
global governance functions is expressive of a changing rationality, or logic, of governance “by 
which civil society is redefined from a passive object of government to be acted upon into an entity 
that is both an object and a subject of government” (Sending & Neumann, 2008, p. 658). In this 
reconfigured logic of governance the “self-association and political will-formation characteristic 
of civil society and non-state actors do not stand in opposition to the political power of the state, 
but is a most central feature of how power, understood as government, operates in late modern 
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society” (Sending & Neumann, 2008, p. 652). 
Sending and Neumann leave two lasting conclusions from this reoriented perspective on 
governance. First, they suggest that different logics of governance produce different approaches 
from NGOs: “The transformation in governmental rationality implied in the increased emphasis 
on governing through free and autonomous subjects generates new types of NGOs and new action-
orientations of existing ones” (Sending & Neumann, 2008, p. 667). Thus, in a period of increased 
state reliance on non-state actors to accomplish governance, we might expect to witness the 
emergence of new and autonomous non-state actors within the sphere of humanitarian assistance. 
Second, they suggest it is actually the ability of civil society to act as reliable sources of expertise, 
as opposed to traditional state institutions, that render central participants in such processes of 
governance” (Sending & Neumann, 2008, p. 667). To this end, the authors highlight the desire of 
the state to professionalize and institutionalize these non-state organizations to an extent, while 
simultaneously emphasizing their autonomous and flexible capacities. 
To this end, interdependence comes as a result of a dynamic in which institutional actors 
require the unique skill-sets and adaptability of NGOs to further their policy goals, whereas NGOs 
require the monetary assistance, access, and legitimacy that cooperation with IGOs and state 
institutions afford. In doing so, NGOs become both subjects, limited by access and funding 
constraints, and objects of governance.  
Humanitarianism, the State, and Security 
Importantly, the current period of humanitarian assistance, from the perspective of the 
state, is closely linked with upholding international norms. In particular, Helton & Lavenex (1999) 
identify humanitarianism, developmental assistance, and securitization as the three main tenets of 
the post-Cold War migration rhetoric of developed states. Given the pervasive nature of these 
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concepts, they become root issues through which NGOs assisting refugees and migrants are forced 
to navigate. The metrics of all three terms provides an interesting lens within which migration-
related NGO work can viewed.    
As opposed to humanitarianism, developmental assistance can be understood as aid, most 
often originating from a developed state or donor, which is targeted at building the institutions and 
infrastructure of the benefactor. In the context of migration, developmental assistance is most often 
observed in two manners, both of which serve the purpose of furthering securitization and 
humanitarian efforts. On the one hand, developmental assistance can be observed as a tool that 
developed states use to diminish the “push-factors” that force people out of migrant-producing 
states. The European Union Trust Fund for Africa, in particular, has been heavily involved in this 
sort of migration-related developmental assistance in the Sahel and Lake Chad region (European 
Commission, 2016).7 On the other hand, developmental assistance is also used as a tool that 
developed states use to incentivize the cooperation of transit countries in the securitization of 
migration. The EU, for instance promised 5 billion EUR in aid to Turkey in 2015 in exchange for 
its cooperation in refugee matters (Kanter and Higgins, 2015). This stresses how enmeshed the 
rhetorical promises of developmental assistance humanitarian aid, and securitization often are.  
Framing their support as developmental assistance, or humanitarian aid, developed 
countries boost the capacity of actors to accommodate or control the assistance of migrants and 
refugees within transit-country borders.  The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 
for instance, provides developmental assistance to the Serbian state through projects which aim to 
develop the water utilities in communities which are currently accommodating refugee centers 
                                               
7 The effectiveness of this sort of developmental aid is dubious at best. Clemens and Postel (2017) provide evidence 
that this sort of aid generally fails to target the “root causes” of migration as it purports to do and as a result finds 
that its overall capacity to deter migration is small at best. Rather, it is seen that successful development in almost all 
formerly-poor countries has produced an increase in emigration.  
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(Update July-August 2017, 2017). Similarly, the EU has provided millions of dollars of assistance 
to Serbia through the course of the refugee crisis, which it frames as humanitarian aid, which in 
some cases has consisted of the deployment of officers  from FRONTEX, the EU’s border agency, 
to the Serbian-Bulgarian border (Inter-agency Update October 2016, 2016). Thus, humanitarian 
assistance and developmental assistance in this sense can be viewed as an effort to further 
securitization as it is also a means of halting further human movement.  
Thus securitization offers a vital perspective in understanding state policy on migration 
issues, especially in regards to the dynamics of refugee assistance in Serbia. Over the past several 
decades, there has been an observable trend towards a cohesive refugee regime within the 
European Union and many identify securitization of migration as the next natural conclusion of 
this process.8 Broadly, the concept of securitization was developed by the Copenhagen school in 
the late 1990s which treated the term as the “the linguistic construction of a security problem” 
(Balzacq, 2005, p. 172). This approach towards defining securitization has since been criticized 
by those who advocate for a more holistic conception of the term which accommodates the actions 
of institutions, rather than just their public discourse (Balzacq, 2005; Leonard, 2010). They argue 
that securitization can be manifested in actions that do not otherwise mirror the public rhetoric of 
state actors. This tendency can be seen repeatedly in the migration regimes of developed countries 
which publicly frame refugee issues as humanitarian while simultaneously enacting legislation 
which limits their movement and opportunities. 
Securitization features heavily in most analyses of contemporary migration policy in 
developed countries, with a particular focus on the EU. Sarah Leonard (2010) defines the 
                                               
8 Lavenex (1999) described the EU refugee regime, as follows: “By cooperating in asylum and immigration matters, 
EU member states have developed a new set of institutions and norms for handling asylum claims which redefine 
the traditional approach of the international refugee regime and establish a distinct regional system of international 
cooperation amongst European countries referred to here as the European refugee regime.” (p. 161) 
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securitization of migration as “the extreme politicisation of migration and its presentation as a 
security threat” (p. 231). Accordingly, she develops an argument for how the actions of FRONTEX 
have furthered the process of securitizing migration within the EU. This trend is widely seen to 
have a heavily external dimension to it. That is, over the past several decades, the migration policy 
of the EU has been increasingly externalized, and, increasingly securitized (Burlyuk, 2017; 
Reslow, 2017; Hernández-Carretero, 2009; Guild et. al., 2008; Guild and Baldaccini, 2007; Helton 
& Lavenex, 1999).9 Between the Dublin Agreement, which effectively restricts the ability of an 
individual to claim asylum in a country of their choice, and bilateral agreements with transit 
countries like Turkey and Libya that further restrict access to EU countries, the EU border regime 
is increasingly strict and increasingly external. 
Less apparent, however, is the level of involvement, complicity, or resistance, NGOs have 
exhibited in response to the EU’s march towards migration securitization. Ford and Lyons (2013), 
writing on the increasing involvement of NGOs in the field of migration management, observe 
that  
The increasing securitization of border regulation and migration management has seen 
immigration officials overwhelmingly preoccupied with enforcement issues rather than 
information and service provision. This gap has been filled by churches, trade unions, and 
NGOs that provide legal services and education/information programmes. (p. 220) 
Throughout the refugee assistance field, the linkages between NGO-work and state migration 
policy are apparent and this has been especially true in the countries dotted along the Balkan route 
                                               
9 In fact, the official position of the EU’s migration policy has sought to utilize external partners and management, 
to an increasing amount, since the 1999 Tampere convention. (Helton & Lavenex, 1999) All the same, less clear 
within the EU’s official rhetoric is to what extent this policy shift has been precipitated on the securitization of 
migration and its borders.  
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(“Integration in Serbia, 2017). To this end, one could observe that NGOs involved in migration 
constitute, perhaps unwillingly, a crucial component of state migration policy. Approaching the 
subject from a different angle, Cabot (2013) writes on the performative nature of eligibility within 
the application of NGO aid to asylum seekers in Greece; in subtle ways, the hegemonic images of 
deservedness are reinforced by some NGOs actors, and then refused by others. Significantly, 
authors continue to question the linkages between NGO work with migrants and refugees and the 
securitization efforts of developed states. These linkages are seen not as explicit links but as tacit 
connections between assistance and securitization, allowing the state to better perform its goal of 
exclusion. 
Although the previous writing offers a useful footing for conceiving of the interest of state 
institutions in refugee assistance, the question still remains as to the extent which NGOs serve as 
conduits for state and international institutions interested in securitizing migration. This is a vital 
consideration for the case of Serbia where refugees, migrants, NGO organizations, and the state 
are actors entwined in the broader debate on migration and asylum policy in Europe. A goal of this 
research, then, is to better inform this debate. 
 
NGOs, Funding, and Access   
As alluded to previously, there is little debate that NGOs have become influential 
participants in humanitarian and migration affairs.  Weiss and Gordenker (2002) stress that as 
actors within the policy and administrative processes of UN organizations, the extent of their 
participation has progressively deepened. Irrera (2013) also observes that NGOs, as integral parts 
of the humanitarian system, have a growing impact on the "transformation of the structure and 
process of world politics” (Irrera, 2013, p. 2). Importantly, he takes the position that “relations 
with political power - in either positive or negative terms - have been an essential part of NGO 
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development and implementation over the years.” (Irrera, 2013, p. 134). As for migration NGOs, 
or those which assist refugees and migrants, Schnyder (2016) details how this field has flourished 
with increased cooperation between both state institutions, intergovernmental organizations 
(IGOs), and other NGOs. We can observe this directly in the case of Serbia where NGOs have 
provided invaluable emergency relief and psycho-social support, approved by the Serbian state, in 
instances where the government was unable or less equipped to carry out these duties (Integration 
in Serbia, 2017). To this end, one might observe the increasing reliance of state institutions on civil 
society to accomplish humanitarian policy objectives. Accordingly, it is important to understand 
how this interdependent relationship functions from a NGO’s perspective. In the following section 
I will review two main arguments within the literature on the effects of institutional pressure on 
NGOs: funding pressures and a control over access.  
Funding  
First, many authors write on the perceived influence which institutional actors exert on 
NGOs through funding. On the one hand, some scholars argue for an enabling effect of government 
funding, one which has a positive effect on NGO political activity. On the other hand, there are 
arguments for a demobilizing, or depoliticizing, effect of government funding on the capacity and 
willingness of NGOs to engage in political activity. The purpose of this study is not to provide 
new data on the question of the effect of funding on NGOs' political activities. Nonetheless, it will 
be necessary to evaluate and analyze the potential effect of funding at the grassroots level. 
Understanding this debate is crucial for any analysis of NGO work in the refugee crisis where a 
divide can often be seen between ECHO and state-funded NGOs on the one hand and independent 
NGOs on the other.10    
                                               
10 A recent update posted on the website of an independent NGO currently operating on Chios in Greece presents an 
example of this divide. At the end of July this past year the Greek government announced that it would begin taking 
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 Kelly Oliver (2017) provides a compelling discursive analysis of the prevailing 
complacency of institutions on migration issues. She frames humanitarian NGOs as an important 
lifeline for refugees and migrants forced into vulnerable situations by state action, but also 
highlights how this very assistance shifts blame and responsibility away from the state. That being 
said, it is important to note how Oliver approaches the issue as a political philosopher. To this end, 
the claim that humanitarian NGOs remain complacent and dependent on government agencies for 
funding and access to spaces should be contextualized with other sources and experiences. Within 
the academic literature on the relationship between institutional interest and NGO activity, there 
is an ongoing debate over the effect of government or institutionally-linked funding on the political 
activity of nonprofits. In the broader context of my thesis paper, this literature can shed light on 
the tacit and hard forms of influence that institutional interests take in the field.  
There are ample voices within the literature which argue against demobilization theories. 
These are arguments which see little to no negative effect from institutional funding (Lecy & Van 
Slyke 2012).  Through this analysis, government or institutional funding positively enables NGOs 
to effect change at little to no impact to their capacity to be politically active. Císař & Vráblíková 
(2012) argue that, at least in the case of the Czech Republic, “Sufficient EU funding facilitates 
transnational protest activities by social movement organizations as well as public persuasion 
strategies such as networking” (p. 142). Similarly writing on the effect of EU funding on NGOs, 
Sanchez Salgado (2013) takes the stance that “the EU helps sustain, but does not significantly 
constrain, the development of European CSOs” (p. 339). The opportunities that EU funding affords 
                                               
over the funding, selection and management of support services to the Vial and Souda camps on Chios, which was 
previously unrestricted. This in turn sparked the withdrawal of NGOs funded by the European Commission from the 
camps. This group then took used this post to clarify that despite the withdrawal of  ECHO-funded NGOs, they, as a 
“fiercely independent organisation, powered by the solidarity shown by independent donors” would be unaffected 
by the ECHO withdrawal.” https://actionfromswitzerland.ch/protection/were-not-going-anywhere/ 
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to under-funded NGOs in accomplishing their goals, especially those operating in countries with 
underdeveloped civil societies such as Serbia, is crucial to the argument for the efficacy of EU 
patronage. Chaves et. al. (2004) similarly find either a positive or non-existent relationship 
between government funding and nonprofit political activity. Thus, their position is clear: 
government funding does not suppress nonprofit political activity.  
Nonetheless, demobilization authors provide robust evidence for their argument, these are 
authors who identify a negative effect of institutional funding on NGOs. Most recently, Bloodgood 
and Tremblay-Boire (2017) caution that “even when governments are motivated by honorable 
intentions, their financial assistance...” may have “...the (unintended) effect of dampening NGO 
political activity” (p. 401). They base this argument on two findings in their research. First, they 
find that since “donors are known to discipline NGOs via implicit or explicit threats to withdraw 
funding should their activity become too radical; increased funding thus moderates NGO political 
activity” (p. 401). Second, to a lesser extent they observe that, “organizations wishing to engage 
in radical activities are less willing to accept government funding as this might limit their 
activities.” (p. 402). EU funding, in these cases, has a self-selecting tendency to mitigate 
contentious political action from beneficiary NGOs. In other words, politically moderate NGOs 
are more likely to seek out funding. The roots of the demobilization theorist can perhaps be traced 
as far back as Doug McAdam’s seminal work Political Process and the Development of Black 
Insurgency, 1930–1970 which supported the assumption that relatively few elites control the 
wealth of power in the political sphere and have the power to tightly control the dissemination of 
these funds into the civic sphere. He argued that institutions select and support moderate groups 
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to prevent or discourage radicalization (Armato and Caren, 2002).11  
It is important to note is that within the existing literature on the impact of EU funding 
there are two substantial gaps with relevance to my case study. First, there is very little substantive 
work within this literature which studies the effect of EU funding on NGOs based outside of the 
union12. Second, a very limited selection of these case studies are concerned with migration-based 
NGOs. Chaves et. al. (2004), for example, analyze the political activity from a national sample of 
US religious organizations, on the one hand, and a longitudinal sample of Minneapolis based non-
profits on the other. This is far from the dynamics at play in the application of assistance to refugees 
travelling along the Balkan route and accordingly should be viewed with caution as to its 
applicability this case study. 
 While some authors may not recognize a direct dampening effect of government funding 
on NGO political activity, many still identify subtle and tangential ways in which government 
funding affects the efficacy of NGOs. Chaves et. al. (2004) admit that institutional funding could 
have a subtle effect through the encouragement of resource dependence and requirement of 
navigating complex legal structures in order to access funds.  Anheier et. al. (1997) similarly find 
that state dependent NGOs tend to exhibit more “state-oriented behavior” than their third-party 
payment dependent counterparts. Perhaps most importantly, Child & Grønbjerg (2007) find that 
substantial government funding tends to have a limiting effect on the political advocacy of NGOs 
due to its tendency to institutionalize, or professionalize formerly contentious organizations. This 
                                               
11 Importantly, McAdam suggested that excluded groups do have the capacity to bring about structural change, an 
outcome dependent on status three elements:  the structure of political opportunities, indigenous organizational 
strength and cognitive liberation. 
12 The work of Bruszt and Vedres (2012) provides one exception to this, although it should be noted that their 
research focused on the effect of the European Union regional development programs in Eastern Europe, where the 
EU spent close to a decade establishing “local developmental agency”. Specifically they analyzed the post-accession 
position of organizations which participated in pre-accession assistance programs, finding an overall positive 
correlation. 
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is an important point which serves to stress the implicit influence that institutional actors can exert 
onto NGOs. As Ron (1997), the move towards enhanced legitimacy, within the borders of the 
organizational field, is both enabling and constraining. Professional organizational practices 
facilitate better funding possibilities and increased positive exposure. On the other hand, newly 
professionalized groups may also find their range of acceptable behaviors to be constrained 
alongside a new and increased reliance on traditional funding channels.   
Finally, in evaluating the ways in which states may influence the activity and efficacy of 
NGOs, we must also consider cases of administrative and institutional influence. Chaudhry (2017), 
for instance, argues that states generally perceive NGOs to be costly due to their ability to 
challenge a state’s economic and security interests, aid in domestic mobilization, and influence 
electoral politics.  Repression, in a general sense, can be understood as  
The actual or threatened use of physical sanctions against an individual or organization, 
within the territorial jurisdiction of the state, for the purpose of imposing a cost on the 
target as well as deterring specific activities and/or beliefs perceived to be challenging to 
government personnel, practices or institutions. (Goldstein 1978, p. xxvii).  
Political repression is a well-established concept in political theory but, regarding its application 
to the relationship between NGOs and state institutions, it is most often seen in writing on 
authoritarian or non-democratic states. Most of the writing which relates repression to NGOs 
focuses on violent oppressive tactics. Chaudhry (2017), however contests this notion by 
introducing the term administrative crackdown to contrast the otherwise violent tactics that a state 
might use to limit NGO activity. This sort of administrative repression, she explains, can be 
conceived of as the enacting of legal restrictions to create barriers to entry, funding, and advocacy 
by NGOs (Chaudhry, 2017).  
 Being a democratizing state attempting to join the EU, it is not in the interest of the Serbian 
state or the EU to utilize violent repressive techniques against the NGOs operating under its 
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purview, despite the fact that their work may go against the interests of the state. The same cannot 
be said of their treatment of refugees and migrants. What we cannot say, at a cursory glance, 
however, is the extent to which the Serbian state or the EU have used “soft” repression tactics 
against the organizations working in the context of the refugee crisis in Serbia. That is, whether or 
not the allure of funding, legal restrictions or barriers to entry have influenced the political 
activities of organizations.  
Access 
Second, and specific to the case of migration and humanitarianism, is the politics of access. 
On this point, Oliver (2017) takes a combative stance in arguing that humanitarian aid is both the 
poison and the cure to humanitarian crises given its over reliance on state institutions for access to 
beneficiaries. Her logic identifies carceral humanitarianism, a paradox which creates the 
motivating conditions for refugee movement, while at the same time criminalizing the very act as 
the dominant force behind modern day humanitarian actions. Within this order, she highlights 
NGOs as an important lifeline for refugees and migrants forced into vulnerable situations by state 
action, but also highlights how this very assistance shifts blame and responsibility away from the 
state.13 She stresses that aid, for the most part, remains dependent on government agencies for 
funding and access to spaces and additionally on military forces to protect their aid workers, thus 
making it a self-perpetuating dynamic. This is a point that Irrera (2013) mirrors when observing 
that the effectiveness of NGOs continues to depend on the access granted to them by state 
governments and IGOs. This is a particularly important consideration for my analysis. The closing 
of informal refugee living situations within Serbia in favor of state run camps and centers has 
                                               
13As a point of interest, the rhetorical roots of this argument can be found in the initial skepticism that Florence 
Nightingale voiced towards the creation of the ICRC which, she argued, would take the humanitarian burden of 
caring for the victims of war away from the states waging conflict therefor making the decision to go to war less 
taxing.   
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resulted in the increased institutionalization of humanitarian access to refugees. 
For decades, refugee camps and border regions have been the traditional setting where 
humanitarian actors have performed assistance. These areas are typically highly securitized spaces 
overseen by state and institutional actors which have the power to control access into and out of 
the camps. This stasis, however, has been challenged somewhat in Europe in particular by the 
proliferation of independent groups which assist refugees and migrants who exist outside of the 
system in transit corridors, in border towns, and in squats. Whereas “camp logics instrumentally 
contain and control mobility so that care can be administered,” solidarity-based, humanitarian 
borderwork breeds a different identity (Pallister-Wilkins, 2016).  
Nonetheless, through the course of the European refugee crisis, humanitarian work has 
been observed as undertaking increasingly state-like responsibilities. In particular, authors such as 
del Valle (2016) and Attina (2017) identify humanitarian actors as joining more traditional border 
actors, such as border police, national Coast Guards, or FRONTEX, in practices of search and 
rescue in the Mediterranean. It should be understood that this cooperation does not, by its very 
nature, uphold the restrictive border regime of the European Union, quite the opposite in fact, 
given that this sort of assistance seeks to save lives in cases where institutional actors would not 
be able to or would not want to. That being said, this cooperation does result in practices which 
serve to legitimize the border policy of the EU and its member countries. As Pallister-Wilkins 
(2017) writes,  
Humanitarian action, with its claims to de-territorialize universalism and challenge 
sovereign power over life and death, actually reterritorializes and consolidates sovereignty 
in practice. SAR operations expand the zones of possible intervention into international 
waters and are reliant on the permission and guidance of sovereign authorities, while on 
land the creation of transit spaces along transport routes are in continuous negotiation with 
local political actors and national authorities. (p. 6) 
Thus, through activity which helps to consolidate the sovereignty of state actors over migratory 
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practices, NGOs become participants within the wider state-based migration regime. 
Conclusion 
This chapter presented a brief overview of the terminology and academic work directly 
relevant from to this thesis. Accordingly, I reviewed the work of Laura Henry (2011) as well as 
other scholars such as Duda (2017) and Milan & Pirro (2018) who are active in the field of NGO 
work in the European refugee crisis, to contextualize the sorts of organizational structures that are 
found in NGO communities. This previous scholarship provides a practical framework to analyze 
refugee assistance work by NGOs in Serbia. Additionally, I overviewed the debate on 
governmentality as it relates to NGOs and the state. Previous authors highlight the symbiosis that 
has emerged between humanitarian NGOs and the state, paying particular attention to the role that 
these organizations play in the processes of governance and security. To this end, the work of 
Sending and Neumann (2006) on the role that NGOs play in governance is of great value. They 
develop a rationality of government in which “political power operates through rather than on civil 
society. Governing is performed through autonomous subjects, not on passive objects” (669). 
Finally, the previous work on the effect of governance on NGO activity was reviewed. In 
particular, two relevant themes were highlighted from this wider discussion - the effect of funding 
on humanitarian NGOs and the effect of state controlled access to refugee camps.  
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II - Detailing the Crisis 
 
"Serbia has not put up fences or barbed wire. It would be easy for us [to do so], while you in the 
EU were silent, when the fence was being erected.” 
- Alexandar Vučić, 2015 
“In this regard, assistance and support in the form of food, clothing, footwear, encouraging 
migrants to reside outside the designated permanent asylum centers and transit reception centers 
are [no]  longer acceptable, this [particularly] on the territory of the Belgrade city municipality.” 
 
- Serbian Ministry of Labour, Employment, Veteran, and Social Affairs, 
Open Letter, 2016 
 
 
In the past several years Serbia, as an important transit point for refugees and migrants 
working their way towards intended destinations in Western Europe, has witnessed the movement 
of hundreds of thousands of people across its borders ("Serbian Centres”, 2017). This is a situation 
that has developed in accordance with the country’s location as a key transit country for refugees 
travelling on the Western Balkan route, in the context of a broader period of human movement 
commonly called the European refugee crisis. In the following section I will provide an in-depth 
overview of the progression of this situation in Serbia. First I will review some key developments 
that emerged in Serbia prior to March, 2016, contextualizing the key elements that came into play 
during this time. Next, I will provide an in-depth overview of the refugee crisis in Serbia between 
March, 2016 and May, 2017, paying particular focus to three key events: 1) the closure of the EU 
borders around Serbia in March, 2016; 2) the issuance of an open letter by the Serbian government 
to refugee assistance organizations; and 3) the demolition of the Barracks squat in downtown 
Belgrade which housed more than a thousand refugees and migrants.  
Refugees fleeing the wars in Syria and Iraq are the most high profile of these cases, 
however many people in Serbia have left Afghanistan and Pakistan in the face of a surge in Taliban 
activity as well as increasingly dismal economic prospects in these countries. Although subject to 
fluctuation, the UNHCR estimates the number of refugees in Serbia at around 7,400, most of which 
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are living in one of the 16 official asylum centers in the country or residing in short-term and often 
vulnerable living arrangements (“Serbian Centres”, 2017). With this in mind, my research 
concentrates primarily on the dynamics affecting and informing the provision of assistance to 
refugees and migrants by Serbian NGOs in and around Belgrade.  
This research looks at the time period between March, 2016 and May, 2017. In particular, 
I identify three key events through the course of the time period which significantly altered the 
situation of refugees and migrants around Belgrade and the assistance which they were provided. 
The period starts near the peak of refugee movement on the Balkan route when thousands of 
refugees were entering and exiting Serbia each day on their way towards their Western European 
destinations. This was at the point when the borders were still, for the most part, open and receptive 
to refugee movement. The relative ease of human movement was curbed when many EU borders 
began to close in March, 2016, kick-starting a state of stagnation in the refugee crisis in Belgrade. 
This dynamic was again challenged later in the year when Serbia’s Office of the Commissariat 
published an open letter in November forbidding NGOs from distributing humanitarian assistance 
to individuals outside of state-run reception centers (Zaba, 2016). The end of the time period, early 
May, 2017, marks the demolition of the Belgrade Barracks and the removal of its hundreds of 
residents to state-run camps outside the city (AYS 10/05, 2017; Goddard, 2017).14 This event 
largely triggered the cessation of NGO assistance to migrants and refugees outside the sphere of 
state management in Belgrade. Analyzing the current situation of refugees and migrants in 
Belgrade, and the NGOs which have provided their services in this context, requires a 
                                               
14The majority of the refugees living in informal arrangements in the winter of 2016/2017 were situated inside the 
abandoned factories behind Belgrade’s main train station, colloquially referred to as “the Barracks” by both refugees 
and NGO workers. Although this is a term that may be unfamiliar to residents of Belgrade who are not personally 
involved with refugee assistance in the city, it is the term that I will opt to use in my research given the lack of a 
standardized alternative. 
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comprehensive understanding of the history and progression of this situation.  In this next section 
I will provide an in-depth overview of the refugee crisis in Serbia, and its surrounding context, 
while paying particular attention to the three events mentioned above. 
 
Prelude to a Crisis 
Between May 2015 and March 2016, over 920,000 refugees traveled through Serbia as 
they made their way to Hungary and Croatia and onwards to Western Europe (ECHO, Factsheet, 
2017). This influx in such a short period of time put unprecedented strain on the EU’s established 
asylum and migration systems, which soon created tension in the broader cultural and political 
debates throughout the region. Anti-immigration stances gained currency in many EU countries 
that had been receiving or observing large numbers of refugees and migrants pass through their 
borders. Hungary, as a key transit country along the Balkan route, is particularly noteworthy for 
how it integrated anti-immigration discourse into its governmental procedures. As early as June, 
2015, the government began developing plans to build a four-meter high fence along its 110-mile 
border with Serbia (Kingsley, 2015). 
Growing tension across the EU began to inform the political debates on immigration and 
refugees. Initially, much of the discourse on migration and refugees ranged from slightly apathetic 
to positive. Countries like Germany, Sweden, and Austria were early supporters of the movement 
to open Europe’s doors to the conflict-affected refugees pouring into the region from North Africa 
and the Middle East. Officially, the EU establishment supported this move from a human-rights 
standpoint as well. In early September, 2015 the President of the EU’s executive wing, the 
European Commission (EC), Jean-Claude  Juncker addressed Europe in a speech saying that 
“Today it is Europe that is sought as a place of refuge and exile...That is something to be proud of 
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and not something to fear” (European Commission, 2015). This rhetoric, ostensibly, sought to 
quell the growing tensions beginning to plague many EU countries concerning the rising numbers 
of displaced persons seeking refuge in Europe. At a more subtle level, however, the speech also 
revealed the tension beginning to show between transit and destination countries in the region. At 
the time, the EC was being faced with threats from Germany and other countries which were 
receiving the bulk of refugees, to re-establish national border controls within the Schengen area 
unless countries began to accept equitable sharing of the new arrivals (Traynor, 2015). Juncker 
went on to announce that the EC was asking national governments to agree to distribute 160,000 
refugees currently in Italy, Greece and Hungary on a binding and not voluntary basis. “It has to be 
done and it will be done,” he said (Traynor, 2015). Thus, Juncker proposed a new and more 
geographically dispersed system of refugee integration, stressing that the Schengen zone would 
not be sacrificed while he remained in charge of the commission.15 Framing the effective 
management of migration as consistent with the effective management of the Schengen zone 
demonstrates the growing strain between transit countries within the EU. For example Slovenia, 
Croatia, Greece, and Bulgaria all allowed refugees and migrants through their territories in 2015 
with the understanding that they would continue on towards the wealthier countries of Western 
Europe.  
Speaking of “common” and “united” refugee and asylum policies, Juncker said they had 
to “be permanently anchored in our policy approach and our rules” (Traynor, 2015). This rhetoric 
was presented as one of humanitarian concern, but at a deeper level one can also identify the 
                                               
15 The Schengen zone is a key component of the EU’s migration regime and its rise signified the solidification of a 
broader process of externalizing European borders.  The Schengen zone guarantees freedom of movement for all 
signatory countries however its pairing with the Dublin Agreement, which props up the rule of first entry for asylum 
seekers, ensures that legally speaking it is the responsibility of member states the EU borders to examine asylum 
claims (Lavenex, 1999). 
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security concerns beginning to emerge. A little more than one month after making these comments, 
Juncker would begin pushing for the negotiated EU-Turkey deal as a measure to ensure that 
Turkey’s more than two million refugees stayed within the country which has, in many ways, 
proven itself incapable of ensuring basic human-rights to this population (Connolly, Traynor, & 
Letsch, 2015). At its heart, this was a bid to move refugees away from Western Europe.  
Unlike the more developed destination countries of Western European countries, Serbia 
functioned as a transit country for refugees and migrants until spring of 2016. This afforded the 
Serbian state a sense of assuredness and security in the midst of the crisis where refugees and 
migrants were often seen as some other country’s problem. Granted, there were hundreds and 
sometimes even thousands of refugees and migrants entering Serbia daily from Macedonia and 
Bulgaria, but all the government had to do was provide them the means to leave and they would 
pass right through. In January of 2016, a winter month which typically sees smaller numbers of 
people in transit, more than 58,000 people passed through Serbia. Thus, the Serbian situation 
wasn’t seen as a permanent crisis; for the moment most were just passing through, rarely spending 
more than a few days in the country as they progressed onwards to their intended destinations. 
Some spent time in the government reception centers, which only had the capacity to accommodate 
around 4,000 individuals, for a week or two to recuperate, but few saw Serbia as their final 
destination (Lukić, 2016). In many ways Serbia was witnessing a very different side of the refugee 
crisis than countries like Italy, Germany, or France where long-term integration was seen as more 
viable.   
Interestingly, the Serbian state began to capitalize on its position by framing itself as acting 
more in line with the EU’s humanitarian policies than the EU itself. In September of 2015, current 
president Aleksandar Vučić, the Prime Minister at the time, said in a speech that in contrast to 
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Hungary, “Serbia has not put up fences or barbed wire. It would be easy for us [to do so], while 
you in the EU were silent, when the fence was being erected.” Elaborating in a later social media 
post, Vučić further praised Serbia’s response to its refugee situation by stating that "Serbia will 
receive a certain number of migrants. This makes us more European than some member states. We 
don't build fences"16 (Avramović & Jovanović, 2015). Within this dynamic, the public rhetoric of 
Vučić is detached from considerations of political gain or posturing. This is reflected in his 
response to the closure of the Balkan route: “Serbia did not want to gain political points, neither at 
home nor abroad, like many other, primarily EU countries, did” (Avramović & Jovanović, 2015).  
The validity of this humanitarian framing is questionable however, due to conflicting 
statements made by the Serbian state and through their cooperation with the other states on 
securitization measures. Rather, one could make the argument that the proper management of the 
refugee situation is seen as a means of advancing towards EU membership. Even Aleksandar Vučić 
has framed the Austrian assistance provided to Serbia in its management of the refugees in Serbia 
as “‘considerable support’ to Serbia on its way to the EU, which he described as a national strategic 
goal” (Tanjug, 2017). Likewise, there has been support for this maneuvering within some of the 
more institutional NGO-circles in Serbia. A representative of Grupa 484, in a public statement 
outlined how the goals of the Policy Advocacy Group (PAG) coalition in 2015 would be 
“monitoring the adoption and implementation of the Action Plan for Chapter 24 in the areas of 
migration, asylum and border control” (“Policy Advocacy”, 2015). This was a move to help 
facilitate the alignment of Serbian state policy in the area of migration with that of the EU, a 
prerequisite for the path towards accession. 
                                               
16 Interestingly, rhetorical framing of Serbia as being “more European” than other European states is an 
established tool used in Serbian politics, dating back to at least the rule of Slobodan Milosević who 
famously stated that -------------- 
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The Border Closures of March, 2016 
The situation in Serbia changed drastically in March of 2016 due to two large developments 
in the EU. First, EU governments in the Western Balkans began announcing the effective closures 
of their borders to migrants and refugees at the beginning of the month in rapid succession. While 
the Hungarian border with Serbia had already been securitized for the better part of a year, thanks 
to Hungary’s new wall, migrants had been able to still use the Balkan route towards Europe by 
instead travelling from Serbia to Croatia and then onwards to either Hungary or Slovenia. This 
ceased to be a viable option when, on March 9th, the Slovenian state announced that they would 
be closing their borders, an announcement quickly followed by governments in Croatia and 
Macedonia. Hundreds of thousands then faced the prospect of becoming trapped in Greece, 
Turkey, and to a lesser extent, Serbia (Kingsley, 2016). Despite the collective fears from refugees 
and migrants, European politicians voiced satisfaction and optimism on the implications of these 
actions. Donald Tusk, president of the European Council, claimed that “irregular flows of migrants 
along western Balkans route have come to an end” while  Slovenia’s prime minister, Miro Cerar, 
said that the “so-called western Balkan route for irregular migrants is no more” (Kingsley, 2016).  
The second monumental action of this month was the deal between Turkey and the EU 
announced on March 20th. The EU-Turkey deal, as it is known, saw Turkey receive up to $6.8 
billion in aid, visa-free travel to Europe for its citizens, and renewed EU membership talks in return 
for the country agreeing to take back refugees and migrants who cross over to Greece (Mohdin, 
2016). From the beginning, this deal was criticized by human-rights groups who voiced concerns 
that it would put refugees in harm's way, usurp their human rights, and incentivize their return to 
war zones.  The effect of the EU-Turkey deal was immediate. Within a month, arrivals to Greece 
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dropped by a staggering 90% (Mohdin, 2017). This made Serbia an increasingly attractive option 
for attempting to enter the EU; refugees stuck in Turkey could bypass Greece easily by leaving 
Turkey for Bulgaria and then move on to Serbia.  
These securitizing moves would go on to have severe implications. According to one MSF 
report, despite the “humanitarian and legal obligations of Europe to treat migrants/refugees with 
dignity and provide safe havens and asylum” during this time period, “what followed was the 
institution of restrictive migration policies which were often characterized by the building of razor 
wire border fences and border closures along the Balkan route” (Arsenijević et. al., 2017, p. 2). 
This would result in increased dangers for refugees and migrants as government camps were 
inadequate to accommodate the increased number of longer-term stays in Serbia. (Inter-agency 
Report August, 2016). Accordingly, Belgrade would begin to fill up with hundreds of refugees and 
migrants who stayed for months at a time, compared to days previously, where they would be 
exposed to the dangers associated with smugglers, mental health, food insecurity, and illness.   
Since the closure of the borders and the stagnation of the refugee crisis, mental health 
emerged as one of the most immediate and severe concerns facing refugees and migrants in non-
permanent arrangements. This includes both the populations living outside state asylum and transit 
centers and those accommodated waiting for their legal status to be decided on. Problems with 
PTSD and depression have been identified en masse through research on similar situations in 
camps in Greece. (Tsagkari, 2017) A report compiled by MSF doctors conducting research in the 
field in Serbia returned important results showing that  the “lack of alternatives for people to 
migrate and seek asylum in an organized manner, including policies of refoulement, push people 
into the hands of smugglers and make migratory journeys far more dangerous.” (Arsenijević et. 
al., 2017, p. 8) Regarding mental health, it also presented data suggesting that “due to long stays 
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and traumatic events, the initial acute reaction if distress experienced by migrants/refugees 
gradually turns to more complex mental health disorders/psychopathology, which is difficult to 
manage.” (Arsenijević et. al., 2017, p. 2017) One of the other most concerning developments of 
the situation in Serbia has also been the significant population of what the UNHCR refers to as 
unaccompanied and separated children (UASC). Mental health problems disproportionately affect 
UASCs, who additionally face a plethora of other concerns as an extremely vulnerable population 
in the crisis (Tsagkari, 2017). Unaccompanied and separated children (UASC) became particularly 
vulnerable to a variety of concerns as they began flocking into Belgrade in large numbers, 
comprising somewhere around 15% of all refugees and migrants (Inter-agency Report February, 
2017). 
A diverse community of groups had emerged in the previous months tasking themselves 
with the assistance of refugees and migrants in Serbia, however the closures of March 2016 
changed the nature of this assistance drastically and, further, started to bring new NGOs into the 
fold. These ranged from UN bodies (most prominently the UNHCR and UNICEF) to large 
international organizations (MSF, ICRC, and IRC, for example) to smaller NGOs. These smaller 
NGOs, in turn, were mainly divided between local, Serbian organizations on the one hand, like 
Refugee Aid Miksalište or the Crisis Policy Response Center, and then small independent, 
international NGOs like the Rigardu on the other hand. 
Of course, one of the most important players in this time period has been the Serbian state 
whose most immediate involvement has been provided through the Commissariat for Refugees 
(KIRS). They too, faced a shifting dynamic following the closures of the EU borders in March, 
2016, forcing longer stays for refugees and migrants within the country, thus increasing the need 
for, and management of, state run asylum and transit centers. To a lesser extent, the Ministry of 
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the Interior (MoI) and the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development 
(MoESTD) have been involved in the management and assistance of refugees and migrants in 
Serbia.  
Nonetheless, state assistance has also been informed by the state policy-making 
infrastructure. Although the office of the Commissariat has been the most visible agency involved 
in the refugee crisis in Serbia, the official policy on refugees and migration has been largely set by 
the Ministry of Labour, Employment, Veteran and Social Affairs (MoLESVA) under its influential 
minister Aleksandar Vulin.17 Current President Aleksandar Vučić, whose controversial clout as a 
firm leader in Serbian politics has grown steadily over the years, has also been crucial to setting 
migration policy in the country.  
The EU also emerged as key player informing the engagement of refugees in Serbia. The 
ongoing negotiation between the Serbian state and the EU, regarding its membership application, 
has been identified by a number of academics and politicians alike as affecting the state’s 
commitment and involvement with certain issues and it is likely that the refugee crisis is no 
different (Anastasakis & Bechev; Tomić, 2013). The EU provides a critical role in the management 
of the refugee situation in Serbia, most of which has gone to the UNHCR and Commissariat or the 
Serbian government. In total, more than $80 million has been financed, through different EU 
financial mechanisms, towards Serbia for the management of the migration situation since 2015. 
According to the EC, this money has been allocated “to ensure the accommodation of migrants 
and refugees in accommodation centers; to support the delivery of health and other primary 
services to refugees, migrants and host communities; and to reinforce its border control capabilities 
                                               
17 Minister Vulin was the Minister of Labour, Employment, Veteran, and Social Policy in Serbia between April 
2014 and June 2017 before taking the position of Minister of Defense. The current Minister of Labour, Employment, 
Veteran, and Social Policy is Zoran Đorđević although thus far his influence in the position seems to be somewhat 
more muted. (Inter-agency Report June, 2017) 
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(EC Press Release, 2017). Other funding, has gone to a collection of ECHO-funded NGOs like the 
Danish Refugee Council (DRC). Still, when one follows the movement of this money it becomes 
clear that EU money in this context has a much wider net of benefactors. First, one must consider 
the subsidiary grants that organizations like the UNHCR and DRC give out to smaller 
organizations to accomplish their projects. Additionally, the non-humanitarian assistance which 
the Serbian state has received is often overlooked by reporters and academics alike. Serbia has 
received millions of dollars in direct security assistance from the EU in the past several years 
(Inter-agency Report October, 2016). Thus, it is true that the Serbian government has had close 
ties to the EU in its management of the refugee situation, but it must also be understood that these 
ties extend towards the NGO field as well.18   
The summer of 2016 progressed with increased congestion in Belgrade and mounting 
numbers of refugees and migrants at key transit points on the borders of Croatia and Hungary, 
primarily around the Serbian towns of Šid and Subotica. There tended to be somewhere around 
1000 people who lived in informal arrangements in the center of Belgrade while groups of 
approximately 200 camped out around Šid and Subotica respectively (Inter-agency Report 
September, 2016). These developments, predictably, were effects of the closed borders. Around 
this time, several Serbian journalists conducted interviews on the situation in Belgrade and 
observed as early as September that a lack of resources and attention was precipitating a serious 
humanitarian crisis amongst the growing refugee population living in increasingly precarious 
conditions. The population had become, almost wholly reliant on smugglers to leave (Obradovic-
Wochnik & Mitrović, 2016). Considering the state of official accommodation for refugees and 
                                               
18 Funding from the EU alone has reached more than 20 million EUR for humanitarian aid and at least 24 million 
EUR in pre-accession support for migration control since the beginning of the refugee situation. Importantly, the EU 
and these other international institutions are funding both the Serbian state and NGO community. For more 
information one might look here: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/serbia_en.pdf 
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migrants at the time, in addition to the lasting fears of pushbacks, it made sense that an increasing 
number of people were sleeping rough in the city center.19  
There were a number of important Serbian NGOs who were providing service-provision 
and informational services to refugees and migrants at the time. Info Park, in particular, emerged 
as a key player in this arena as it operated a small informational kiosk in Bristol Park, where many 
were sleeping at the time. It provided daily updates to refugees and migrants about the situation at 
the borders, and services available in Belgrade, including translation services. Miksalište also 
emerged as an important provider of similar services.  It was situated in the close by Savamala 
district until it was displaced from its location as part of the controversial, UAE-funded Belgrade 
Waterfront project (Zaba, 2016). The Serbian state forced the operation out in late April, 2016, by 
reclaiming the land and giving the organization one day to move out to a new location before 
destroying the building entirely. Admittedly, the organization had no property claims on its 
previous residency however the contentious and immediate nature in which they were forced to 
move to a new place underscores the tensions between the state and NGOs at the time. 
During this time, refugees and migrants in Serbia were active, to varying degrees of 
success, in their own advocacy. This has been best seen through two means of mobilization: 
marches and graffiti. In late July, state officials began agitating for the “reoccupation” of Bristol 
Park and Luka Celović Park which had been serving as a key meeting a rest point for refugees and 
migrants in the months prior. Arguing that  that the grass needed to be replanted, both parks were 
dug up, and previously grassy areas were covered with an orange plastic fence making any more 
                                               
19 The term pushback is a key component of the situation that unfolded in Serbia in 2016 and 2017 and is a term 
used to describe the informal expulsions of asylum seekers without due process, a tactic often used alongside 
violence and beatings. All of the states on the Western Balkan route have been guilty of pushbacks, Serbia included, 
however Croatia and Hungary in particular came notorious during this period for the brutality of their measures 
which routinely involved the use of attack dogs and batons which resulted in many broken bones, open wounds, and 
smashed phones. (Nallu, Pushbacks, 2017) It has, in effect, become an important part, if unofficial, part of the 
migration regimes of these EU countries. 
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camping in the park effectively impossible (Obradović-Wochnik & Mitrović, 2016). People were 
forced to find new accommodation and many people flocked to the abandoned factory close by, 
behind the train station, which would go on to become one of the most important and contentious 
places of the refugee crisis in Serbia (Greetings, 2016). These actions were followed by a large 
joint action between the police and the Serbian Commissariat during which they attempted to 
evacuate the park by ushering everyone they found on buses, “reportedly threatening people with 
deportation and prison” to the nearby Krnjača asylum center. Reportedly, however, when reaching 
the camp, authorities were faced with the prospect that there was not enough space for everyone, 
resulting in some being sent away by camp personnel and others deciding for themselves to leave 
and return to the Barracks (Greetings, 2016). Although the ability for these parks to function as 
overnight accommodations was removed, they would continue to function as informal meeting 
and information points. 
These actions catalyzed an increase in protests led by refugees and migrants in Belgrade... 
Responding to rumors about their impending eviction from the park, a group of about 150 refugees 
and migrants began a hunger strike on July 22nd in protest of the situation on the Hungarian border, 
the perceived threat of deportation, and the lack of food. In the hopes drawing media attention to 
their predicament and hopes of crossing into the European Union, they started a march out of 
Belgrade and toward Hungarian border in the north (B92, 2016).20  A representative from Info 
Park said in a news interview that "Just as we were about to start a distribution of the breakfast 
this morning, a large group of refugees in the park gathered in the central square in the park," 
adding that the refugees were "refusing to take any food though Caritas and Info Park had 1,200 
                                               
20 It is unclear exactly how many people took part in this protest although the numbers range somewhere between 
150 and 300. B92, the main Serbian media source who covered these events and originally put the number at 150 
although within a week revised their original estimates to around 300. (B92, 2016; B92, 2016b) 
 
EUROPE’S OUTSOURCED REFUGEES      Sapoch, 51 
breakfast portions ready " (B92, 2016). The group moved on foot from Belgrade as far as Sremski 
Karlovci, about 60 miles away, before opting to move by train to the border, due to exhaustion 
(B92, 2017b). Here, it would appear the group began to dissipate, with those who continued the 
hunger strike being mostly men from Afghanistan and Pakistan, who were particularly vulnerable 
to the EU’s austere migration regime (B92, 2017b). 
While it is important not to take away the agency of this vulnerable group in their own self-
advocacy, it should be noted that that, in many cases, this political action has been catalyzed or 
supported by the work of several, predominantly independent and international, NGOs. Serbian 
media, for instance, accused activists from Germany of catalyzing the protest actions conducted 
by refugees and migrants in July of 2016 by claiming that activists arrived several days prior to 
discuss the “protest with the migrants" (B92, 2016). Likewise, NGO activists provided materials 
for some of the graffiti work which began popping up around the Barracks complex which 
contained poignant and simple messages decrying the situation faced by the residents of this space.  
 
The Open Letter of November, 2016 
A moment that appears to have strongly informed the current status of NGO/state relations 
in the provision of refugee assistance in Belgrade was certainly the issuance of an open letter to 
all applicable NGOs in Serbia by the Ministry of Labour, Employment, Veterans and Social 
Affairs (MoLEVSA) on November 4, 2016. A portion of it reads as follows: 
...we inform you that, in order to ensure humane living conditions for migrant populations 
in the Republic of Serbia the stay within the transit reception centers for migrants and 
permanent centers for asylum in which all necessary assistance is available (food, shelter, 
clothing, medicine, psychosocial and health care) in the best interest of migrants. In this 
regard, assistance and support in the form of food, clothing, footwear, encouraging 
migrants to reside outside the designated permanent asylum centers and transit reception 
centers are [no] longer acceptable, this [particularly] on the territory of the Belgrade city 
municipality. (Border Monitoring Serbia, 2016)  
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The “Open Letter”, as was referred to colloquially by those in the field, came amidst a period of 
growing pressure on the state to address the worsening conditions of the refugees and migrants 
living in squats close to the train station in downtown Belgrade. The letter asked NGOs in the city 
to cease the distribution of direct aid, such as food and clothing, to refugees and migrants in these 
situations, arguing that they should register in the reception camps where “all necessary assistance 
is available (food, shelter, clothing, medicine, psychosocial and health care)” (“Serbia asks 
volunteers”, 2016). In the previous week the state had also forced at least two Serbian NGOs, 
Refugee Aid Miksalište and Info Park, to cease the distribution of food to those sleeping rough in 
the city center. (Inter-agency Update November, 2016; Serbia Update 31 Oct-02 Nov, 2016) The 
move to freeze assistance was an ostensible attempt to incentivize the movement of these people 
to reception camps around the country, from Krnjača to Preševo, which the government declared 
sufficient to accommodate the incoming influx. Previous work points to the presence of a sustained 
tension between the state and NGOs in Serbia, dating back to Milosević era, and it is possible that 
they heavy handed nature of this call to cease assistance was a manifestation of this lasting unease. 
(Grødeland, 2005; Mikus, 2015).  
There was always confusion amongst the refugees and NGOs operating in Serbia about the 
availability of space in these camps. Tijana Sijarić, an activist working for Info Park, was quoted 
remarking on the foolishness of the state thinking that “if food and clothes aren’t distributed, there 
will be no migrants in the park, it doesn’t work that way.” Rather, she reflected “the problem is 
that all camps are full, and these people have nowhere to go, so this decision didn’t solve anything. 
People keep coming, the problem remains the same, the difference is that many of them are now 
both homeless and hungry” (Zaba, Survival, 2016). Remarking on the situation emerging at the 
time where Hungary kept to its strict quotas while Belgrade became a pitfall for refugees with no 
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way out, Sijarić said that “The ‘no food, no migrants’ policy is not working. They were hoping 
people would stop coming if we didn’t help them. But look now – there’s no food and people still 
keep coming” (Zaba, Survival, 2016). Meanwhile, at the same time authorities were adamantly 
claiming the opposite, that the state camps had sufficient space to accommodate all who wanted 
entrance, and derided those who would choose to stay on the streets. Ivan Gerginov, a 
representative from the Commissariat said at the time that “Those people don’t want to start the 
asylum procedure, that’s why they stay where they stay. Most probably because they think that 
this way it will be easier for them to leave Serbia...As I said, I represent the state body that deals 
with this problem and I confirm I can accept all of those people”  (Zaba, Survival, 2016).  
The legal process approach towards asylum and refugee movement in Serbia has always 
been confusing, however generally speaking it requires a refugee or migrant to register with police 
within 48 hours of arriving in the country. Understandably, given the Dublin agreement and the 
widespread misinformation surrounding the agreement, many refugees and migrants were 
extremely skeptical of officially registering with the Serbian authorities, especially those whose 
original countries have been deemed as safe or those who may have failed to register upon their 
arrival to the country.21 Nonetheless, the official position of the Serbian government at the time 
was that even migrants who did not meet the deadline to register themselves in Serbia, or who did 
not show up in a camp after registering at the local police station, could still be accommodated in 
collective centers, registered under any names and surnames. Pointing to the fears of many in 
registering in centers, a representative of the Serbian Commissariat for Refugees and Migrants 
remarked in the aftermath of the open letter that “What is crucial about this situation is the fact 
that they [migrants] don’t want to leave their fingerprints during the registration, because they fear 
                                               
21 The Dublin Regulation “obliges refugees to seek asylum in the first EU country that they reach - and is designed 
to stop states on the edge of the EU from passing on migrants elsewhere.” (Milekić, 2017)  
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possibly being turned away from an EU country [once they get there]” (Zaba, Survival, 2016). 
Figure 2.  Residents of the Barracks line up to receive meals from an independent NGO in 
February, 2017 (Sapoch, 2017) 
 
  Many NGOs and donors took this moment to align themselves, at least publicly, with the 
Serbian state. Immediately after the open letter was issued the UNHCR-led Refugee Protection 
Working Group (RPWG) gathered “over 70 representatives of authorities, UN agencies, other 
agencies and NGOs and donors/diplomatic missions” to discuss the Open Letter as well as their 
announcement to plan relocation into several camps (Serbia Update 03-06 November, 2016). The 
group then followed through on November 7th by sending a letter to the Inter-ministerial Working 
Group on Mixed Migration of the Government of Serbia suggesting how and which UN and civil 
society organizations would be willing to assist authorities in the relocation of refugees and 
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migrants from Belgrade to governmental centers (Serbia Update 07-09 November, 2016). 
Many in the NGO community voiced skepticism about the actual merit and intent of the 
open letter.  One respondent summarized her interpretation of the event as such: [It] was a letter 
from the state which says that we can’t do distribution, the only centers where distribution is 
allowed are state camps because they are the state, and they are the only ones who can provide this 
kind of humanitarian aid to the refugees. But we still do it, unofficially, unofficially we still do 
distribution (T. J., personal communication, April 25, 2017). Thus, in a relationship of tacit 
allowance from the Serbian state, a number of independent NGOs began to operate in the Barracks 
despite its apparent condemnation by the authorities. Other NGOs, however, continued to be 
discouraged from operating in the Barracks.22  
Despite the repeated claims by the state that there were no disincentivizing factors from 
registering in a state run camp, the refugees and migrants sleeping rough around Belgrade and in 
the country’s North remained hesitant. In the broad push to sequester refugees and migrants in 
state-run camps in early November, 2016 only 110 out of the close to 1500 people in informal 
sleeping situations chose to enter a state camp. Those 110 who did so as a group on the morning 
of November 10th were collectively transferred to the closed Preševo Reception Center in the far 
south of the country, reportedly without informing them of their destination prior (S.T., personal 
communication, April 17, 2017). Developments like this proved to be an extremely contentious 
issue for the residents of the Barracks, who almost entirely, were all planning to continue on to 
Western Europe through Hungary or Croatia. Moving a group of people, who willingly entered 
themselves within state system, all the way to the south of the country where such progression 
                                               
22During the winter and spring of 2017 independent, generally non-Serbian, organizations such as Hot Food 
Idomeni, SoulWelders, and No Name Kitchen were not stopped from distributing humanitarian aid to the refugees 
and migrants in the Barracks while other organizations were forced to cease operations within the informal camp 
after the open letter was issued.  
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would be impossible, served to diminish the already tenuous bonds of trust of many with the 
Serbian state. The repercussions of these actions were further compounded by reports that “a group 
of 41 asylum- seekers, including families with children from refugee-producing countries, who 
had registered for asylum in Nis on November [5th] and received referral letters to Tutin 
Temporary Asylum Centre were illegally expelled” to Macedonia (Serbia Update 10-13 
November, 2016). 
Tellingly, this period in early November also saw an upsurge in political actions among 
residents of the Barracks in Belgrade. On 11 November, around 130 refugees and migrants, mostly 
men from Afghanistan and Pakistan, set out on a protest march from Belgrade to the Croatian 
border (Serbia Update 10-13 November, 2016). While a few decided to return to Belgrade due to 
cold and exhaustion, the others continued and reached Šid by train on 13 November. In the morning 
on 14 November, some 30-40 remained near the border crossing at Šid, refusing to relocate to 
government facilities despite government offers, instead maintaining that they would wait until 
they were allowed to proceed to Western Europe. Ultimately, the march ended peacefully later that 
day. After being prevented by Serbian and Croatian authorities from crossing into Croatia at Šid, 
they decided to return to Belgrade by train, refusing the SCRM offer for transport to government 
facilities (Serbia Update 14-16 November, 2016). 
From November into the depths of winter, the situation for refugees and migrants in 
Belgrade would only worsen from an area of humanitarian concern to one verging on a crisis. The 
winter of 2016/2017 was a particularly harsh one and the refugees and migrants sleeping rough in 
the Barracks began being presented months of freezing temperatures, outbreaks of scabies and 
body lice, food insecurity, and serious concerns associated with the carcinogenic plastics and 
railroading material they were forced to burn for warmth. In this time period, Reuters reported 
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cases of self-prostitution from minors in the Barracks. An unaccompanied minor living in the 
Barracks remarked that “They come here and target the foolish ones...They ask how much money 
you need. They pay and they go, but they do bad things with them,” explaining how some men 
offer up to 2,000 Serbian dinars ($17) to have sex with the boys. (Taylor and Cardi, 2017)  
It is important to understand why many would choose to stay in the Barracks and other 
informal settlements around Serbia despite the lack of government assistance, the adverse 
conditions, and the promise of a more stable day-to-day living environment. The fear of being put 
in the system and ultimately being tied to Serbia was a fear of many refugees and migrants in the 
country. This fear was born from general confusion about the EU’s country-of-first-entry rule, the 
Dublin Protocol, and the EU-Turkey ultimately served to push many away from state-run centers. 
Additionally, staying in the Barracks or the informal refugee camps in Subotica and Šid 
significantly eased the means in which one could attempt to enter the EU irregularly with a 
smuggler or with a group. This is an angle with which the Serbian media and state sources often 
brought attention to however it is important to recognize the other compelling reasons for which 
many did not seek out state centers. For many, the Barracks offered an established community of 
support and solidarity. In this way, some sacrificed the safety and comfort of beds in state-run 
asylum centers for the independent, community support found in the Barracks. Independent NGO 
workers certainly provided a role in this dynamic not only through their provision of assistance, 
but through the genuine friendship, support, and solidarity that they offered to the residents of the 
Barracks.  
Nonetheless, the winter took its toll on many and through the course of the season there 
were a number of large exoduses from the Barracks to government center, particularly once the 
Obrenovac Transit Center opened up on January 17, 2017 as an ECHO-funded emergency measure 
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(Inter-agency Report February, 2017). These actions provided accommodations for almost 800 
refugees and migrants over the winter, who would fill up the center in the following months, 
however a steady stream of new arrivals from Macedonia and Bulgaria ensured that hundreds 
would continue living rough in the center of Belgrade through the winter (Inter-agency Report 
April, 2017). Time magazine described this dynamic as  
A political game, where Europe points its finger at Serbia for its management of refugees, 
UNHCR suggests not considering Serbia a safe country, Serbia replies that it doesn’t want 
to enact extreme measures like Europe has done, that it doesn’t want to use force to make 
people go to camps. Both sides seem to think they are doing better than the other. (Time, 
“Migrants”, 2017)  
This complex entwinement of securitization and humanitarian aid is what has led some journalists 
to refer to those trapped in Serbia as “Europe’s outsourced refugees” (Nallu, 2017).  
 
The Demolition of the Barracks in May, 2017 
In early May, 2017 the Barracks, which housed more than a thousand refugees and 
migrants through the course of the previous winter, began to be cleared by authorities. Videos 
surfaced on May 10th of a Serbian government worker in full chemical protection gear spraying 
down the buildings of the complex with a chemical substance later claimed to be pesticide. He 
paid no attention to the refugees and their belongings, spraying them with the chemicals as well. 
One NGO volunteer who observed the event remarked that “it was done with no regard to their 
humanity at all. They just came into everybody’s rooms and started spraying what could have been 
a dangerous toxic substance. They just sprayed it over what little belongings they have, it was 
scary and rude and undignified.” Inhabitants of the Barracks were reportedly given five minutes 
before the chemical spraying began (Goddard, 2017).  
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Figure 3. Graffiti left on a wall of a Barracks structure as it was demolished in May, 2017 
(Sapoch, 2017) 
 
Contradicting these videos, the Serbian Commissariat denied any role in the use of 
insecticide, saying it is “not mandated with any kind of spraying” and adding that it could not 
confirm who carried out the spraying (Goddard, 2017). On the morning of the next day the 
remaining residents were woken up and began being pushed out of the Barracks. Most were loaded 
up onto buses and dispersed throughout the country in state centers, many without prior knowledge 
of their destination, before the demolition process began later that day.  
In the days following the long-threatened eviction, the Serbian state and NGOs sent mixed 
signals about the success of the clearing and demolition of the Barracks.  On the one hand, the 
Serbian state triumphed the success of this operation, claiming that the refugees were “transported 
in an organised manner in buses to the reception and asylum centres” and the whole process went 
“without slightest incident or unwanted action” (Goddard, 2017). Ivan Mišković, a representative 
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from the Serbian Commissariat remarked that the  
moving out of migrants from the Barracks and other public spaces in the Belgrade city 
center was carried out in a highly human and proper manner, at the same time taking into 
account migrants’ human rights...All the migrants, more than 900, were properly informed 
a week in advance and provided with information on free beds in reception and asylum 
centers managed by the Commissariat for Refugees and Migration of the Republic of 
Serbia. Also, they were given an option to apply themselves and to choose where to be 
accommodated. (Goddard, 2017) 
Presenting the eviction as a matter of voluntary choice, the representative went on to say that “It 
is our impression that they themselves realized that living in the Barracks in question was no longer 
sustainable for many reasons. And, of which is more important, by moving them from those places 
we protect them from smugglers and other forms of abuse” (Goddard, 2017). 
This narrative was disputed on the other hand by a number of predominantly independent 
NGOs. One long-term volunteer with the group SolidariTea remarked how her and her 
organization “were shocked at how inhumane and disorganized the eviction was...The 
commissariat came into the Barracks where people were sleeping at 7am, waking people up by 
hitting them with tent poles, dismantling their tents while people still slept inside and not giving 
anyone time to gather their meagre belongings” (Goddard, 2017). Another independent group, 
SoulWelders, documented the eviction of the residents in a video released on their Facebook page 
that stressed the disordered, poorly informed, and inhumane nature of the eviction (SouldWelders, 
2017). Nonetheless, while some local aid workers reported chaos, other organizations, many of 
them UNHCR-affiliated, described the evacuation as a “remarkably smooth operation” (Goddard, 
2017). 
Since most of the previous 1,500 residents of this space were relocated to state centers 
across Serbia, this development profoundly affected how assistance was provided to refugees and 
migrants in Belgrade. Arguably, it also signaled the end of an era of the refugee crisis in Serbia 
with more and more of the refugee and migrant population being contained in state run asylum 
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and transit centers. This presented new obstacles to the state and NGO community. With over 95% 
of the refugees and migrants in Serbia now accommodated in state-run centers, the engagement of 
NGOs in assistance work largely relies on the approval of the Serbian state, opening up increased 
possibilities for the differential treatment of NGOs engaged in contentious political advocacy 
(Inter-agency Report May, 2017).  
 In some ways, this event highlighted new points of tension as well. On May 5th there was 
a meeting called by the Commissioner of the Commissariat and held in the downtown Miksalište 
building amongst representatives of a number of prominent NGOs involved in refugee assistance 
in the city. The ostensible purpose of this meeting was to outline the Commissariat plans to move 
forward with the long expected closure of the informal Barracks camp in downtown Belgrade and 
begin the conversation on the role that these groups would play in this period of transition. Just 
how this role has progressed is up for debate. It has been frustrated, in some ways, by contradicting 
behavior by the state. Despite telling NGOs they gathered for the meeting on the Barracks that the 
clearing process would take place over a month, they instead cleared and destroyed the site within 
a week (A.S., personal communication, May 8th, 2017).  Additionally, a Croatian blog designed 
to inform independent volunteers and workers operating in the refugee crisis wrote of “reports of 
officials softening their attitudes towards groups that had been assisting refugees in the Barracks," 
which had been previously been fraught. They tempered this observation, however, by additionally 
reflecting that officials were trying to “bargain with volunteers and grassroots organizations, 
dangling the idea of camp access” in exchange for cooperation, “when this doesn’t work, force is 
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threatened.” (AYS, Silenced, 2017). 
 
Figure 4. The Eagle Hills buildings serve as a backdrop to the demolished Barracks in late May, 
2017 (Sapoch, 2017) 
 
While life in the Barracks was in many ways a harsh and trying experience for its 
inhabitants, it was an important space for many as well. Speaking on this feeling, Ahmed, a 24-
year-old refugee from Afghanistan who had been moved to a state center, remarked to a reporter 
that he had not wanted to leave the Barracks because although the conditions were adverse they 
had become his home. He remarked that “in these camps we’re not free, we live like 
animals...We’re fed and then we sleep and that’s all we do. In the Barracks we had a good life; we 
were all living together here and we were free” (Goddard, 2017). In many ways, the closure of the 
Barracks signaled the conclusion of a period of human movement which had first begun to be 
constrained a year prior during the closure of the EU borders around Serbia. The new period that 
 
EUROPE’S OUTSOURCED REFUGEES      Sapoch, 63 
these changes heralded have, at this point, been defined by the restricted movement of refugees 
and migrants and an increased scrutiny on the nature of their prolonging stay in Serbia.  
The Barracks were ultimately cleared due to its place in the plans of the multi-billion dollar 
Belgrade Waterfront development project, which when finished, will include skyscrapers, luxury 
penthouse apartments, shopping malls, hotels and parks (Goddard, 2017). The irony of this 
Emirati-funded project had been, for many months, apparent as skyscrapers slowly rose next to 
the squalor of the Barracks.  
 
Conclusion 
Analyzing the political dynamics of NGO work assisting refugees and migrants in Belgrade 
is a challenging case study. The current refugee situation in Serbia is still quite young, less than 
three years old. On top of that, the situation is constantly evolving as international circumstances 
change. There is comparatively little precedent for such a complicated and evolving environment 
that engages state actors, international institutions, aid providers (both local and international), and 
people in various states of displacement. On top of all of this, the situation is situated within the 
context of Serbia which is itself a post-conflict society. All the same, this chapter has attempted to 
outline these factors and situate them within the political and historical context of Serbia.  As one 
NGO worker put it, a “situation, which is as highly tense as the refugee crisis in Serbia, brings out 
so much [sic]  things that are in the carpet when everything is okay” (J. B., personal 
communication, April 26, 2017). While these dynamics may not define every aspect of the 
assistance provided to refugees and migrants in Serbia, they certainly inform its manifestation. 
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III - Organizational Structures and Their Applications 
 
The problem is, you know, Serbia is weird, Serbia is strange, Serbia is different, the 
Balkans [were] different, you can do things here differently. We are using it to our 
advantage, unfortunately Europe is also using it, and the whole system is using it...that is 
how it is right now and looks like it is going to be how it is for a long time, and we need to 
be here  
- B.A. 
 
 
This paper sheds light on how refugee assistance organizations operate and develop their 
operational strategies in the context of the changing environment in which they work. I argue that 
despite the diversity of ways these organizations mediate structural factors, the organizational field 
creates powerful incentives for NGOs to structure themselves in ways which help further the 
interests and obligations of the state. In this way, institutional pressure serves to reinforce the role 
of NGOs in humanitarian work as both objects and subjects of governance. In terms of the refugee 
crisis in Serbia, the constraints and pressures applied to refugee assistance organizations work, 
broadly speaking and in no particular order, towards the interest of the Serbian state, the European 
Union, and international institutions. It should be understood that while these three entities have 
overlapping interests in governance, they are by no means identical. This is rooted in Foucault's 
concept of governmentality which refers to an “indirect form of power exerted upon a population 
through a configuration of institutions, ideas, routines and procedures to induce individual subjects 
to govern themselves” (Richter, 2008, p. 1). Importantly, government in this sense is not limited 
to the formal institutions and policies of the state, but refers to the entire repertoire of institutions, 
procedures, analytical techniques, strategies and practices configured to shape human behavior 
towards a particular end (Richter, 2008 on Foucault, 1994a:  220). 
Several questions are born from this consideration. How do NGOs structure themselves to 
best secure funding and beneficiaries? What sorts of projects do they engage in? Who else do they 
 
EUROPE’S OUTSOURCED REFUGEES      Sapoch, 65 
work with? Important to this analysis is understanding how the organizational field influences the 
ways that organizations navigate these questions. To this end, it is important to account for the 
funding structures and political institutions which exert influence on these groups. Understanding 
these questions allows us to better account for the considerable variation of organizational 
structures within the field as well as shed light on the overall role that these organizations have in 
the assistance of refugees and migrants.  
Accordingly, this chapter outlines four distinct patterns of organizational structure that 
exist within the community of NGOs providing assistance to refugees and migrants in Serbia. 
These ideal organization types are referred to as independent, international, institutional domestic, 
and non-institutional domestic. The four categories provide a way of characterizing the general 
management structure and project focus of organizations; however, it is recognized that within 
these ideal-types, organizational activities vary widely. I use case studies of several organizations 
from each category to demonstrate this as well as to highlight the underlying characteristic of each 
group. The evidence from these examples illustrates a broader picture of organizational structure 
and activity which are malleable to the changing landscape of assistance in Serbia. 
Methodology 
This research is based on information gathered over the course of two separate periods of 
data collection in Serbia during 2017. To identify the participants of this study, I used the contacts 
and relationships which I formed through my volunteer work with Hot Food Idomeni, a 
humanitarian NGO, as well as my semester in SIT’s Peace and Conflict in the Balkans program. 
My data consists of 20 semi-structured interviews which were conducted with participants from 
14 different non-governmental organizations which were engaged in the assistance of refugees and 
migrants in Serbia between 2016 and 2017. In addition, I conducted several more interviews 
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through email and Skype to supplement the information obtained in my initial rounds of data 
collection.  
The affiliation of the participants to their organizations varied to a certain extent as some 
held paid positions while others did not and others held high-ranking roles within their groups 
while others held lower positions. For the purposes of this study, it did not make sense to limit the 
scope of these interviews to individuals financially employed by their organizations as this would 
have diminished the important and sizeable work done by volunteer and independent organizations 
which disproportionately rely on pro-bono work. All the same, the parameters of this study 
required that the participants were involved for a minimum of four months with the organization. 
In the presentation of my findings I have made sure to protect the personal identities of the 
participants through the use of pseudonyms. It should be noted, however, that with the consent of 
my participants I have included the names of some of the organizations for which they work. This 
move was designed to better demonstrate the finer details of the NGO community within Serbia.  
Importantly, this study holds a wide range of perspectives from Serbia’s NGO community. 
In order to include and present potentially different perspectives in my research I also interviewed 
individuals from the Commissariat for Refugees. The organizations I interacted with for the 
purpose of this project were either based around Belgrade or Šid; however many had projects 
located in other parts of the country. The demographic makeup of my participants varied widely. 
Of the 21 participants that I formally interviewed, 12 were Serbian citizens. The rest were 
international workers or volunteers from the EU, the United States, or Australia. Slightly more 
than half were female. Roughly a quarter were from international and independent organizations 
respectively. The rest of my participants were from domestic, Serbian NGOs. Of these domestic 
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organizations, slightly over half were newer, less institutionalized organizations and the rest were 
more established and professionalized organizations.   
In these semi-structured interviews, I asked participants a number of questions about their 
organizational strategies and approaches to refugee assistance and activism. I inquired about their 
primary methods of funding and whether or not their organization had experienced any particular 
competition for funding within the field. Additionally, I asked them about their relationship the 
Serbian state and the EU, as well as their experience with several key events during the course of 
the Serbian refugee crisis.  
Organization Types 
A group of heavy-smoking, Spanish-speaking, twenty-somethings living together in a 
small house on the border of Serbia and Croatia. Eight well-dressed intellectuals typing together 
silently in a second-floor office on a sleepy Belgrade street. An international hodge-podge of 
doctors and program managers in a noisy clinic ringing with a handful of different languages. A 
pair of bonafide backpackers-turned-volunteers chopping wood together outside an old industrial 
building. What do these groups of people share in common? Despite their immediate differences, 
they are brought together through their engagement in the assistance of refugees and migrants in 
Serbia. Motivated by different reasons, working towards various goals with varying degrees of 
efficacy, these groups form the basis of an organizational field centered on the assistance of 
refugees and migrants within the country. They are brought together under this loose banner of 
identity.  
While working in this field, each group must answer several fundamental questions. Where 
will they find funding to conduct their work? Where will they engage with the people that they 
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assist? How will they assist them? For how long will they assist them? Will the group find 
volunteers or paid staff to accomplish their mission?  
For some, the answers to these questions are self-explanatory. MSF’s mission in Belgrade 
will get funding from their international headquarters. Hot Food Idomeni, as per their name, will 
provide hot nutritious food to hungry refugees and migrants. The Belgrade Initiative for Human 
Rights, as it has done for the past 30 years, will assist in the litigation and defense of human rights 
issues affecting vulnerable people within the country. As for the future goals, institutional Serbian 
organizations will continue to do the best that they can for vulnerable people within the country, 
regardless of whether or not they are refugees.  
Similar to Laura Henry’s (2010) description of the Russian green movement, the 
humanitarian assistance community that developed around Serbia has been by its very nature 
heterogeneous  and divisive. In part, this has been because the humanitarian assistance of refugees 
is a broad concept which encompasses a wide array of needs including, to name a few, access to 
food, access to psychosocial services, human rights, human movement, and legal advocacy. To 
this end, the single overarching and unifying goal that the community works towards is muddled 
by a grey area of intentionality. In the Serbian case in particular, the general heterogeneity of the 
community is compounded further by the unique positionality of the country within the broader 
European refugee crisis. As a key transit country on the Western Balkan route towards Western 
Europe, Serbia saw hundreds of thousands of people move through its borders between 2014 and 
2016, with few rarely staying for more than several days. The EU border closures and increasingly 
negative populist attitudes towards migrants in EU countries resulted in Serbia becoming an 
important strategic holding point as the last barrier of entry for migration-weary Schengen-zone 
countries. Since then, despite the absence of any sustainable asylum procedures, refugees and 
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migrants stay in the country longer without any clear solutions for their future. Thus, this has 
resulted in the development of a unique field of organizational assistance with established civil 
society organizations, new domestic organizations, international institutions, and international 
solidarity groups all stepping in to facilitate the assistance of refugees and migrants within Serbia, 
most of whom have aspirations of leaving the country for wealthier Western Europe.  
Broadly speaking, four distinct patterns of organizational structure exist within the 
community of NGOs providing assistance to refugees and migrants in Serbia. These ideal 
organization types are referred to as independent, international, institutional domestic, and non-
institutional domestic organizations. Given that these are constructed categories, this is not a 
perfect method for delineating the considerable variety of organizations active in Serbia, 
nonetheless these ideal types serve as a general road map of organizational structure and strategy. 
Within the distinct patterns of organizational structure, groups vary can significantly.  
 
Independent groups tend to be spontaneous mobilizations. Most are relatively young 
organizations and non-professional with very few, if any, paid positions within the organizations. 
Currently, these groups are comprised of almost exclusively of young, international, volunteers 
although it should be noted that the landscape of independent groups has changed over time. 
During the beginning of the refugee crisis, during the summer of 2015, the sorts of solidarity 
mobilizations consistent with independent NGOs were almost exclusively domestic Serbian 
initiatives. Milan and Pirro (2018) identify Refugee Aid Miksalište and Info Park as two of the 
most important independent organizations during this period. It is of note that in the time frame of 
my study, between March, 2016 and June, 2017, these two Serbian organizations had 
professionalized into established NGOs.  
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These groups often derive a bulk of their funding from individual donations and other 
crowdfunding initiatives. Their smaller size and non-professional nature also correspond with a 
horizontal organizational structure. Seldom do these groups have the hallmarks of professionalized 
organizations, including a board of directors or dedicated email accounts.   
The goals of independent groups are stratified on two highly divergent levels. On the one 
hand, these groups seek to provide for the most immediate and direct needs of refugees and 
migrants within Serbia. To this end, independent groups are likely to engage in the distribution of 
food and non-food items (NFIs) like shoes or coats, and engage in person-to-person socialization. 
On the other hand, a large number of these groups have backgrounds rooted in activism and 
solidarity movements which result in an awareness of the systemic and institutional factors at play 
in the mistreatment of refugees and migrants on the Balkan route. Given their lack of a highly 
visible platform to spread awareness or engage in political advocacy, these groups tend to play to 
their strengths by mobilizing their sizeable solidarity networks, engaging in “witnessing” 
activities, or simply engaging in politically contentious forms of assistance.  
These independent groups most often have affiliations with other independent volunteer 
groups either in the country or abroad. Nonetheless, it is not rare to have working relationships 
with international groups and the sorts of non-institutional and younger domestic NGOs operating 
within the country. The international aid organization Médecins Sans Frontieres is notable for its 
engagement and working relationship with a wide variety of independent groups in Serbia. 
However, apart from this, cooperation between independent and international organizations is 
minimal. Representatives from various independent groups active in Belgrade during the spring of 
2017 would meet weekly in a cafe in the city’s central train station close by to the Barracks to 
discuss strategies for cooperation and activism (B.A., personal communication, December 20, 
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2017). Additionally, there were a number of Facebook pages and message groups dedicated to 
sharing information between independent groups.23  
 Importantly, they often work, to some capacity, outside of state-run transit and asylum 
centers. The Belgrade Barracks as well as squats in Subotica, Šid, Horgoš, and Sombor have all 
been regions of sustained activity from independent organizations. 
 
Non-institutional Domestic groups are typically less professionalized and have been formed in 
the context of the refugee crisis.  Thus, they are younger and their staffing and organizational 
decisions tend to reflect this as well. Most started out as civic or grassroots initiatives at the 
beginning of the refugee crisis which then grew into more structured organizations as time 
progressed. Non-institutional groups may have a paid staff and a hierarchical organizational 
structure, however this tends to be held to a looser standard. These groups often have close contact 
with independent organizations.  
Similar to institutional domestic groups, the non-institutional Serbian organizations often 
conduct projects which address deep-seeded Serbian problems but typically operate at a lower, 
more-on-the-ground capacity. To this end, these groups often provide help with the initial stages 
of the asylum procedures, general informational debriefs about the situation in Serbia, educational 
activities, referrals, initial receptions, and to a less extent, the direct distribution of NFIs.   
These organizations are often affiliated as partner organizations with international 
institutions or international NGOs and serve as a source of referrals for established, institutional 
NGOS. At the field level, these groups often have close and personal relationships with 
                                               
23 The most prominent social media page used by independent NGO volunteers and workers was the Information 
Point for Belgrade Volunteers group which had more than 700 members and was started by long-term volunteers 
from Refugee Aid Serbia and Hot Food Idomeni. The page was based off of similarly-named groups targeted at 
foreign volunteers working in Greece and Turkey.    
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independent organizations and, similar to these organizations, benefit from the work and assistance 
of foreign volunteers. Overall, they tend to exhibit similar traits to other domestic groups but are 
made distinct through their relatively young staff and recent roots as civic initiatives. They tend to 
be less professional than other Serbian groups yet, importantly, have become much more 
professional in comparison to their initial identities at the beginning of the refugee crisis in the 
summer of 2015. Indicative of this shift is the substantial staffing changes that many of these 
groups have experienced over the past several years; as brought up to me by Chiara Milan who 
interviewed figures from these organizations in 2015, “both organizations relied on local and 
foreign volunteers at first, and they also changed over time” (Chiara Milan, personal 
correspondence, March 7, 2018). To this end, the early iterations of Refugee Aid Miksalište and 
Info Park were not staffed by the same people as they are currently. They now both have paid 
employees who were hired from within the professional assistance community. Accordingly, it is 
likely that their workplace cultures have evolved as well.  
The level of political contention with which non-institutional domestic groups are willing 
to engage in varied. Many of these former civic initiatives secured established international 
partners as they began to professionalize. Some groups oriented their behavior to reflect this 
partnership, by adopting similar stances to their partner organizations, while others leveraged their 
relationships to better accomplish their own organizational goals, paying less regard to the interests 
of their partner organizations. With that being said, it appears that nearly all non-institutional 
domestic groups have had to think carefully about their relationship with the Serbian state. Their 
status as new organizations which disproportionately engaged in the direct assistance of recently 
arrived refugees and migrants put them in an uncomfortable position after the Serbian government 
issued the Open Letter. Accordingly, these organizations responded in a variety of ways.  
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Institutional Domestic groups are highly “professionalized”, a word used here to describe the 
emulation of a Western organizational style. They often have paid staff, a dedicated bank account, 
a heavily hierarchical organizational structure, a board of directors, and a rented office space. For 
the purposes of this study, I consider institutional domestic groups to be organizations which either 
existed prior to the refugee crisis as a professionalized organization or were professionalized from 
their conception.  
The goals of these organizations tend to be centered on addressing issues surrounding 
refugees and migrants in Serbia from a professional standpoint. These groups offer specific 
services at specific times and places, most often in rented or owned offices. They tend to have 
established relationships with relevant state institutions, such as the Commissariat for Refugees 
and Migrants or the Belgrade City Center for Social Work. These previous relationships, or 
perhaps their established role within Serbian civil society, may also explain why many of these 
organizations are granted access to work state-run asylum and transit centers. Only international 
institutions are granted access more frequently. This work is often lobbying or consultation on 
national migration issues, producing reports on the situation, providing psychosocial, legal, or 
educational support to asylum seekers. To this end, these groups function as the local foot soldiers 
of the neoliberal assistance model. From a professional standpoint, they assist refugees and 
migrants in ways that the government cannot and work to build up the capacity of the Serbian state 
to align their asylum and migration system with that of the EU. 
In the Serbian case, institutional domestic groups interact with each other in a number of 
professional capacities such as the Policy Advocacy Group (PAG) which is a coalition of 
established NGOs, such as Praxis and Grupa 484, which deal with migration issues on the policy 
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side. The PAG was formed in 2011 with help from the Norwegian Embassy, one worker within 
this network described it as a group of civil society organizations which “work together on 
monitoring the policy framework situation on the field when it comes to access to rights of 
migrants and different categories of migrants” (G. G., personal communication, May 3, 2017). 
To this end, these NGOs often engage in lobbying and bargaining with decision-making 
authorities at different platforms, obtaining support from government actors, building up pressures 
through various campaign mechanisms, and actively engaging in institutional advocacy activities 
(Panda, p. 261). They are often affiliated partners with international institutions, such as the 
UNHCR or Embassy funds, and work closely with state institutions and international NGOs. They 
are often organizations of referral for newer, domestic NGOs or independent groups. Moreover, 
they often pursue multiple goals and projects at a time and rely heavily on foreign funding. 
Importantly, similar to Henry’s (2010) findings, they are also less likely to engage in protest or 
contentious forms of activism (p. 147). 
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Figure 5. A small billboard erected in downtown 
Belgrade by Asylum Protection Center, an 
institutional domestic NGO. It message 
translates to “They are cold and afraid. Let’s help 
them find shelter and understanding [while they 
are] in centers in Serbia.” The sign also displays 
the logo of the Serbian government’s Office for 
Cooperation with Civil Society across from 
which is the European Union’s logo and a small 
bit of text which reads: “This project is financed 
by the European Union. (Sapoch, 2017 
 
International groups, by their very nature, are the local project or initiative of a larger organization 
based outside of the country. They often have a close relationship with state agencies and are 
funded by their organizational headquarters and, to a lesser extent, from grants from powerful 
donors. The Danish Refugee Council, for example, received a large amount of funding from the 
European Union’s ECHO fund in support of a projects such as its “Enhancing Protection and 
Humanitarian Aid in FYROM and Serbia” project (DRC, 2017). They have all of the hallmarks of 
a professionalized organization - a bank account, a hierarchical organizational structure, a board 
of directors, a dedicated office space, and professional public relations materials.  
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The goals of these organizations are most often derived from the general interests of the 
organization’s headquarters, which is often mediated by the project leaders within the country. 
Given that most of these organizations are devoted to crisis response, humanitarian response, or 
refugee assistance, their presence in the state of Serbia is largely dependent on the existence of 
beneficiaries. As one employee of MSF said, 
We need to understand that to be in Serbia and Europe today for MSF, it is a big choice, 
this context is not typical context in which MSF operates, it is not a conflict, like active 
conflict ongoing, and there is [sic] no natural disasters, so the other option for MSF to 
intervene in certain contact is to have a choice. (A.C. #2, personal communication, 
December 15, 2017) 
This perhaps points to the mitigation of a burden to act in accordance with the political norms of 
the host country. The lack of an established imperative to “remain” in the country lowers the 
potential damages of “not playing by the rules” 
These organizations tend to have well-developed relationships with actors across the 
spectrum, perhaps due to their international clout. To this end, these groups often have working 
relationships with state agencies and institutional, domestic NGOs. Additionally, for international 
NGOs with a deep well of funding to draw upon typically have close, established connections with 
smaller sub-funded domestic or independent organizations.  
 
Strategies of Refugee Assistance 
The following section builds off of the previously developed taxonomy of organization types by 
presenting a series of in-depth case studies of several organizations from each category to 
demonstrate their underlying characteristics. Importantly, these case studies also serve to stress 
the differences that exist within these organizational categories. The evidence from these 
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examples illustrates a heterogeneous community of NGOs which has been made malleable by 
the changing landscape of assistance in Serbia. 
 
Independent  
No Name Kitchen - No Name Kitchen is a predominantly Spanish organization which describes 
itself as a group of independent people from around the world dedicated to helping provide food 
and nutrition to those in need. This entirely volunteer run solidarity group formed spontaneously 
in the Belgrade Barracks in the winter of 2017 after a group of six volunteers from Greece came 
to the city to deliver humanitarian supplies to refugees and migrants. Several of the volunteers 
ended up staying and began organizing a volunteer-based network within the Barracks.  
No Name Kitchen’s website contains a self-proclaimed manifesto which outlines its core 
ideals. Emphasizing this structural independence, the organization identifies itself as “a group of 
independent people organized with an horizontal structure” (No Name Kitchen, MANIFESTO). 
Continuing, the manifesto reads as follows: 
Our project is based on the idea of covering one of the most basic and universal needs: 
food.  
We were born from the profound indignation that we feel towards the inequality and 
injustice that capitalist and [sic] racist system creates. This system segregates people 
depending on their original country and doesn’t respect the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, such as the right of movement (article 13) or right for food or medical or 
for a home (article 25).  
We escape from the paternalist models and from vertical charity models. We want to show 
solidarity to our equals, and practice civil disobedience. We want to engage with the 
vulnerable situation that some people are in, cooperating together to provide food to the 
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people that need it. Our values are integration, a nondiscriminatory approach and mutual 
aid. (No Name Kitchen, MANIFESTO) 
Elaborating on the idea of rejecting a vertical charity model, a member of No Name Kitchen 
explained that “we speak with each other weekly, and we sit down and we get decisions, between 
all of us…we choose what we do and how we do it...we are all at the same level” (B.A., personal 
communication, December 20, 2017). 
 The group’s organizational culture is influenced, to some extent, by the cultures of activism 
and ideology reminiscent of anarchist solidarity collectives active in Greece and Western Europe. 
It is important to note that while a number of participants in this study characterized the members 
of this organization as being “anarchists”, the organization does not necessarily identify with that 
label. That being said, the group engages in activities which are clearly derived from the traditions 
of anarchist solidarity groups like No Borders, particularly in their dedication to “witnessing”, or 
self-reporting acts of border violence. Along with several other independent organizations active 
in Serbia, No Name Kitchen helped launch a website called borderviolence.eu which maps and 
“documents illegal push-backs and police violence inflicted by EU member state authorities, in 
the  EU borderlands surrounding Serbia” (Border Violence Monitoring, 2018). Rather than relying 
on traditional media or institutional outlets, which are often unable or uninterested in reporting 
these human rights abuses, this initiative enables groups like No Name Kitchen to self-report and 
document the crimes they witness on a daily basis.  
Self-definition can be a hard thing for the sorts of humanitarian groups which fall outside 
the lines of the traditional NGO framework. To this end, “independent” has become a unifying 
way of describing these sorts of organizations although it is interesting to see where and when 
certain descriptions are deployed. No Name Kitchen is a registered non-governmental organization 
in Spain. However when asked the question over whether or not the self-identified as an NGO, a 
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member of the team gave a more reserved response: “NGO? I don't know, we don't even know 
what we are. We are just a group of friends, that we believe in something, and we just gather with 
each other, we just get money from different people” (B.A., personal communication, December 
20, 2017).  
Within a year the organization went from being an impromptu supply delivery mission to 
being a legally registered NGO. It went from having six active volunteers to over 40 in the 
summertime. It went from providing a single daily meal distribution to providing additional 
services such as a medical clinic and a free clothes market. Thus, although the ideological 
differences between NNK and traditional NGOs may be great, NNK is by all means a rapidly 
expanding organization with a strong possibility of institutionalizing further within the next year.  
 
Hot Food Idomeni - Hot Food Idomeni started as an independent, volunteer-based response to the 
overcrowded transit camp in Idomeni on the Greek-Macedonian border in early 2016. As word 
spread of the worsening humanitarian crisis in the Belgrade Barracks, the organization made the 
decision to open up a new project in the city providing hot meals with high nutritional value to the 
refugees and migrants sleeping rough outside of the state asylum system. Importantly, the group’s 
decision to continue providing this service to the residents of the Barracks after the issuance of the 
Open Letter, was surrounded by a large amount of uncertainty. Leveraging their identity as an 
independent group of foreigners, and framing their activities as crisis response, they were tacitly 
permitted by the Serbian state to continue this work. According to one long-term volunteer,  
The guy who runs the group, he was emailing the Commissariat and all the people in the 
authorities each day to say what we were doing, what time we would be at the squat, how 
many meals we were gonna be providing, to keep them informed….on the basis that it was 
an emergency response and the authorities kinda turned a blind eye to so we were able to 
carry on. (A.R., personal communication, April 15, 2017)  
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This project gradually expanded and by the time the Serbian government opened the Obrenovac 
Transit Center in an attempt to relocate the residents of the Barracks, they were asked to provide 
food services in the camp as well.  
 Hot Food Idomeni engaged in what was arguably some of the most visible and media 
friendly activities amongst the community of independent volunteer groups in Serbia. Their 
activities, the production and distribution of nutritious and warm meals, were easy for an outsider 
to understand. Further, the lines which formed in the Barracks for this service were loosely 
controlled by volunteer line-herders which kept a semblance of order to a single file line for food 
that numbered in the hundreds. Thus, this service drew the inhabitants of the Barracks, who were 
often inside the structures or passing time elsewhere in town, into a single space at a relatively 
predictable time every day. This resulted in a high degree of media attention to the group’s 
distributions and accordingly the group as well. Looking back to the media coverage of the 
situation in the Barracks, which peaked around January or February of 2017, a high proportion of 
these images feature Hot Food Idomeni food line.  
 Perhaps as a result of this, the organization benefited from a positive reputation both 
internationally, as a place for potential volunteers, and domestically, within the Serbian 
government, as a mostly non-political independent group willing to feed the population of the 
Barracks who otherwise may go hungry. Accordingly, when the Serbian government opened up 
their transit camp in nearby Obrenovac, a move designed to attract the residents of the Barracks 
into state-run centers, the Serbian Commissariat for Refugees and Migrants invited the group to 
provide the camp’s lunches.  
 One of the most significant decisions that Hot Food Idomeni made was their decision to 
cease their activities in Belgrade and effectively immobilize their solidarity network. This was an 
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act finalized in early May, 2017, only several weeks before the demolition of the Belgrade 
Barracks. Importantly, the group did not pull out of the country due to funding constraints or for a 
lack of support. Rather, it was a decision made on the basis that the situation in the Barracks has 
stabilized to a point that it no longer constituted an immediate crisis. Their decision to effectively 
demobilize, gifting the majority of their equipment to other organizations, without plans for any 
immediate future activities is interesting for the way in which it subverts traditional assumptions 
about the self-preservation tendencies of NGOs.    
  
Belgraid - Belgraid is an independent, volunteer-based organization which primarily provides 
meals to refugees and migrants within state-run asylum or transit camps. The primary project of 
the organization consists of providing food to the predominantly young men staying in Obrenovac 
transit center. They took over the operations of Hot Food Idomeni in the spring of 2017 once that 
group decided to cease its operations within Serbia after deciding that, as a self-described 
emergency response organization, the situation in Belgrade had stabilized to a point which 
rendered their mission fulfilled. According to an employee at the organization 
The founder [of our organization] saw the need for there to be some kind of independent 
platform for volunteers to come and work in Serbia, starting in the Barracks when those 
were still a thing, and...started bringing volunteers in and then became a registered Serbian 
NGO in April [of 2017]. (C.S., personal communication, December 13, 2017) 
Perhaps symbolic of this transfer of activity, the Belgrade Barracks were evicted and demolished 
little more than a week after Belgraid began running its operations independently in Serbia. 
Accordingly, the bulk of its organizational effort became centered in the state-run Obrenovac 
transit center.  
In the following months, however, the group would begin managing other small projects, 
such as humanitarian support to unregistered refugees and migrants in the border town of Subotica. 
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Another project has been the distribution of NFIs to refugees and migrants around Belgrade who 
are outside of the system. Interestingly, the manner of funding these individual projects seems to 
be, on some level, the product of strategic framing. One figure from the organization remarked 
that 
 For our food program, the main source of funding is Oxfam Italia, they cover all of the 
food ingredients and also all food related costs like fuel for our vans when we do deliveries, 
gas for the kitchen and stuff like that. We do hygiene distributions, those are often funded 
by an organization's called Help Refugees, based in the UK, and then we have a bunch of 
private donors who cover other things such as our operations in Subotica and other 
distributions we do that don’t follow under hygiene. (C.S., personal communication, 
December 13, 2017)  
Thus, the most contentious organizational activities  have been funded through private donations 
and crowdfunding whereas more traditional methods of assistance, such as food distributions in 
state-run camps, has been funded by established funders like Oxfam. 
 Similar to other groups receiving crowdfunded and other private donations, Belgraid 
discussed the increased flexibility with which this funding approach offers: “Funding has sort of 
just happened in a really interesting way because people who have come and volunteered with us 
and loved what we do and want to support it, we are pretty flexible” (C.S., personal 
communication, December 13, 2017). Situating his organization in comparison to established 
institutional actors, the participant went on to remark that “While [Belgraid has] grown and we do 
have some established projects, we have some more flexibility than some of the established larger 
partners. Oxfam has very little freedom to just go in and do something, in the same way that we 
can” (C.S., personal communication, December 13, 2017). Thus, Belgraid serves as an example of 
an independent organization which seeks to leverage the unique organizational opportunities that 
its independent status allows, while also taking advantage of more institutional funding structures 
to accomplish its goals. 
   
 
EUROPE’S OUTSOURCED REFUGEES      Sapoch, 83 
International  
JRS - Serbia - Jesuit Refugee Service is an international organization with programs in more than 
50 countries including Serbia. The organization as a whole was formed by the head of the Jesuit 
Order of the Catholic Church in response to the population of Vietnamese refugees who became 
notorious as the “boat people” for the method of leaving the country.  The organization established 
an office in Serbia during the Yugoslav wars however this office closed in 2001. Their current 
mission in Serbia has been active since the EU borders closed around Serbia in March of 2016. 
Although initially involved in short-term relief operations, mainly in an informational provider 
and distributor of donated NFIs, their projects have gradually shifted towards the role of a long-
term service provider. Currently, the organization is devoting most the majority of its resources in 
Serbia towards its Pedro Arrupe House project which provides shelter and custody services to 
unaccompanied and separated children going through the asylum process in Serbia.  
 JRS Serbia should be viewed as indicative of a certain type of international organization 
active within Serbia. On the one hand, it leverages its international identity by highlighting its 
organizational advantages:  
The international dimension of JRS (we are present in 18 EU countries) allows us to be 
aware of the different asylum systems, legal frameworks and integrations praxis. 
Exchanging our experiences with other countries helps us find the best and fastest solutions 
to help to the people we serve (Jesuit Refugee Service, 2017) 
On the other hand, the Serbian offices are relatively small, with only five full-time employees, 
most of whom are Serbian. Arguably, the organizational makeup helps explain its strategic 
approach to handling the refugee crisis.  
 Like many organizations active in Serbia over the past several years, JRS initially provided 
direct assistance to refugees and migrants. After the Serbian state issued its Open Letter in 
November, and the situation became protracted, the organization began to shift its focus to long-
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term care. Interesting, this shift prompted the mediation of several interests. On the one hand, the 
organizations still wanted to provide assistance to refugees and migrants living outside of the 
system in Serbia. On the other hand, it didn’t wish to jeopardize its relationship with the Serbian 
state in doing so. As one figure from the organization remarked: 
I think most of the NGOs were doing it like this, so we are doing it, we are giving it to 
them but we just don’t want the police of the Commissariat to see us. So it was, we didn’t 
do it as much as some others, we were mostly giving money to other organizations to buy 
whatever they need so we had this stuff in the storage that we needed to distribute and after 
that we didn’t do it because we wanted to open this house and for this we needed a [lot of] 
cooperation from the government and we didn’t want to [sic] make anything that can be 
getting on their bad side. (V.M., personal communication, December 11, 2017) 
In this way, JRS followed a similar track to many international and domestic NGOs active in Serbia 
between 2016 and 2017. Although initially engaged in the direct assistance of refugees and 
migrants during the transit period, the group slowly began to shift their focus towards long term 
integration support for those seeking asylum within the country. Accordingly, the group began to 
craft strategic decisions in regards to their organizational activities and their working relationship 
with the Serbian government.  
 
MSF - Médecins Sans Frontières is an internationally renowned humanitarian organization which 
has been providing medical and psychosocial assistance to refugees, migrants, and asylum seekers 
within Serbia since 2014. They have their country headquarters in Belgrade but have also 
conducted projects around the country, specifically in the border towns of Šid, Preševo, and 
Subotica. MSF holds a significant amount of clout with their mission and has taken this standing 
to publish materials and engage in activities which directly confronts human rights issues in the 
country. In the fall, the organization published a report entitled Games of Violence: 
Unaccompanied Children and Young People Repeatedly Abused by EU Member State Border 
Authorities which condemned the EU’s illegal approach to border security (Médecins Sans 
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Frontières, 2017). Additionally, the organization is unique as it one of the only institutional 
organizations, domestic or international, to have engaged in the direct assistance of refugees and 
migrants in areas which have been grey-listed by the Serbian state. To this end, MSF staff opened 
up a small station within the Barracks in the winter of 2017 to treat the squat’s vulnerable 
population. At the time, institutional NGOs organizations tended not to engage this population 
directly except through either field workers who would in turn refer potential beneficiaries to the 
proper NGO, or through outreach from office spaces close by to the Barracks.  
 In addition to conducting contentious medical assistance, MSF repeatedly demonstrated its 
willingness to engage with independent groups considered as controversial or “anarchist” by other 
organizations. Perhaps benefiting from an organization culture which has historically valued 
contentious forms of assistance, the Serbian MSF office has taken steps to engage with non-
traditional independent groups active in the field. As on figure from the organization mentioned: 
An alternative response can be efficient rather than investing so much money in an 
institutional response, I'm not saying that the two things cannot cooperate together,  I'm 
just saying that we have to recognize the role all of the non-traditional actors, especially in 
this context. (A.C. #2, personal communication, December 15, 2017) 
The logistical and economic cooperation between MSF and independent groups was largely born 
out of the willingness of these organizations to engage in the direct assistance of refugees and 
migrants who were living outside of the system. Thus, this demonstrates how converging interests, 
and perhaps ideological approaches to humanitarian assistance, provide the platform for 
cooperation between vastly different groups.  
The malleability of this organization’s approach to politically contentious issues is likely 
rooted in several key factors. One the one hand, the historical ideology and tradition of certain 
groups, such as MSF, are rooted in the notion that humanitarian assistance is inherently a 
politically contentious process. In fact, the organization was formed as a result of a group of 
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doctors’ resistance to the apolitical stance that the Red Cross has historically prescribed itself.  As 
a result, a workplace culture has developed inside of MSF over the years which accepts a certain 
amount of “political script deviation” from its project managers and employees which other 
organizations might shy away from. Additionally, the group benefits from its international and 
recognizable character; an internationally recognized group like MSF can ‘get away’ with more 
than smaller, domestic groups which lack the platform of MSF. Further, as an organization which 
is only temporarily engaged with the refugee situation in Serbia, their group escapes some of the 
intense pressure which domestic groups face to preserve their relationship with state actors.  
 
Institutional Domestic 
Grupa 484 - Grupa 484 has been a civil society organization assisting refugees and migrants in 
Serbia since 1995. Their mission statement reads as follows:  
Through its activities in Serbia and the region of Southeast Europe, Group 484, together 
with migrants, local population, and especially with youth, and in cooperation with 
organisations and individuals that foster similar values – has been building up a society in 
which diversity and rights of everyone are respected. (Group 484, 2017) 
The initial context of work centered on the assistance of 484 families who fled to Serbia following 
the forced displacement campaign of the Croatian government’s Operation Storm. Later, these 
efforts would expand to include refugees arriving from Kosovo during the late 1990’s. The 
majority of their efforts have now shifted to the more contemporary case of refugees and migrants 
arriving in the country from outside the immediate region. The organization has been a fixture in 
the Serbia NGO community for decades and has deep connections with state institutions as well. 
They have a diverse array of projects ranging from psychosocial services, integration efforts, to 
legal advocacy and involved in the development of the Serbian state’s migration policy and its 
alignment with EU principles.    
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 Currently, the organization employs a number of highly educated, highly qualified, Serbian 
professionals who work in a variety of capacities. Some of this work falls within their Center for 
Migration, which seeks to “influence the development of policies and legislation that enable the 
full realization of the rights and potentials of migrants, and to encourage interest in the professional 
and general public in Serbia for the issue of migrations.” This work is framed as being significant 
for the development of Serbian society, especially within the context of EU accession. Other 
projects ranges from integration support to psychosocial services offered in Bogovađa Asylum 
Centre to an initiative which attempts to strengthen the network of civil society organizations 
active within the field in the region through grants funded by the Norwegian Embassy. This final 
project has benefited primarily Serbian NGOs and international religious organizations engaged 
in work in the country’s asylum centers.   
CRPC - The Crisis Response and Policy Center is a domestic affiliate of the UNHCR and functions 
as the latter’s “eyes and ears” on the ground in Serbia. Its informational material frames itself as 
an organization “formed as a voluntary, non-party and non-profit citizen association” interested in 
protecting human rights and promoting human rights awareness, specifically in terms of the 
“protection of vulnerable individuals and groups, their identification, needs assessment and 
advocacy of their rights.” The group is an offshoot organization of an earlier project called Asylum 
Info Centre and is formed from the core staff of this previous joint initiative which was active 
during the transit period of migration in Serbia in 2015. CRPC was formed in 2016, around the 
same time as the EU borders around Serbia began to close.  
An employee of Crisis and Policy Response Center chose to distance his organization's 
activities from a political angle, but still brought up organizational projects which might be 
construed by some as activism: 
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“We don’t care to speak up politically. We don’t delve into politics. We have just, we are 
trying to raise awareness of inclusion of the refugees within Serbian society and...we are 
trying to help the government, state, in providing assistance to them regarding any that 
[sic] inclusion of refugees and stuff, cultural, what we basically do is cultural mediation 
and that comprises of, for example we tried to, how should I say it, close the gap between 
domestic society and the refugees themselves…” (Z. M., personal communication, 
December 12, 2017) 
It should be noted however, that this group was characterized by several actors within the NGO 
community in terms of its close connections to the UNHCR and the Serbia state. To this end, it 
would most likely not behoove CRPC to self-identify as being active in contentious political 
advocacy. The organization was also criticized for being overly interested in professionalizing. To 
this end, one criticism was that they over reported the numbers of beneficiaries they have. On their 
website, the group claims to have assisted “more than 100.000 beneficiaries from 50 countries of 
the world”. Nonetheless, the desire to detach the organizational activities of humanitarian 
organizations from explicitly political actions was a common theme amongst participants of all 
styles of organizations.  
 
PIN - The Psychosocial Innovation Network is an organization which describes itself as a “non-
partisan, non-political and non-profit association” which strives to “achieve various goals in the 
field of psychological science and practice” (PIN, 2018). It has been active in Serbia for the past 
two years in which time it has engaged primarily in psychosocial support for asylum seekers within 
the country as well as producing research on psychological challenges facing this population. 
Additionally, the group has engaged in several other projects of interest, particularly one seeking 
to mitigate the second-hand trauma experienced by responders to the humanitarian crisis in Serbia. 
The organization’s projects that engage with asylum seekers is largely funded through the 
UNHCR. Aside from the relationship, the organization has established connections with many of 
the established, Serbian-staffed, refugee assistance organizations active within the city of 
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Belgrade. They provide psychosocial support to refugees and migrants in their office in downtown 
Belgrade, most of whom come from the nearby Krnjača Asylum Center, as well as similar support 
to the residents in the Banja Koviljača and Bogovađa Asylum Centers. 
 Although it is a relatively young organization in comparison to other institutional domestic 
groups, PIN organizational identity as a group of professional academics with close relationships 
to the UNHCR and IRC reaffirms its institutional character.  
 
Non-Institutional 
Info Park - The organization Info Park has been operating in downtown Belgrade since the spring 
of 2015 when it began as an initiative headed by a longtime civil activist and administered by two 
Serbian donor organizations - the B92 Fund and Trag Foundation. For slightly over a year, the 
group worked out of a small wooden kiosk in downtown Belgrade’s Bristol Park which is right 
across from the city’s main bus station and served as a hotspot of refugee movement at the time. 
Before the closure of the Balkan route, the group also had similar missions in the border areas of 
Preševo and Dimitrovgrad. The organization frames this early iteration as being a specifically 
grassroots endeavor.  
Info Park operated in their hut from mid-September, 2015 until October 24th, 2016 at 
which point it was pressured to leave by the Serbian state. About a week later, the organization 
began to run its operations from a small office down the street from its former location where it 
has an information desk, an education space, a safe space for women, a family drop in zone, and a 
small computer lab. It is also a base for the organization’s mobile team which reaches out to 
vulnerable refugees and migrants around Belgrade. Over the past year it has restructured itself as 
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a refugee support center which specializes in protection, information, communication, and 
education services alongside offering referral support, accommodation, and psychosocial services.  
Currently, the organization has 8 regular staff members and is augmented by a rotating 
collection of volunteers. They have a broad network of partner and donor organizations consisting 
of IRC, MSF, Save the Children, CARE, Praxis, and CRPC. The organizations also provides 
support to relevant state institutions like the Belgrade City Center for Social Work whose field 
teams use Info Park office during the process of best interest determination for unaccompanied 
minors. They have had close, albeit less formal, relationships with smaller independent NGOs 
active in the field in Serbia, showing a rather unique willingness to work with these sorts of groups. 
They share information with groups like No Name Kitchen through personal communications 
between members of the groups. Likewise, during the spring of 2017 they were notable for their 
efforts, as a domestic Serbian organization, to get directly involved in the application of assistance 
in the Barracks. Specifically, they distributed breakfast to the residents of the Barracks in 
conjunction with two independent volunteer groups: the Italian group Bridge to Idomeni and the 
Bosnian-based MFS-EMMAUS.  
It is difficult to say what accounts for this group’s mediated organizational identity. The 
group has professionalized within the last year and half, changing from an informal, grassroots 
mobilization in Bristol Park in 2015 to an established NGO with a dedicated office and paid staff.  
Nonetheless, throughout this time it has remained in close contact with independent organizations 
and regularly engages with refugees and migrants who are living outside of the system in the city. 
Moreover, the organization has publicly questioned the Serbian state’s management of the refugee 
situation through self-published news briefs. To this end, it is possible that this group’s unique 
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organizational identity and workplace culture has influenced the organization to engage in closer 
cooperation with independent groups and to engage in more contentious forms of assistance. 
 
Refugee Aid Miksalište - Refugee Aid Miksalište is a Serbian initiative which has entertained a 
storied path as a key figure in the assistance of refugees and migrants in Belgrade dating back to 
the summer of 2015. The organization was started as an offshoot of the non-governmental 
organization Mikser House, a well-respected social club in the city, as “an ad-hoc public social 
campaign to collect humanitarian aid in the August of 2015.” Since then, however, the organization 
has transformed into a separate NGO which has provided assistance to more than 300,000 refugees 
and seen help from more than 2,000 volunteers. In other words, despite having an initial identity 
which might fit more in line with that of a grassroots or independent organization, the organization 
has navigated towards a more professionally oriented management structure.  
The organization has shifted the focus of its projects since its conception to reflect both the 
changing nature of needs along the Balkan Route and their need for professionalization. This has 
meant a shift away from the distribution of food and NFIs towards medical assistance, legal and 
psychological support, social activities, cultural exchanges with the local community, and 
education. Additionally, it has also meant that the majority of its operations are now being 
conducted in a single location.  
The group’s name and geographic location has been similarly malleable. In late April, 2016 
the organization’s squatted headquarters were demolished with only brief warning by the Serbian 
government in accordance with its controversial Belgrade Waterfront project. Tajana Zadravec, a 
former employee of the organization, remarked to a local media source at the time that “We put so 
much effort in it, we had showers, washing machines, drying machines there, and they destroyed 
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everything, we needed to [re]organise everything from the very beginning” (Zaba, 2016). Since 
this forced removal, the organization works out of a new hub a few blocks away. The new location 
was briefly closed down in the summer of 2016 after disputes with local businesses and residents 
angry at the high number of beneficiaries crowding the surrounding area. At the time, the 
organization was mainly offering direct assistance to all in need. Soon after, an agreement was 
reached in which the organization agreed to change its assistance approach. Speaking about the 
resolution, an employee of the organization said that “We’ll change our focus on families with 
children only, currently we’re working on a sustainable strategy for Miksalište. We want to 
become a center for social cohesion which is not possible to achieve if you accept 600 people on 
a daily basis” (Zaba, 2016). This employee stated that other organizations would take care of 
adolescents who travelled alone and male refugees.   
At the hub, the organization works alongside Save the Children, Center for Youth 
Integration, Crisis Response and Policy Center, UNHCR, MSF, SOS Children Village Serbia, 
Novi Sad Humanitarian Center, Terre des Hommes, CARE and UNICEF. The space serves as an 
important hub within the system as the partner organizations within the space provide services 24 
hours a day 7 days a week. The hub itself derives its name, Miksalište, from the organization. 
Coincidentally the desire to brand the space better resulted in pressure from the other organizations 
for Refugee Aid Miksalište to rename itself, which it did, to Mikser Association.  
The group sees its main strengths as consisting of its “flexibility, immediate 
responsiveness, and adaptation to new circumstances and needs of beneficiaries, including 
coordination with the state and international organizations.”  
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Conclusion 
This chapter has developed four distinct organization types within the community of NGOs 
providing assistance to refugees and migrants in Serbia. These ideal organization types are referred 
to as independent, international, institutional domestic, and non-institutional domestic 
organizations. Given that these are constructed categories, this is not a perfect method for 
delineating the considerable variety of organizations active in Serbia, nonetheless these ideal types 
serve as a general road map of organizational structure and strategy.  
Within the distinct patterns of organizational structure, groups vary can significantly. 
Professional and grassroots approaches are each deployed in unique ways by organizations within 
the NGO field. As one might expect, certain organization types tend to rely on professional 
approaches more than others and vice versa. Importantly, similar to the findings of Panda (2007) 
and Henry (2010), many organizations adopt practices from both approaches. MSF, for instance, 
cooperates with closely with both professional organizations as well as independent, grassroots 
groups. Independent organizations, in turn, have developed strategic institutional partners with 
which to derive funding from and to cooperate with on a diverse array of projects. Moving forward, 
I will situate these organizations within the broader organizational field of assistance which 
presents incentives and opportunities to organizations to structure themselves professionally. 
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IV - The Reach of the Organizational Field  
 
If we are not here, nobody knows about this. Since we have been here, I can tell you 4 
deaths that happened within this area, 4 deaths. If we are not here, maybe nobody knows 
about them  
- B.A. 
 
This chapter outlines how the organizational field presents certain institutional factors that 
mediate organizational activity. Primary amongst these factors is the funding landscape as well as 
the interests and behavior of three groups of institutional actors: the Serbian state, the EU, and 
international institutions like the UNHCR. These institutional actors influence the organizational 
field in a multitude of ways, however I focus in particular on how they incentivize organizations 
to professionalize. I highlight two key ways in which this is accomplished: funding opportunities 
and camp access opportunities 
From my research, the findings are clear that despite the diverse ways organizations 
mediate structural factors, the organizational field creates powerful incentives for NGOs to 
structure themselves in ways that further the interests and obligations of governance. Institutional 
pressure serves to reinforce the role of NGOs in humanitarian work as both objects and subjects 
of governance. In terms of the refugee crisis in Serbia, the constraints and pressures applied to 
refugee assistance organizations work, broadly speaking, towards the interest of the Serbian state, 
the European Union, and international institutions. Refugee assistance organizations provide 
humanitarian support in cases where the state does not or cannot provide support. Where this 
relationship becomes more blurred, however, is in the cases of refugee assistance organizations 
which work in direct contention with the state. The local No Borders group and, to a lesser extent, 
ideologically driven solidarity groups like No Name Kitchen present a challenge to this 
relationship due to their ability to facilitate activities such as contentious political protests or illegal 
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border crossings and run in direct contrast with the European Union’s border regime. Their 
avoidance of traditional funding models further insulates them from this influence. 
 
Organizational Field  
Attempting to describe the nature of organizational activity within a given field of NGO 
work requires a holistic understanding of the structural environment in which this work occurs. 
Henry writes that “grievance identification, resource flows, political access and issue framing are 
not independent factors but rather interrelated and often mutually reinforcing.” (Henry, 2010, p. 
7)  Following this framework, I approach my Serbian case study from a “nuanced perspective on 
the role of resources in supporting activism, highlighting the fact that monetary and nonmonetary 
resources are inextricably tied to particular cultures of activism.”  (Henry, 2010, p. 7) Looking at 
the evidence offered by the participants of this study, it would appear that powerful institutional 
incentives exist for organizations to moderate their behavior. Nonetheless, the behavior of 
organizations within the field makes it clear that the resources and political access afforded to an 
organization is closely tied and interrelated with the ideology and workplace culture associated 
with a given NGO.  Thus, where an NGO gets its money from, how the money is used, where the 
NGO works, who it works with, and who it works for it all depend, in part, on the distinct culture 
and ideology behind the group.  
This directly relates to Henry’s (2010) concept of the “organizational field” which seeks to 
contextualize the environment and opportunities that define NGOs. The organizational field 
describes the range of grievances, resource flows, political opportunities, and cultural framings 
which form the context of NGO work in a given field. The opportunity structures in this field can, 
in turn, mediate the organizational behavior of NGOs. That being said, Henry argues that the 
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incentives brought out by the organizational field only become salient after they are 
operationalized by leadership perceptions and preferences: 
[Within a context] of scarce resources, organizations are likely to seek funders with a 
similar view of the problems they address and to develop dependencies on critical funders. 
Grievances matter for social mobilization because they stimulate different constituencies, 
activating the ideas, tactics, and resources of certain groups and not others. Therefore, it is 
the source, not just the level, of critical resources that shape social organizations’ 
development. Dependent organizations will try to manage these relationships in order to 
achieve beneficial terms, but they cannot avoid being profoundly shaped by the 
organization field. (Henry, 2010, p. 234) 
Again, the overall importance of this concept lies in the way that the organizational field mediates 
and informs the habits of NGOs. 
In the application of this framework to the Serbian case, it becomes possible to provide a 
sketch of some of the cooperating influences exerting pressure on organizational activity. In 
particular, I focus on the availability of funding and the impact of institutional actors (the EU and 
the Serbian state in particular) to develop a better understanding of the institutional forces at work.   
 
Funding 
Funding is an important and palpable factor which influences the community of NGOs 
providing assistance to refugees and migrants in Serbia. This influence is manifested in in several 
important ways. There is a relatively crowded field of organizations which compete to attract the 
attention of a finite amount of donors. In the emergency period of the humanitarian situation in 
Serbia, when thousands were in direct need of daily assistance, a large amount of funding flooded 
the country from international donors. A particularly large amount of money began coming into 
the country from the EU during this time. Now that the situation has stabilized somewhat, funding 
flows are beginning to return to the domain of established, institutional actors. The competitive 
nature of this funding accordingly means that the large international donors which supply the 
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majority of grants to the NGO community have a degree of discretion as to where they want their 
money to go to. Additionally, the project-based nature of funding within the field has an influence 
the long-term planning of NGOs which often have few other viable funding prospects. In this next 
section I will overview the funding landscape by first overviewing the important donors in the 
field, reviewing the influence that they have on NGOs, and then finally making some remarks 
about the alternative methods of funding which are present within the field.  
EU Influence 
In this current period of refugee and migrant movement along the Balkan route, the EU has 
been arguably one of the biggest international stakeholders through its hands-off management of 
the situation. Perhaps more than anything, the effective closure of the Balkan route in the spring 
of 2016 has most informed the Serbian refugees and migrant’s situation. Therefore it came as little 
surprise that many respondents saw the EU as having an important, top-down, effect on the refugee 
situation through its influence on the borders and the Serbian state. More directly, however, the 
EU was also seen to influence the organizational field of refugee assistance through its capacity as 
a donor.  
There are vested interests at play within the field of refugee assistance in Serbia. Both the 
Serbian state and the EU have been keen to build up the capacity of the country’s reception and 
asylum capacities. While the Serbian state has resisted the aggressive border enforcement of its 
EU neighbors, it has consistently demonstrated a commitment to aligning its migration policy with 
the EU’s norms and interests. As a country with an underdeveloped asylum system which receives 
little funding from the already cash-strapped Serbian budget, the government is heavily reliant on 
the EU, other sovereign donors, and NGOs in the management of the refugee situation in Serbia. 
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One NGO worker summarized his impression of the EU funding method by emphasizing its links 
with the Serbian state. He reflected that 
“The EU provides the most money for the refugee situation in Serbia, they provided like a 
lot of money because they understand that they need to help Serbia in this case. But the 
thing is that all this money goes to the UNHCR and Commissariat or the Serbian 
government...So Serbia didn’t spend any of our public money or our budget so far for the 
refugees. Just European Union and the other donor’s money.” (S.T. #1, personal 
communication, April 17, 2017) 
Continuing, this Info Park employee connected the EU’s interests in the Serbian response to the 
refugee crisis, and their according patterns of funding, with their broader migration regime:  
[The] EU probably looks at it this way...they call it the externalization of the borders...So 
that’s the thing, they provide support for people to be stranded. In the end you don’t need 
to have a strong surveillance system or the wall like Hungary, you just need to have an 
external border that someone can control in that sense, where you can provide support for 
those refugees to stay there.” (S.T. #1, personal communication, April 17, 2017) 
Situating his criticism in a similar externalization discourse to that of Burlyuk (2017), Reslow 
(2017) and Helton & Lavenex, (1999), the participant connected the EU’s interest in providing aid 
to Serbia to their greater interest in keeping refugees and migrants outside of EU borders. Other 
NGO workers also framed their work as being heavily affected by the border policies of the 
European Union. Taking a more combative stance, a figure from No Name Kitchen responded 
saying that “Well the European Union is the one putting up the borders,  the European Union is 
Croatia right now,  these borders, the police that are beating these guys [up] is the European Union” 
(B.A., personal communication, December 20, 2017). 
Although it is not within the scope of this paper to do justice in explaining the differences 
and connections between the EU and Serbian approaches to migration policy, for the purpose of 
this analysis it is safe to say that their interests converge through the practical application of 
assistance. They both work towards the progressive stabilization and securitization of refugees and 
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migrants within Serbia, particularly through the containment of this population in state-run transit 
and asylum centers. This is a point that I will expand upon below.    
Tracing the impact and influence of the EU’s economic contributions to the refugee crisis 
in Serbia means combing through a complex web of direct support, contract grants, and subsidiary 
funding. The European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) fund has 
pumped more than 80 million Euros into Serbia over the past several years to assist in the care of 
refugees and migrants (EC Press Release, 2017). That being said, the extent of funding is 
obfuscated by the fact that the EU is also a major funder of organizations such as UNICEF, CARE, 
Danish Refugee Council, and OXFAM, all of which have had missions in the country. These 
organizations, in turn, give out subsidiary grants to others. Mapping the pattern of funding from 
the EU is further confused by the unitary actions of EU member states which have a repertoire of 
beneficiary aid organizations and targeted donations of their own. Nonetheless, it is important to 
attempt to nail down how this funding and influence has played out. A more practical way of doing 
this is tracing what kind of funding has been made available by the EU and its subsidiary 
institutions.  
Through the course of the past several years the majority of EU funding in Serbia has gone 
towards strengthening and expanding the capacity of Serbian institutions to accommodate and 
house refugees and migrants in state centers. When Michael Davenport, the head of the EU 
Delegation to Serbia, met with the Serbian Minister of Labor and the head of the Commissariat for 
Refugees and Migrants along with the ambassadors of eight EU member states in February, 2017, 
he praised the Serbian state’s policy towards refugees and migrants. (Davenport, 2017) In his 
remarks, which were made at the newly opened Obrenovac Transit Center, he made no reference 
of the more than 1,000 refugees and migrants sleeping rough in downtown Belgrade, whom 
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Amnesty International characterized barely a week before as being “trapped in a dehumanizing 
daily struggle to find warmth and food” (Gardos, 2017). In this way, selective engagement came 
to define the European Union’s protocol for providing assistance to refugees and migrants in 
Serbia. This meant limited interest in assistance which might facilitate further “irregular crossings” 
into the EU from Serbia.  
Thus, EU funding has been skewed towards the sorts of institutions and organizations 
which assist refugees and migrants who are being served within the state support system. 
Conversely, less traditional organizations that primarily engage with unregistered refugees and 
migrants, those working in the Barracks or the other squatted camps on the borders, were seen as 
less likely to attract institutional support. Although independent groups working with refugees and 
migrants outside of the state system were able to secure some funding from international donors 
such as Oxfam for their activities, none were able to, or in some cases were not interested in, 
securing funding from funding from the EU.   
Impressions from NGOs 
Given the relatively high number of refugee assistance organizations that began to work in 
Serbia between 2015 and 2017, and the relatively low numbers of established donor institutions, 
organizations must compete against other qualified groups to secure project funding.  Some 
remarked that the competitive funding environment in Serbia is an extension of the neoliberal 
status quo. Capitalism, they explained, calls for competition. A number of participants held this 
view, particularly those who come from non-institutional organizations. One worker observed of 
her boss that “...sometimes she does occasionally communicate with these other organizations but 
you know in today’s system of capitalism and everything, you cannot ignore somebody who is 
‘competition’” (T.J., personal communication, April 25, 2017). A worker of another organization 
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surmised that “the situation is looked at as a marketplace and not as something that we all need 
take care of or coordinate better, because everyone is looking for markets, everybody wants their 
share of the market” (S.T. #1, personal communication, April 17, 2017). He further related his 
impression that this is a key characteristic of how organizations in the scene develop their interests. 
Interestingly, he viewed this behavior to be true not only in regards to an organization’s donors, 
but also towards their engagement with their beneficiaries.   
Regarding the competition for funding within the NGO community in Belgrade, one 
participant reflected that “It's just inevitable in neoliberal capitalism, in this system, because the 
state is not enough to just provide all these things, and then these little organizations have to do it 
by themselves and compete for all these international fundings that need to be used in this kind of 
context” (T.J., personal communication, April 25, 2017). Another prominent NGO worker in 
Belgrade echoed this opinion while speaking on the status of civil society in Serbia since the 
democratization period, saying that “[I]t’s very hard for them to get funding, to survive, to get their 
own space, it’s definitely not easy in that sense to operate” (A. C, personal communication, April 
27, 2017).    
A number of participants expressed frustration by the manner in which certain 
organizations go about securing their funding. One Serbian NGO worker complained of the 
existence of organizational “grant-eaters” who are basically just oriented towards projects and 
fundings” and appeal to established international institutions. (S.T., personal communication, 
December 12, 2017) Echoing this sentiment, another Serbian worker took the time to voice her 
frustration about the existence of organizations which over-report their activities to cater to the 
interests and expectations of international donors (V.M., personal communication, December 11, 
2017). Overall, this behavior seems to be exhibited most often by professionalized NGOs which 
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competitively market themselves towards well-respected international donors. This interest in 
attracting foreign funding may provide incentives to overemphasize their work.  
One platform to witness this behavior is the UNHCR’s monthly Inter-Agency Updates for 
Serbia which serves as an excellent source of information on the kinds of assistance that is being 
provided to refugees and migrants in Serbia. It also exists as a quasi-official forum where 
professional organizations send in and report statistics on the sorts of work they are engaged in. 
These reports, which are self-submitted by NGOs and accepted by the UNHCR so long as they are 
not “controversial in any way”, cover topics such as the number of beneficiaries which assisted by 
the given group or the number of meals or NFIs they distributed in a given month (V.D., personal 
communication, March 9, 2017). It is here, some suggested, that organizations take steps to 
overemphasize the significance or magnitude of their activities. These complaints tended to come 
from newer, domestic organizations and are pointed towards other domestic organizations which 
hold close ties with international institutions like Oxfam or the UNHCR. Thus there was a 
persisting perception that these “grant-eaters” were leveraging their institution connections to 
perpetuate their own organizations without having a vested interested in maximizing their 
humanitarian impact.  
Furthermore, there were widespread complaints of organizational strategies being altered 
by the interests of donors. One participant complained of organization changing to meet the 
priorities of donors rather than their beneficiaries, but largely accepted the need for this to happen 
(V.M., personal communication, December 11, 2017). Touching on this point, another Serbian 
NGO worker reflected on her observation about the objectives of large international donors. She 
remarked that these institutions:  
Are addressing specific issues and when you write a project you have to write what it says 
on the project, you cannot write a project for what you need. So you always have something 
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that is a theoretical framework of the project which you must write in order to get these 
funds and these projects miss a lot of important issues, you know, for example I cannot 
now write a project for these people (points to the young Afghani and Pakistani men outside 
of the window) because everyone just wants to help women and children and I know that 
addresses mental health, that addresses violence and stuff like that but everybody 
underestimates these young boys who are literally nobody’s target group because these big 
donors, they don’t write projects for them. (T.J. #2., personal communication, December 
15, 2017) 
 While some study participants reported that a culture of competitiveness between NGOs was born 
from a lack of funding options, others were less keen to point this out. This was often the case for 
participants employed by organizations with relatively secure financial assets and dedicated 
international partners. Common international partners in Serbia are organizations like the Danish 
Refugee Council, the UNHCR, CARE, or the International Rescue Committee.   
Legitimacy 
One important aspect to consider across these groups is how certain work is made visible, 
or invisible, by the manner in which it is conducted. Nearly all organizations maintain a presence 
on social media to boost the visibility of their work. Likewise, larger groups may even have staff 
dedicated to spreading awareness to the public and to news organizations about the activities which 
they engage in. Established domestic groups benefit locally from their connections to national 
news outlets. Other groups are able to attract the attention of large media organizations with global 
audiences. The independent NGO Hot Food Idomeni in particular benefitted from this spotlight 
due to its highly visible meal distributions in downtown Belgrade.  
Importantly, the visibility of assistance work also has bearing on the institutional 
recognition that refugee assistance NGOs can expect to receive. A UNHRC report which purported 
to detail “WHO is doing WHAT and WHERE” sought to detail the range of groups assisting 
refugees and migrants throughout Serbia, both inside state-run centers and outside. To this end, 
the report covers the activities of 71 different groups of which 5 were government agencies and 4 
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where UN-run offices. Of the 62 NGOs which comprised the rest of this list, 31 were international 
and 24 were institutional, domestic organizations. This left only 5 groups which might be 
considered to fall under the category of non-institutional domestic organizations and only 3 which 
could be considered independent (UNHCR, 2017). While there are relatively few groups in total 
which fit under the designation of non-institutional, domestic NGOs, this report does not recognize 
a number of independent organizations which have played an important role, albeit less visible 
role, in the community. Rigardu, No Name Kitchen, Fresh Response, Belgraid, and Aid Delivery 
Mission were all missing, to name a few. Given that these missing independent organizations do 
not cooperate or engage with established actors like the UNHCR, it is unlikely that these groups 
even took notice of their absence from this list. Nonetheless, their absence represents a lack of 
engagement between certain independent groups and important institutional actors. This, in turn, 
has bearings on the degree with which these organizations are viewed as viable partners for 
cooperation or funding.  
Alternative Strategies for Funding 
One of the standout differences between independent groups and the rest of the community 
is the way in which their funding structure differs from the traditional approach to NGOs and 
humanitarian aid. Alternatives to institutionalized donor networks exist and are perhaps more 
widespread in the sorts of non-traditional organizational frameworks which characterize the 
independent organizations active in Serbia. No Name Kitchen, for example, currently covers their 
operating costs with personal donations from their extensive solidarity networks and by 
coordinating with other grassroots groups. Their website states that as a group independent from 
governmental and external structures, their “funding comes from individual donations and entities 
that [sic] identity with our values as responsible consumers and the ecological use of resources” 
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(No Name Kitchen, MANIFESTO). Thus, No Name Kitchen obtains a bulk of their funding via 
their expanding solidarity network. One member explained that their funding comes mainly 
from volunteers and people who know volunteers, you know, some of them are fairly 
active, sometimes they are not so active but it is people who stay here for one week, they 
go back to Spain and they get lots of money and then people who have been here for 4 
months, then they go back and you don't hear more from them, individual donations, 
concerts, basic events, different kind of events (B.A., personal communication, December 
20, 2017).  
 This organizational approach to a DIY model of funding is hardly unique and can be found in a 
number of other organizations active in the field in Serbia. SolidariTea, a small independent group 
from England active in the country last year was funded primarily through support from their 
hometown which raised over £13,000 for the initiative through concerts, breakfasts, and 
collections amongst other things. They also benefited from a crowdfunding campaign which raised 
an additional £5,000 (R.D., personal communication, February 23, 2017). 
Similarly, another small organization staffed by young international workers found a 
functional alternative funding model by relying on selective crowdfunding campaigns, donations, 
and funds from small international organizations which they fostered relationships with. Speaking 
on the culture of competition that she has observed between humanitarian NGOs in Belgrade, a 
representative from this organization remarked that  
That’s a very common thought among aid organizations in Belgrade, a lot of the NGOs 
always competing with things like that, and I think we have just skipped on that entire thing 
because for whatever reason I think that we have just always been honest in what we can 
and can’t do (D.V., personal communication, December 18, 2017). 
Thus, she credited her organization’s capacity to avoid the competitive traditional funding field 
with their ability to foster connections and stay nimble within their organizational capacity. Groups 
like Belgraid, Hot Food Idomeni, and even Jesuit Refugee Service also launched crowdfunding 
campaigns through the website GoFundMe. In this way, there is evidence of groups searching for 
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alternative ways of securing funding for their assistance activities which fall outside of the normal 
project-based donor channels.  
 
State and Access 
The Serbian State and Access  
It has been observed by a number of authors that the effectiveness of NGOs continues to 
depend on the access granted to them by state governments and IGOs (Oliver, 2017; Irrera, 2011). 
For decades, refugee camps and border regions have been the traditional setting where 
humanitarian actors have performed assistance. These areas are typically highly securitized spaces 
overseen by state and institutional actors which have the power to control access into and out of 
the camps. This stasis, however, has been challenged somewhat by the proliferation of independent 
groups which assist refugees and migrants who exist outside of the system in transit corridors, 
border towns, and squats. Whereas “camp logics instrumentally contain and control mobility so 
that care can be administered,” informal refugee camps tend to allude this control (Pallister-
Wilkins, 2016). Accordingly, the assistance which is conducted by NGOs in these non-state areas 
has similarly lacked the same degree of state oversight which can be observed in state asylum or 
transit centers. This particularly been true in the case of organizations assisting refugees and 
migrants in Serbia. Over the past year and a half, however, the eradication of informal squats in 
favor of state run camps and centers has allowed the state, in many ways, to re-institutionalize the 
provision of assistance to refugees and migrants in Serbia. As a result, the Serbian state, along with 
coordinating actors like the EU, have an important platform from which to exert pressure on the 
organizational field of NGO assistance. In this section, I will demonstrate several of the ways in 
which the Serbian state and the EU exert influence on NGO actors in Serbia. Moreover I will share 
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the perceptions of my participants on the role of these actors.  
There is a wealth of academic literature that points to the presence of a sustained tension 
between the state and NGOs in Serbia, dating back at least to Milosević era (Grødeland, 2005; 
Mikus, 2015). Conversely, there is a comparatively less developed consensus of where, and even 
if, these dynamics are exerting themselves in the provision of assistance to refugees and migrants 
in Serbia. Sharing their perspectives on this relationship, many participants voiced that, at least 
some level, elements of distrust persist in the working relationship between the two groups. 
Summarizing her view on the underlying dynamics at play in this relationship, one NGO worker 
in Belgrade made the following observation: 
Serbia has a long, let’s say, history of media coverage and politicians making a strong line 
between the state and NGOs. So when you listen to politicians in the last 15 years most of 
the thing you hear is that the state is working against NGOs and the NGO are working 
against the state. So if you are an NGO providing psychosocial support usually people from 
the state are not ready to accept it. Even if you are doing it for free, even though it can be 
helpful for them, because it is like we are told too many times that we should not work 
together. (J.B., personal communication, April 26, 2017) 
From a general standpoint, there is a precedent for distrust between NGOs and the state in Serbia. 
Less clear, however, is how this relationship functions in the context of the refugee crisis.  
Respondents within the Serbian NGO community described the status of their relationship 
with the state as confusing, inconsistent, and difficult. The lack of consistency in state decision-
making on the refugee-migrant situation was commonly cited by these respondents as a major 
obstacle to effective cooperation. One employee of an NGO providing psychosocial support to 
refugees in Serbia expressed her frustration at the on-off nature that her organization was granted 
access to state-run camps, saying one week they would be allowed in and the next they would be 
denied with no explanation. Summarizing her frustration, she reflected that “it seems to me that 
the biggest problem is that we cannot really understand what is happening in their minds. There is 
no consistency in their decisions” (T.G, personal communication, April 25, 2017). Similarly, 
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another participant complained of the state’s management of the situation, relating it their lack of 
sensitivity and knowledge on the dynamics at play that “There was always a problem with working 
with the authorities because they always have their ways with how to deal with something...They 
decide to work [sic] people who are really not sensitive or don’t know much about the issues” 
(S.T., personal communication, April 17, 2017). 
That being said, others voiced that their relationship with the state has gotten better over 
the course of the refugee crisis in Serbia. “I think it became better than it was in the beginning,” 
said one figure from the Crisis Response and Policy Center (Z.M., personal communication, 
December 12, 2017). Likewise, figures from two independent organizations remarked that the 
more communication that they had with the Serbian Commissariat for Refugees and Migrants 
(KIRS), the better their cooperation has become over the months. Not every group got along with 
KIRS, but most expressed an understanding that they were a permanent force, which you had to 
either cooperate with or maneuver around. A figure from Jesuit Refugee Services remarked that  
...we don’t cooperate with the Commissariat at all because they think we are stealing their 
jobs. With [the] Commissariat now, it is very tricky between JRS and the Commissariat, 
but we are cooperating with the Center for Social Welfare because they are the guardians 
of all our children in the house. (V.M., personal communication, December 11, 2017) 
Over all, organizations that worked inside state-run centers came into contact with the state much 
more often than those which operated in squats like the Barracks. However, access to state-run 
centers is much more tightly controlled and as a result the sorts of organizations that operate in 
these places do so at the discretion of the government. To this end, the question of access to camps 
is an extremely important consideration for NGOs to keep in mind when also engaging in 
potentially contentious activities.  
It is impossible to write on refugee assistance work inside and outside of state-run camps 
without touching upon how the politics of access mediates this work. This is a topic which became 
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particularly relevant for the organizations working to assist the refugees and migrants within the 
Barracks or other informal, non-state camps in Serbia during the first half of 2017.  
Figure 6. Population of Refugees and Migrants in Serbia January 2016 - June 2017. Data from 
Serbia Inter-agency Operational Update June 2017 (2017). 
 
As evidenced by Figure 6, there was a period of just over a year, roughly corresponding 
with the closures of the EU borders in March, 2016 and the demolition of the Belgrade Barracks 
in May, 2017, where the numbers of refugees and migrants living outside of the state system 
blossomed. With the demolition of the Barracks, alongside an increased level of pressure for 
refugees and migrants to formalize their presence in the country, fewer and fewer refugees and 
migrants were living in places outside of explicit state control. According to UNHCR reports, 
between April and May of 2017, the total percentage of asylum seekers, refugees, and migrants in 
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Serbia accommodated in one the 18 state-run centers rose from 81% to 93% (Inter-agency Report 
April, 2017; Inter-agency Report May, 2017).  
 For some NGOs, in particular the independent and non-institutional domestic 
organizations which stepped in to provide much of the direct assistance to refugees and migrants 
over the previous months, this drastically changed the landscape of their work. An employee of an 
independent NGO reflected that  
...previously our entire demographic was 95% were the people in the Barracks, particularly 
for our school, we were running English classes on someone else’s premises, in Info Park’s 
premises, and then we opened up our own actual physical location and then it literally 
switched in the span of one month from all guys from the Barracks to all kids from Krnjača, 
so then all the guys from the Barracks were not receiving any form of education because 
they were sent to all various camps which didn’t provide anything like that, there is almost 
no recreational activities in most places outside of Belgrade. (D.V., personal 
communication, December 18, 2017) 
The normalization of the refugee situation in Belgrade produced a high incentive for NGOs 
interested in remaining in Serbia to seek access to state-run camps in order to find and provide 
services to beneficiaries.  
 The evidence from my interviews, however, signals that this process is far from linear and 
involves a negotiated performance of being a “professional NGO.” An employee of the 
Commissariat for Refugees and Migrants framed the fragile nature of camp access for NGOs as a 
problem born out of structural weaknesses within civil society. She reflected that 
...we have a situation where some organization is [sic] in our camp I don’t know, for one 
month, two months, three months, and after that they are leaving because they don’t have 
enough money or their project is finished or something and they start to do something with 
the refugees and leave him at the halfway, the job is not finished, and that is the main reason 
because we are quite strict about this. (D. R., personal communication, May 5, 2017) 
Predictably, this stance contrasts with the perception of the situation by actors within the NGO 
community. An employee of a prominent NGO which provides psychosocial assistance to refugees 
and migrants remembers this differently. In her comments, the psychosocial support was 
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inconsistent in government camps because the Commissariat would sometimes allow them into 
the camp for a period of time, only to renege on this offer later, and then subsequently re-grant that 
permission (J. B., personal communication, April 26, 2017).  
It should be carefully acknowledged that the state employee’s read of the situation does 
touch upon several potential points of truth as it underscores the project-based sources of funding 
that organizations are able to secure as opposed to sustained or generic funding. In the resource- 
scarce environment of Serbian civil society, organizations of all types can only provide services 
so far as their sources of funding will finance. This is particularly true for organizations which rely 
on project-contingent funding from international donors such as Oxfam or the ECHO fund. 
Nonetheless, the stance of the state employee seems somewhat misguided in her characterization 
of this being a source of shaky NGO presence in camps because project grants are very rarely 
awarded in week-by-week timeframes. Rather, the psychosocial NGO employee’s characterization 
of a camp access being subjective and state contingent fits the mold of the impressions of many 
other NGO actors.  
Further complications have arisen from the state’s control over access to camps. After the 
demolition of the Barracks in May, 2017, independent organizations which had previously been 
active in the squat complained of that in the wake of this decisions, officials were “now trying to 
bargain with volunteers and grassroots organizations, dangling the idea of camp access in 
exchange for their departure for the area” (AYS, Money Talks, 2017). Perhaps more alarming, 
there were also reports of state representative pressuring NGO workers to share photos of President 
Vučić with a refugee boy named Farhad Nouri in September, 2017 to ensure that these groups 
would stay on good terms with the government (AYS, New old route, 2017). In this regard, it is 
likely that the Serbian government leverages, to a certain extent, its position as the gatekeepers of 
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access to its asylum and transit centers in order to moderate the activity of some NGOs. 
The strategic deployment of a professional organizational “personality” was identified as 
key in terms of gaining access to camps. As one figure from the NGO community reflected “it is 
much, much easier to communicate with other organizations that are from the civil society and the 
NGO sector but we do communicate with the state. We have to of course, in the end it is their 
question.” (T.G., personal communication, April 26, 2017). Another NGO worker reflected that  
I think the better relationships you have with the Commissariat, with the municipalities, 
and the more you do things in line with what is asked and required, the better image you 
have, and that seems to be a really important thing: the image of your organization and 
what you do, and how you are perceived by the locals and the government. (D.V., personal 
communication, December 18, 2017) 
Expanding on this thought, she commented that it was particularly difficult for independent 
organizations to gain access to camps:  
...any smaller  NGOs, like at our level...unless you are providing clothing or distribution of 
food or something like that, you are not gonna get access, so even if you have a relationship 
and you do the things with the government, it’s almost impossible currently (D.V., personal 
communication, December 18, 2017) 
Overall, access to camps has become an important, albeit contentious, point of consideration for 
most organizations working in Serbia in the post-crisis period. Judging from the evidence offered 
from this study’s participants,  it would appear that a number of NGOs have begun to deploy 
strategies in order to set themselves up better to secure such access in the future, mainly through 
the professionalization of their structures and activities.  
Political Advocacy and Contentious Forms of Assistance 
 Given the tense nature of refugee assistance work in Serbia, it is of use to look into the 
ways in which institutional pressure might disincentivize or discourage politically contentious 
forms of activism from these sorts of NGOs. The responses of my participants on this topic 
indicated, by and large, that the performance of politically contentious forms of activism is taboo 
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to the extent that it might jeopardize future working relationships with the Serbian state. That being 
said, however, the participants of this study indicated that there is a wide array of alternative 
approaches to advocacy which are practiced within the field.   
It is common for humanitarian or refugee assistance organizations to frame their work as 
apolitical, or non-contentious. For organizations assisting individuals who are operating within the 
accepted asylum and migration norms of the country, this designation seems like a no-brainer: the 
right to food, shelter, and asylum are a human right, as per the Geneva Convention, and therefore 
should be accepted as a norm. This was a stance commonly brought up in my interviews. The 
independent NGO Hot Food Idomeni, for example, would give a speech to its crew of volunteers 
every day before its distributions where it restated its identity as a “non-political organization” 
solely interested in the distribution of high-quality, nutritious, hot food. To this end, there was a 
desire to detach the organizational activities of humanitarian organizations from the political 
questions which may arise from being involved in refugee assistance. 
The designation of being apolitical begins to face some tension, however, when groups 
begin to assist contentious pockets of need. This was reflected in a conversation with an employee 
of MSF last spring who stated that “today, to work around the nature of migration in Europe you 
have to take political stances” (A.C. #1, personal communication, April 27, 2017. Thus, the 
organization’s decision to erect five tents in the Barracks in late January, 2017 for the purpose of 
providing medical assistance, without the approval of the Serbian state, held certain political 
implications. Similarly, their publication of reports documenting and condemning the epidemic of 
border violence perpetrated by EU authorities positions them, at least in part, in public opposition 
to the Union’s current border regime. Despite these pseudo-political actions, it is still important 
for organizations to frame these stances in a non-political nature.  Continuing on, the MSF 
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employee remarked that “we try not to compromise our agenda, which is strictly humanitarian, 
with political agendas. Because then you have donors, you have organizations which depend on 
donors, you have government authorities, you have other authorities which they all have their own 
political agendas” (A.C. #2, personal communication, December 15, 2017). To this end it is 
important to for organizations, especially those with many points of contacts with influential 
actors, to think holistically about the implications of their actions.  
This applies to smaller organizations as well. An employee of a small international NGO 
reflected that “raising awareness is part of our organization, what we do, but we also have to remain 
neutral and independent and...it’s finding the balance between speaking out and not saying things 
that will cause drama that doesn’t end up paying anything” (D.V., personal communication, 
December 18, 2017). One figure at Belgraid commented that his organization wasn’t “super 
interested in shit-talking.” Elaborating, he reflected that “We work in Serbia, it benefits us to work 
closely with the Serbian government, we have to, to a degree, but also we don’t want to have an 
antagonistic relationship with them because I don’t see any real positive outcome of that” (C.S., 
personal communication, December 13, 2017). In this sense it is important for many organizations 
to toe the line of respectability with the state and international institutions which grant them access 
and funding. Echoing the sentiments of the MSF employee, the figure at Belgraid explained that,  
As an organization we call ourselves non-political and I think that, in a lot of ways, that’s 
accurate. We’re not here to promote a political agenda, we are here to promote humanity 
and human rights for refugees. If that aligns with a political side that is accidental. There 
has been so much opportunity to just provide for needs in the past that it has just been less 
of a focus. (C.S., personal communication, December 13, 2017) 
Not risking the direct confrontation of other, more contentious, political tactics, certain 
professional organizations make a strategic decision to organize their actions with a certain level 
of respectability in order to maximize their perceived effect. 
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 Independent groups often operate under more heavily politicized circumstances in Serbia 
due to their tendency to assist refugees and migrants outside of the state system. This is perhaps 
no coincidence. Certain groups embraced their politicized work, to an extent. No Name Kitchen 
defines itself by its differences to hierarchical, institution-driven forms of humanitarian assistance 
which it sees as inadequate or unwilling to meet the needs of those in need. Similarly, the 
independent group Rigardu defines itself partly in opposition to the traditional institutional 
assistance structures. Their website emphasizes their origins as a “loose, self-organized group of 
people” which grew rapidly to provide a number of projects such as food distribution and the 
deployment of a mobile shower system to the border towns of Šid, Subotica, and Sombor. 
Eventually they would also become officially recognized as a non-profit organization. The group 
believes that that their work strongly benefits from their “largely un-bureaucratic structure which 
allows” the organization “to act spontaneously” (Rigardu, 2017). Writing on their political 
approach, the group states that. 
The necessity of our humanitarian and educational work arises from the failure of the 
responsible political actors to protect human rights, particularly the rights of fleeing 
persons. With our work we aim to bring this issue to the attention of politicians and civil 
society. That is why we see ourselves as a political actor and want to be perceived as such. 
(Rigardu, 2017)   
All over Europe, in places where squatted or informal camps of refugees and migrants struggle to 
survive outside of the securitized migration landscape, solidarity groups similar to these can be 
found. The autonomous, leaderless, No Borders collective, in particular comes to mind for their 
substantial contribution to the assistance of refugees and migrants in the “Jungle” in Calais, France 
(Milner, 2011). The influence of the No Borders tradition is quite wide and their practices can be 
observed in the behavior of many of the new groups operating in Calais, Greece, and Serbia. 
Importantly, “No Borders activists believe in horizontal, non-hierarchical structures of organizing 
and reject the binary identities of citizen vs. non-citizen and illegal vs. legal. The network is a 
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social and political site, that does not operate through a permanent membership model, but rather 
through a common thread of political beliefs and principles that links a number of radical migrant 
solidarity groups and campaigns together” (Cantat, 2013, p. 28).  
The local No Borders group in Serbia is arguably one of the most controversial, albeit least 
understood, participants in the field of refugee assistance in the country. A group of refugees 
started a protest in Belgrade in November, 2016 which subsequently turned violent and resulted in 
the injury of several people including three of Info Park’s aid workers (I.V., personal 
communication, December 19, 2017). In the fallout of this event, many within the field pointed 
their fingers at No Borders for instigating the protest as a means of furthering their own political 
aims. One NGO remarked that “They are pushing their political ideologies in a context where it 
shouldn’t be pushed. It’s humanitarian aid to refugees who need lifesaving support and mixing 
that, then, with pushing one’s own political ideology can be quite a dangerous thing” (D.V., 
personal communication, December 18, 2017). Nonetheless, the local No Borders group in Serbia 
has engaged in important acts of assistance that have ranged from starting one of the first informal 
squats for refugees and migrants in Belgrade in 2015 to distributing tea to providing material 
assistance to independent organizations like No Name Kitchen (Milan & Pirro, 2018; (B.A., 
personal communication, December 20, 2017).  
 It is important, however, to understand that the defiance of political norms within the NGO 
community are limited to a few organizations. As evidenced before, other independent and non-
institutional domestic NGOs, mirroring their more professionalized counterparts take steps to 
minimize the political nature of their work, preferring to focus on the simple tasks of meeting the 
immediate needs of those that they are helping. This is a dynamic which some groups have been 
able to carefully navigate to their own benefit. A good example of this is Info Park’s activities in 
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the Barracks during the spring of 2017. According to one of the employees, in the spring of 2017 
they began to provide breakfast to the residents of the Barracks through project-financing from 
Oxfam. Strategically, they used two independent groups, and Italian group named Bridge to 
Idomeni and a Bosnian group called MFS-Emmaus, to carry out the groundwork of this operation. 
Using this strategy they were able to remain, for the benefit of their relationship with the Serbian 
Commissariat for Refugees and Migrants, outside of the squat. 
[When the] breakfast started, people started to ask questions. Who are the providers? Who 
are the people providing this thing? The Commissariat was the first asking questions, what 
is this? And Info Park’s name started showing up, and then of course, they started asking 
questions like “Why? Is it true that...you are providing support?” And we were like “No, it 
is just like a bridge between independent organizations and Oxfam as a donor”, which 
wasn't really true, we were the ones organizing everything, and the volunteers were there 
really just to put their hands on the materials. (S.T. #2, personal communication, December 
12, 2017)  
To this end, it is important to understand that although there are strong incentives for groups to 
mediate their actions and activities in such a way that they are more attractive to donors and can 
secure access to state-run camps, certain groups develop mechanisms to work around this dynamic. 
In the following section, I will explore these pressures and the resistance against them within the 
field in more detail.  
 
Professionalization and the Organizational Field 
As the previous sections have demonstrated, there are powerful incentives on organizations 
in Serbia to professionalize themselves so as to be better able to compete for grants and continue 
their assistance work by gaining access to camps. It is important here to understand why the trend 
of professionalization is so pervasive.  
In their chapter in the book Solidarity Mobilizations in the ‘Refugee Crisis’, Milan and 
Pirro (2018) provide an analysis of the grassroots/independent organizations active in Serbia 
 
EUROPE’S OUTSOURCED REFUGEES      Sapoch, 118 
during the “Long Summer of Migration” in 2015. In particular, they identify three “solidarity 
mobilizations” of interest - Info Park, Refugee Aid Miksalište, and the local No Borders group. 
This is of interest because during the period of focus for this research, particularly from 2017 
onwards, both Info Park and Refugee Aid Miksalište have professionalized considerably leaving 
only the No Borders group which could be considered as a possible independent group. Both of 
the former two groups gradually took on paid employees who were hired from within the 
professional assistance community, a departure from their previous identity as purely volunteer-
dependent organizations. Accordingly, it is likely that their workplace cultures have evolved as 
well. 
This is a common case for the domestic, Serbian organizations which first became active 
at the start of the refugee crisis. Although they began as grassroots or civic mobilizations during 
the peak of the refugee crisis when Serbia functioned exclusively as a transit country, the changing 
demographics of movement in the country have resulted in the professionalization of these 
organizations. One NGO worker reflected on his time at the organization: 
I started working with Info Park when the whole idea of independence also started to cook, 
because Info Park started in 2015 as a completely voluntary project, then somehow 
professionalized during 2016, and in 2016 Info Park moved out from the hut in the park 
[and into its current office space]. (S.T., #2, personal communication, December 12, 2017) 
The prospect of future plans and interests forms a key component in the development of 
organizational strategy and this is compounded when an organization has clear plans to stay active 
within a certain location for the foreseeable future. Overall, international organizations engaged in 
crisis-response capacities do not encounter the same burden of maintaining solid working 
relationships within the field given their short-term commitment to the country. 
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Nonetheless, professionalization has also been exhibited by the community of independent, 
international groups active in the field. As one member of the organization Belgraid brought up, 
organizations tend to do what is best for their mission in the long run: 
You know, organizational ideas of how this should run, or should work, between like, we 
do more good if we are here, for sure, if we can stay on the ground that means that 
sometimes we are going to have to be really strategic in how we approach things. It doesn’t 
mean that our values have changed or that we are going to ignore major issues that need to 
be reported on. (C.S., personal communication, December 13, 2017) 
Due to its working relationship with the Commissariat and its sustained funding from large 
international donors like Oxfam, Belgraid was considered by a number within the field, 
particularly smaller organizations, to be a recent example of a professionalized independent 
organization. Thus, it is important to note the way in which the employee framed the organization 
as being strategic in how they approached delicate institutional issues while emphasizing the 
absence of any ideological changes.  
 Put simply, most organizations, independent or not, have ambitions to expand the size and 
scope of their projects and in order to do that it is necessary to secure new means of funding. A 
figure from another small independent group which has previously relied on crowdfunding and 
collaborative grants echoed this issue: 
Next year we want to become much more specialized and we want to go a lot maybe next 
year open up a couple of schools and do a lot more community outreach projects and really 
sort of professionalize our organization and maybe get a lot more business consultants, 
which we've done in the past few months, and really try to develop as best as possible and 
expand and I think that's when we're really going to be applying for a lot more grants and 
so that will maybe change the dynamic. Maybe we will be competing with a lot more NGOs 
but I don't really know how that will play out. (D.V., personal communication, December 
18, 2017) 
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This speaks to the need for many organizations interested in expansion to institutionalize 
themselves, to an extent, in order to become more attractive candidates for grants.  
Even No Name Kitchen, an organization which shows an impressive devotion to the ideals 
of solidarity, horizontal organizing, and alternative political structures, acknowledged an interest 
in expansion which may require more traditional funding sources. Although their funding currently 
comes from individual donations from mainly volunteers and people who know volunteers, one of 
the organization’s leaders acknowledged that “maybe if one government wants to give us money 
to do something, we will see who is the government, what kind of funding they give us, to do what, 
then we will see” (B.A., personal communication, December 20, 2017). This is not to say that the 
organization has lapsed on its desire to “do things differently”, rather it is should be seen as a 
nuanced mediation of the logistical realities of humanitarian work.  
The incentives which new organizations face to professionalize are strong and this has been 
observable to actors within the community. One employee from MSF remarked on the 
independent, volunteer-based organization Belgraid and noted its recent shift towards a more 
professional orientation: 
All of those...non-organized groups, or self-organized groups, [sic] then they change, they 
shift, they take positions. For example now we have Belgraid, Belgraid is an NGO. It 
started as a group of different volunteers with the different backgrounds, now it is kind of 
an institutionalized body, which has also a clear position, but that still keeps inside of a 
certain tradition, if you want to say. So you also have this kind of hybrid development on 
positioning which are also very interesting because, it is a process, again, on how certain 
initiatives then if they want to continue they also need to adapt to a certain way of operating 
which is regulated by institutions, by states, by the fact that this is an institutionalized 
response. It is not any more an emergency response. (A.C. #2, personal communication, 
December 15, 2017) 
To this end, there is observable pressure exerted onto NGOs by institutional actors in Serbia. This 
influence was observed as being manifested through funding pressure and control over access to 
camps. Many of the younger groups in particular saw this influence as manifested through pressure 
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on their organizations to professionalize so as to better be able to compete for grants and camp 
access. Importantly, this exertion of influence is by no means direct, or perhaps even the result of 
a conscious policy effort, rather it is the manifestation of a system-wide process of vetting. This 
process, by its very nature, tends to moderate the contentious actions of the very groups it relies 
on. In my closing section, I will develop some conclusions from this overview of the organizational 
field and the types of NGOs active in the field in Serbia.  
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V - Conclusion 
 
 
“[Working with] the European Union, it is always like a pact with the Devil in a way...they 
will start to  push their own activities that they want to see, that is the problem with the 
European Union always.”  
-  S. T.  
 
“Any organization that has any level of issues with the Commissariat and the government, 
will just not be able to get access into the camps.”  
- D. V.  
 
 
This paper has sought to analyze the ways in which refugee assistance organizations 
operate and develop their operational strategies in light of a changing work landscape. Moreover, 
it attempted to contextualize these strategies within the greater context of the “organizational field” 
in order to develop an understanding of how state and international institutions influence the 
actions and decisions of NGOs. This is an important area of research not only because there has 
been relatively little scholarship done on the impact of the migration crisis on the behavior of 
NGOs, but also because it informs the broader discussion on the strategies humanitarian NGOs 
deploy in contentious environments to accomplish their goals. More broadly, it will also shed light 
on the overall role state and international institutions play in NGO work. 
To reiterate, this thesis has put forth several findings which shed light on the way in which 
refugee assistance NGOs develop and deploy organizational practices. First, I outlined four distinct 
patterns of organizational structure that exist within the community of NGOs providing assistance 
to refugees and migrants in Serbia. These ideal organizational types were referred to as 
independent organizations, international organizations, institutional domestic organizations, and 
non-institutional domestic organizations. These four categories provide a way of characterizing 
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the general management structure and project focus of organizations; however, it is recognized 
that within these ideal-types, organizational activities vary widely.  
Second, I discussed the practical implications of Serbia’s organizational field, conceived 
of as the range of grievances, resource flows, political opportunities, and cultural framings which 
come together to shape the appropriate organizational structures, goals, and methods of operation 
in a field of NGO action. To this end, I argued that the field presents certain institutional incentives 
to mediate organizational activity. Primary amongst these factors is the funding landscape as well 
as the interests and behavior of three main groups of institutional actors: the Serbian state, the EU, 
and international institutions like the UNHCR. In particular, the effect of these institutions works 
to professionalize the organizational activity and structure of NGOs. This is accomplished within 
the Serbian case primarily via soft control over funding flows and the control over access to camps.  
 In this final chapter I elaborate on these findings by putting forth an argument which ties 
the moderating characteristics of the organizational field to a rationality of governance that 
strategically utilizes NGO-work to accomplish its goals. Through the soft mechanisms of 
organizational influence, such as control over access and funding, a dynamic is produced wherein 
NGOs function not only as subjects of governance but also as participants of governance. This 
argument is rooted in Foucault's concept of governmentality which refers to an “indirect form of 
power exerted upon a population through a configuration of institutions, ideas, routines and 
procedures to induce individual subjects to govern themselves” (Richter, 2008, p. 1). According 
to Foucault, modern political institutions do not exert power over society; they exert power through 
society. They act upon the “field of possibilities” of others’ actions’ to construct subjects who 
govern themselves (Foucault, 1982, p. 790).  Importantly, government in this sense is not limited 
to the formal institutions and policies of the state, but refers to the entire repertoire of institutions, 
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procedures, analytical techniques, strategies and practices configured to shape human behavior 
towards a particular end (Richter, 2008 on Foucault, 1994a:  220). 
As Sending and Neumann (2006) argue, the role of NGOs in carrying out global 
governance functions is expressive of a changing rationality, or logic, of governance “by which 
civil society is redefined from a passive object of government to be acted upon into an entity that 
is both an object and a subject of government” (p. 652). In this reconfigured logic of governance 
the “self-association and political will-formation characteristic of civil society and non-state actors 
do not stand in opposition to the political power of the state, but is a most central feature of how 
power, understood as government, operates in late modern society” (Sending & Neumann, 2008, 
p. 658). States utilize the ability of civil society to act as reliable sources of expertise and 
assistance, as opposed to traditional state institutions, which in turn renders them central 
participants in such processes of governance. To this end, for the Serbian case, it is within the 
Serbian state’s interest and intent to professionalize and institutionalize NGOs to an extent, while 
simultaneously emphasizing their autonomous and flexible capacities. These organizations help 
fill gaps in the assistance of refugees and migrants which the state is unwilling or unable to provide. 
Crucially, professionalization leads the groups to become more active participants in governance 
insofar as they begin to envision and conduct their work through established channels of assistance, 
such as camp-based care or policy development, which upholds the state’s sovereignty over 
borders, human movement, and the asylum process.  
An interdependent relationship then characterizes the dynamic in which institutional actors 
require the unique skill-sets and adaptability of NGOs to further their policy goals, whereas NGOs 
require the monetary assistance, access, and legitimacy that cooperation with IGOs and state 
institutions afford. In doing so, NGOs become both subjects, limited by access and funding 
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constraints, and objects of governance. Importantly, this field of influence is both enabled and 
constrained by its powerful institutions. It has finite boundaries of control against which it is 
possible for organizations to navigate and push back.  
 
The Return to Normalcy  
In terms of the refugee crisis in Serbia, the constraints and pressures applied to refugee 
assistance organizations work, broadly speaking, towards the interest of the Serbian state, the 
European Union, and international institutions. Refugee assistance organizations provide 
humanitarian support in cases where the state does not or cannot provide support.  
Where this relationship becomes more blurred, however, is in the cases of refugee 
assistance organizations which work in direct contention with the state. The local No Borders 
group and, to a lesser extent, ideologically driven solidarity groups like No Name Kitchen present 
a challenge to this relationship due to their ability to facilitate activities such as contentious 
political protests or illegal border crossings and run in direct contrast with the European Union’s 
border regime. Their avoidance of traditional funding models further insulates them from this 
influence.  
To this end, it should be observed that while NGOs may function within the broader 
interests of state governance, there are methods and manners to which they may push back against 
this role. This can be achieved more visibly by organizations which work in direct contention with 
the state. The organizational style of these groups push against the traditional conceptions of 
humanitarian assistance and organizational structure and present an altogether new approach to 
solidarity activism. Importantly, more professionalized groups have also demonstrated their 
capacity to push against the normalizing effects of the organizational field through strategic 
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actions. Info Park, a grassroots initiative which has professionalized into an established Serbian 
NGO in the past several years, continues to engage in the sorts of advocacy and projects which 
have typically been relegated to independent groups in Serbia.  
Importantly, this should not be taken to mean that established, professional groups such as 
the Belgrade Center for Human Rights or the Danish Refugee Council do not engage in cases of 
contentious political advocacy or express dissent against controversial state decisions. Rather, this 
argument seeks to highlight how the organizational approaches to refugee assistance by these 
groups tends to be conducted within established professional channels which in turn carries certain 
implications. This paper argues that the very act of becoming “professional” is a culmination of 
the strategic mediation of the desire to ensure the ongoing ability for these groups to assist refugees 
and migrants.  
In the context of a stabilizing refugee situation, such as the one in Serbia in 2017, the future 
goals of refugee assistance organizations incentivized many groups to present themselves in such 
a way as to be able to secure continued funding and access to state-run camps. As the needs of 
refugees and migrants began to change, at least in the eyes of institutional actors, so too did the 
funding and access opportunities of the organizational field. One employee of MSF reflected upon 
this: 
The whole point is to come back to normality....the response is over, the emergency 
response is over, this should be part of the normal administration. Because the numbers are 
going down so there is no need any more to have all this machine[ry], to have all this 
money, all this external donors because otherwise then there also is the legitimization of 
the state, the weakness of the aid institutions...which is one of the risks in general terms, 
about the introduction of NGOs. (A.C. #2, personal communication, December 15, 2017) 
To this end, the return to “normality” which state and international institutions seek is consistent 
with the broader hegemonic discourses on migration and securitization.  
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This discourse on migration characterizes the rising numbers of people seeking to claim 
asylum as a “crisis” or a “flood” of refugees; it is portrayed as a momentary aberration in the 
normal state of affairs for the developed countries of Europe. From a position of crisis, then, the 
chief desire is to a return to normalcy. For the Serbian case, the “return to normalcy” has been 
characterized by the containment and sequestration of refugees and migrants in state-run centers 
which exist out of the public eye.  
Importantly, this initiative to securitize the movement of refugees and migrants within the 
country was not initially accompanied by any viable paths towards long-term residency which 
relates to a key underlying tension in the refugee assistance field in Serbia: no one originally 
thought of the country as a permanent destination. The testimony of the hundreds of refugees and 
migrants who attempt to cross into the EU from Serbia every month, only to be violently pushed 
back by Croatian and Hungarian border police, speaks for itself. Just the same as the hundreds of 
thousands who crossed the country in the summer of 2015, very few intended to stay in Serbia. 
Importantly, this belief was also a cornerstone of the Serbian state’s approach to refugees and 
migrants in the country: 
PM Aleksandar Vučić built national consensus on migrants by stressing two main points: 
first, by nurturing the idea that refugees would not settle in the country and, hence, Serbia 
would not have to offer them permanent asylum and, second, that Serbia had the duty to 
assist migrants as a way to accelerate its path towards EU membership. (Milan & Pirro, 
2018) 
There was a certain eagerness with which the Serbian state accepted the task of facilitating the 
movement of refugees and migrants, as temporary, transiting individuals, through its borders. 
Prime Minister Vučić said in September of 2015 that "Serbia has not put up fences or barbed wire. 
It would be easy for us [to do so], while you in the EU were silent, when the fence was being 
erected.” Elaborating in a later social media post, Vučić touted Serbia’s response to the refugee 
situation by stating that "Serbia will receive a certain number of migrants. This makes us more 
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European than some member states. We don't build fences" (Avramović & Jovanović, 2015). The 
situation began to change drastically in Serbia with the closure of the EU borders surrounding the 
country in March of 2016. Since then, the public perception of refugees and migrants, as potentially 
permanent residents within the country, has had a large impact on state rhetoric. In the summer of 
2017, Vučić, now President, said that Serbia cannot be a "parking lot for Afghanis and Pakistanis 
who other countries don’t wish to see, let alone accept" (Rudić, 2017). 
The Open Letter issued to international humanitarian and non-governmental organizations 
providing support to refugees and migrants in Serbia represented the beginning of the state’s push 
to securitize the crisis and return to normalcy. There were two important implications attached to 
the Serbian government’s claim that it was no longer acceptable to provide direct assistance and 
support to refugees and migrants residing outside of the government’s asylum and transit centers. 
First, it signaled the beginning of the end of the state’s tacit acceptance of unregistered refugees 
and migrants within its borders. The refugee populations living in abandoned squats in downtown 
Belgrade or in the border towns of Šid, Subotica, Sombor, and Horgoš, would no longer function 
with the level of impunity with which they had been afforded in the summers of 2015 and 2016. 
Second, from an institutional standpoint, this also signaled the implicit disapproval of any groups 
which continued to provide assistance to refugees and migrants living outside of the state system.  
Although the Open Letter was not a formal piece of legislation, it carried weighty 
implications for NGOs in the field: conform to government’s script of acceptable assistance or risk 
the costs of a jeopardized relationship with the Serbian state. As one NGO worker reflected:  
It was just a fear tactic to kind of scare people off from providing aid, and it all 
worked...because they didn’t want to lose their organization, and everyone sort of did risk 
assessments for what they sort of can do and can’t do, and how to do [it], and started to 
rely on more independent volunteers to do things because they wouldn’t be as likely to get 
in trouble or be here as long, or independent organizations. (D.V. personal communication, 
December 18, 2017) 
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A figure from the Info Park echoed this point and remarked that after the Open Letter was issued 
many domestic NGOs were afraid of continuing to provide direct support because they didn’t want 
to risk losing their permission to provide assistance to refugees and migrants in Serbia. 
Importantly, he also remarked that in addition to this fear, “organizations were somehow 
indoctrinated in a way that the institutional support is the only one which is proper...so basically 
the camps and the registration is the only way to support refugees and migrants” (S.T., #2, personal 
communication, December 12, 2017).  
To this end, we can track the professionalization of NGOs in the Serbian refugee response 
to the concurrent institutionalization of refugees and migrants within state-run asylum and transit 
camps. Following notions of governmentality developed by Foucault, NGOs are subject to an 
indirect form of power which induces groups to conduct themselves in conducive to the interest of 
the state which are, in this case, the securitization and control over refugees and migrants. By and 
large, domestic Serbian organizations did cease in the direct assistance of refugees and migrants 
outside of the state system. Independent, non-professional groups, unphased by the threat of a 
jeopardized relationship with Serbian state, then rushed in shortly after to fill this void.  
Importantly, this period also witnessed the professionalization of two assistance groups, 
Refugee Aid Miksalište and Info Park which Milan and Pirro (2018) identify as two of the most 
important independent groups in Serbia during the summer of 2015. It is of note that in the time 
frame of my study, between March, 2016 and June, 2017, these two Serbian organizations had 
professionalized into established NGOs and somewhat relinquished their identities as civic, 
solidarity, mobilizations. This is partly due to a shift in personnel as many of the original volunteers 
and staff of these organizations left to be replaced by hired professionals. Importantly, the adoption 
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of a more professional organizational identity is also likely due in part to the changing funding and 
access requirements of a long-term assistance organization in Serbia. 
As the circumstances of refugees and migrants began to become normalized within state 
structures, so too, did the heterogeneity of the NGOs providing assistance to this population. This 
point alludes to the moderating effect of the organizational field. Consistent with this finding, 
previous work has found that in fields which are strictly controlled and moderated, institutional 
actors are more likely to have clearly defined scripts of behavior which are passed down from 
higher- to lower- level organizations. Conversely, “in fields with no clear hierarchy...isomorphism 
takes place more subtly” (Ron, 1997, p. 277). To this end, one might argue that Serbia’s hectic 
transition from a transit state to a holding state, where the standard procedures of camp-based care 
and state control over migration were absent, provided the perfect environment for a heterogeneous 
community of NGOs to grow. As the situation began to be normalize under state structures, there 
began to be a greater pressure for organizations conform a certain script of presentability which 
would allow them to compete for camp access and funding.  
Accordingly, the pressure to demonstrate legitimacy within a normalizing organizational 
field are high and in response to these pressures, many NGOs develop structures and behaviors to 
respond to and fend off claims of illegitimacy. As Ron (1997) writes, “over time, organizations 
learn what types of response to audits are legitimate and what types of external structure they 
should adopt to maintain the proper aura of respectability” (p. 277).  
The strategic, organizational changes of NGOs active in the field of refugee assistance in 
Serbia navigate the constraints and conditions imposed upon them by the organizational field. “As 
the environment changes, some forms of behavior become stigmatized while others become 
acceptable. Actors seeking to boost their reputations will want to reflect the new criteria for 
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evaluation, even if they do not believe in the substantive value of the new symbols themselves” 
(Ron, 1997, p. 279). Importantly, as Ann Swidler (1995) writes, "what governs action in this case 
is not individuals' internalized beliefs, but their knowledge of what meanings their actions have 
for others” (p. 8). 
 To this end, NGOs involved in migration constitute, perhaps unwillingly, a crucial 
component of state migration policy. In subtle ways, neoliberal conceptions of camp-based care 
and governance are reinforced by the interdependence which these actors entertain. The 
securitization of migration by institutional actors is made easier, not harder, by this relationship. 
Importantly, the organizational field has finite boundaries of control to which it is possible 
for organizations to navigate and push back against. True opportunities emerged in the context of 
the refugee crisis for independent, non-professional organizations like No Name Kitchen or 
Rigardu to engage in radical acts of solidarity which subvert the traditional notions of assistance 
and control. These groups define themselves through their opposition to hierarchical, institution-
driven forms of humanitarian assistance which they view as inadequate or unwilling to meet the 
needs of refugee and migrant populations. As one figure from the organizations said to me in 
passing, “we really believe that we can do things different” (B.A., personal communication, 
December 20, 2017). Their acts can be interpreted as reactions to the poor responsiveness of public 
authorities and traditional assistance networks. Through their reliance on crowdfunding, non-
professional, volunteer-based assistance these initiatives aim to overcome the limited financial and 
human resources available to non-professional organizations in support of migrant populations. 
Their reliance and their aversion to camp-based care for refugees and migrants in turn allows them 
to engage in this work without direct cooperation with the state.  
Additionally, the fact that these groups are often spontaneously formed by ideologically 
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driven foreigners further diminished their need to play by the rules of respectability and plan for 
future considerations of domestic cooperation. The practice of radical solidarity, such as these 
groups engage in, inherently pushes against the borders of the supposedly self-contained 
organizational field which leverages the future goals and pragmatism of traditional NGOs against 
the desires of state authorities to control and securitize migration.  
Importantly, it should be understood that, while perhaps less explicit, professional 
organizations can push back against this as well. While independent groups with little interests in 
career-building are particularly resistant to this form of influence, other organizations within this 
study exhibited strategic, professional behavior while simultaneously engaging in norm 
challenging methods of assistance. Info Park serves as an excellent example of a domestic 
organization which has professionalized, to a certain extent, while still maintaining a strong 
workplace culture of civic engagement.  
MSF, as an international organization, displayed similar tendencies. As a large, established, 
international organization, it has shown an impressive commitment to engaging in contentious 
advocacy for issues involving refugees and migrants in Serbia. This has most notably consisted of 
its publication of reports cataloguing and condemning the violence of EU-country authorities on 
the borders of Serbia. Additionally, it has engaged in a number of actions which defy the expressed 
wishes of the Serbian government, such as their decision to provide direct medical assistance to 
the residents of the Barracks from a tent they set up on the premises of the squat in January 2017. 
Perhaps most importantly, the group has shown its willingness to engage in close cooperation with 
non-traditional, non-professional independent groups in recognition of the unique skills and 
abilities that these groups possess. As one figure from the organization explained, 
An alternative response can be efficient rather than investing so much money in an 
institutional response, I'm not saying that the two things cannot cooperate together,  I'm 
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just saying that we have to recognize the role all of the non-traditional actors, especially in 
this context. (A.C. #2, personal communication, December 15, 2017) 
The malleability of this organization’s approach to politically contentious issues is likely rooted in 
several factors. The historical ideology and tradition of certain groups, such as MSF, are rooted in 
the notion that humanitarian assistance is inherently a politically contentious process. In fact, the 
organization was formed as a result of a group of doctors’ resistance to the apolitical stance that 
the Red Cross has historically prescribed itself (Omaar & de Waal, 1994). As a result, a workplace 
culture has developed inside of MSF which accepts a certain amount of “political script deviation” 
from its project managers and employees which other organizations might shy away from. 
Additionally, the group benefits from its international and recognizable character. An 
internationally recognized group like MSF can often “get away” with much more than smaller, 
domestic groups which lack the platform of MSF. Further, as an organization which is only 
temporarily engaged with the refugee situation in Serbia, their group escapes some of the intense 
pressure which domestic groups face to preserve their relationship with state actors.  
 To this end, it must be understood that while the pressures NGOs encounter to enact 
governance from a professionalized standpoint are strong, they are also finite. Certain 
organizations develop strategies and structures which challenge the state’s traditional control over 
humanitarian assistance and human movement.  
 
Further Research 
This research is not an exhaustive look at refugee assistance organizations and the 
institutional pressures they encounter. Accordingly, there are a number of places which subsequent 
research might expand upon. Further studies would certainly benefit by shedding light on the 
extensive fields of assistance which have also developed around Greece and in Calais, France. 
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Although I devote some space to the analysis of non-professional, solidarity mobilizations, there 
is certainly further room to expand our understanding of these groups. Of particular interest is the 
connection between these groups and their political cultures which, in many cases, is rooted in 
anarchist political theory and practice. 
Additionally, while the dynamics surrounding cross-organizational cooperation between 
NGOs has received a great deal of attention from scholars recently, the local dynamics of 
cooperation between refugee assistance groups and the people which receive their help present an 
equally interesting opportunity for further research. In particular, the role in which refugees and 
migrants play in the development and practice of these solidarity networks is sorely under-
researched.  
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Appendix 
 
 
Table 1. Interviews Chart. This table reflects the various participant individuals whom I 
interviewed for the purposes of this thesis.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
